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0.2 Abstract
The thesis characterises conditions under which holdout and violence in land ac-
quisition for industrial progress arise precisely because of the interplay between
imperfections like bureaucratic corruption, legal and extra-legal influence of polit-
ical parties and motivated civic societies, that are endemic to LDCs and distort
property rights. At first, it introduces and characterises conditions for buyer-
induced holdout in which a buyers optimal acquisition design strategically imple-
ments holdout as a response to these imperfections. Among other results, it devel-
ops testable hypotheses suggesting that buyer- induced holdout (i) increases with
a reduction in bureaucratic corruption if the existing imperfections are significant,
(ii) increases with an increase in ease of political opposition to land acquisition
and (iii) is more likely to occur closer to elections than otherwise. If political
parties can impose credible threats and act coercively, its impact on the size of
sale and on price are interestingly nuanced. It then studies the implications of
this holdout on sellers welfare and overall economic surplus, that shows (a) small
improvements in institutions can have immiserising effect on economic surplus,
(b) seller welfare decreases with worsening of political institutions, even though
the very existence of opposition is good while the impact of fall in corruption is
nuanced. The thesis then shows that, in democratic societies while property rights
are legally provided so that land seizure is difficult and consent for sale is practiced
through landowners voting, interplay between institutional imperfections infringe
such decisions, creating potential for local political violence. While efficiency can
still be achieved, there are possibilities of low level equilibrium trap and violent
agitations, discarding industrialisation. But violence occurs only if there is early
mobilisation of resources for post-voting violence. Interestingly, opposition may
prefer a late mobilisation of resources even if the results go against its ideology.
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“Wherever there is great property, there is great inequality.” “. . . in
the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a
principle of motion of its own, altogether different from that which
the legislature might choose to impress upon it. If those two
principles coincide and act in the same direction, the game of human
society will go on easily and harmoniously, and is very likely to be
happy and successful. If they are opposite or different, the game will
go on miserably, and the society must be at all times in the highest
degree of disorder.”
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations.
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0.3 Introduction
Democracy empowers eligible citizens to engage and participate in decisions that
shape their society. Members of a democratic society are entitled to a rule of law
that ensures legal equality amongst all its residents and the political freedom that
authorises them to choose and replace their government without bringing in rev-
olution. Such society adheres to the protection of individual rights, that not only
ensures active and respectful participation of its civilians in politics and in public
life but also shapes and mandates good governance. Thus democracy is construc-
tive – on one hand it is moral as it allows citizens to express their opinion and on
the other hand it is rational as it aggregates individual information that enhances
efficiency of social decisions. But as Abraham Lincoln once famously quoted that
“no man is good enough to govern another man without that other’s consent”,
democratic governments are ought to enjoy such ‘consent’ with pragmatic mech-
anisms that otherwise results in imperfections in democracies with repercussion
effects. This PhD dissertation is concerned about such aspects of democratic soci-
eties, which despite their constitutional provisions lead to imperfection as seen all
over the less developed world, in light of the issues arising out of acquiring land
for industrial development.
In the post liberalisation era, in its search for an optimal course of develop-
ment for LDCs the traditional approach to industrialisation primarily focuses on
the accumulation of physical capital which then gradually transferred to the ac-
cumulation of human capital.1 Land as an impediment in the process was ‘safely
ignored’ by both of these schools of thoughts as its relative availability for in-
dustry or infrastructure was often insignificant (Sarkar, 2007). However, with
the ever rising population pressure and fragmented landholdings this eventually
becomes a central issue in driving conflicts. Agreeably the use-value of land is
expected to rise when used in a ‘developmental’ project ranging from building
Special Economic Zones (SEZs), power plants, highways, dams to private indus-
1For example, literary works of Lewis (1954) and Dixit (1973) emphasise on the accumulation
of physical capital and the works of Romer (1986,1990) and Lucas (1988) emphasise on the
accumulation of human capital.
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tries, commercial agriculture, real estate and slum developments. But instead of
passing on the promised ‘spill over’ effects onto the society, land transfers for these
more often result in ‘land grabs’, forceful evictions, scams, perturbed deals, and
even bloodsheds. These not only turned down the idea of this so called inclusive
development but also demean the core elements of democracy – equality, respon-
siveness, accountability and transparency. It is so because while constitutions of
these societies impart mechanisms to encourage impartiality and deliberative gov-
ernance, it is their institutional infirmities that fail to uphold and complement
these elements, resulting in what I term as imperfect democracy.2
Conflicts over land-use changes that turned out to be the ‘biggest problem’ in
African, Latin American, Central and Southeast Asian development, have been
subjected to huge media coverage over the last two decades. Given the demand
for vast area of well connected land for industrial development, that happens to be
found in use for agriculture or forestry with large fragmentations in these heavily
populated economies, acquisition of farmland has taken the centre-stage for such
conflicts. The issue is intriguing for two reasons. First, that there is a lack of
availability of land that can be readily transferred without affecting the lives and
livelihoods of inhabitants. Second, that the numbers involved are rather aston-
ishing – millions of dollars for a single acre of urban land which is multiple of its
rural counterpart and hundreds of thousands of dispossessed and affected popu-
lation from a single project. At the surface, the problem seems to confine to the
inadequacy of compensation packages and the lack of options for the dispossessed
occupants outside their traditional livelihood. But the root of the problem goes far
beyond that, with the skewed land distribution, overlapping property rights, the
expropriation and redistribution policies, improper adherence to the rule of law
and bureaucratic corruption, that are more prominent in LDCs. Even the enact-
ment of ‘eminent domain’ law that allows government to confiscate private land for
public purposes in exchange of just compensation did not appear to be helpful, if
2To affine perfection in democracies it is not sufficient to build a static set of constitutional
provisions, it requires continuous evaluation to identify ways in which the elements of democracy
overlap and better complement each other so that improvement along one dimension brings along
the improvement of others (Vermeule, 2007, Diamond and Morlino, 2004). This demands for an
indisputable role of well functioning institutions, in particular legal and political institutions.
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not have worsen the matter. It is fetching attention of not only politicians and pol-
icy makers but almost every spectrum of modern society – from environmentalists,
developers, activists to agriculturists, rural wage-earners and urban elites.
In order to cope with it a surge of literary works have emerged towards un-
derstanding the determinants of just compensation and effective redistribution
packages. But as the issue is clearly complex, overlapping and have multiple di-
mensions in a LDC framework, direction towards solving one aspect often raises
many others, making once-and-for-all solutions inapplicable. Apparently as the
value of land that is being acquired for industrial or infrastructure development
manifolds with its commercialisation, farmers and landholders balk to exchange
their land at a price based on its current ‘market value’. In fact in absence of well-
functioning land markets such valuations becomes less credible due to the admin-
istrative inefficiencies resulting in outdated, inaccurate land records and distorted
land prices. But there are also groups of landholders who refuse to sell their land at
any price, primarily because land possesses history, security and high attachment
value to them and secondly due to their untransferable skill set reducing future
employability, their preference irrationalities or lack of financial inclusivity in ru-
ral areas. All these resulting in relatively inelastic supply of land and when set
against the commercial gain from changing its current use, have led to proliferation
of pitched clashes threatening both current and future flow of investments in these
economies. However each clash seems to be different from the other – in the way
they unfold, their history and political contexts, and with the non/involvement
of outside intrusion. Thus while the consensus over land transfers, renegotiations
over compensation or bargaining schemes seems to be successful in some cases,
they fail to mitigate conflicts in others. Moreover these clashes often seek gov-
ernment mediation but evidences suggest that such involvement often turns into
‘wedge issue’ politics that the parties use to gain political mileage in upcoming
elections (I will return to this point in Chapter 3 (Section 0.12)). Very few eco-
nomic literature have considered inefficiencies in the land acquisition for industries
in light of political imperfections. It is crucial to look beyond the issue of compen-
sation and resettlement arrangements and dedicate research towards providing a
‘political economy based’ foundation of the land acquisition process.
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Political intervention - Why, how and to what extent?
The political-economic context of this massive demand for land can be explained
with the development model followed by developing economies in the post-liberalisation
era. Extensive investment requirements for industry, power generation, ports, air-
ports, telecommunications and real estates are factually inseparable from infras-
tructure development and investments undertaken in these sectors mostly follow
the public-private partnership (PPP) model of development. For instance, Indian
government anticipates that in order to stay away from bottlenecks in the country’s
industrial growth and inflation, India’s investment in infrastructure should reach
7.6% of GDP, or around US$ 514.04 billion by the end of the Eleventh Plan (2007
to 2012) and grow a further of 1.5% during the Twelfth Plan (2012 - 2017).3 Since
the resources required to meet such demand for investment exceed the capacity
of public sector, it necessitate private investment through appropriate forms of
PPPs. Report from planning commission of India suggests that the share of in-
frastructural investment by private corporations are on a rise in the country – from
36.61% of the required investment during the Eleventh Plan to a stunning 48.14%
during the Twelfth Plan.4 The picture is not very different in other developing
economies specially in the African and South American region.
Clearly, expansion of infrastructure through PPP models has transformed these
traditional public goods, being provided by the state government, into profit-
making ventures that renders ‘commodities’ to be transacted in the international
financial markets. Thus infrastructural development schemes (such as SEZs) pro-
vide incentives for private corporations to develop land for industrial use and often
3See< http : //planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/11th/11 v1/11v1 ch12.pdf >
and < http : //planningcommission.gov.in/plans/planrel/12thplan/pdf/12fyp vol1.pdf >
4Being the largest market for private investment in infrastructure amongst the devel-
oping world, it is not rare that in some sectors neoliberal India attracts even more than
half of its share of investment from private corporations, largely in the form of PPP.
For example, during the year 2011 alone it attracted 98% of the share of South Asian
regional investments, that help implementing 43 new projects in the region and posi-
tioned India in the league of developed economies like Republic of Korea and Japan
on implementation of PPP projects for infrastructure development. See < http :
//planningcommission.gov.in/plans/planrel/12thplan/pdf/12fyp vol1.pdf >
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facilitated them by allocating surplus land and/or by providing leniency in leas-
ing land. The problem is, private accumulation of land is rather prolonged and
costly as large chunk of land comes under small-holding peasantry and the land-
holders’ unwillingness to give up their traditional livelihood as discussed earlier.
Thus while on one hand it is crucial to retain the inflow of investments to trigger
the growth agenda, on the other hand an assurance is required that such schemes
must resolute in principles. Thus the formulation and execution of projects must
endure public interest in achieving additional capacity and deliver affordable and
quality public service. But this calls for an environment where the market is itself
competitive providing consumers a choice among alternative suppliers and vice
versa, as well as the transparency in regulations to ensure standards of services,
which the LDCs fail to deliver.
Outdated and inaccurate land records make land transfers further difficult gen-
erating issues with property rights. Fragmentation of land not only increases the
cost of direct negotiations but almost inevitably induces the problem of holdout
that strategically raises price of land resulting in inefficiency. Thus even if the
government would prefer to refrain from the political cost of acquiring peasants’
land for large private enterprises, its mediation seems necessary to continue with
this synchronous model of neoliberal development, aiming for broad-based inclu-
sive growth and for bridging rural-urban divide. Finally, one cannot discard the
possibility that the inefficiency in land administration, the prevailing communal
conflicts over land, unavailability of land market would not create an information
asymmetry, which the private investors will not exploit to make profitable land
deals. Further while a regulatory watchdog for such development schemes is an
absolute necessity, conflict resolution via court proceedings are rather prolonged
owing to the endemic legal institutional inefficiencies in LDCs. All these put to-
gether therefore drive government intervention in the process of acquiring land for
infrastructure development, that almost inevitably brings in political influence in
the matter.5
5This is supported by the report of Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) commissioned by the
Asian Development Bank (ADB), which shows private investment and PPP schemes for infras-
tructure development have been driven by strong political will in rapidly growing economies and
have been successful in advancement of public capacity and processes. For detail refer to study by
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Following the above discussion one can easily understands the associated rev-
enue generating aspects for the state and the involvement of the state ruling party
in the process. The fact that the affected people almost always belonged to the
socially and economically marginal sections of the society, for example, tribes,
etc. also induce such involvement.6 Agitations over land acquisition, both for and
against, however have seen the involvement of several kinds of ‘agents’ including
the ruling political party, buyers and sellers. In conflicting scenarios opposition
may come from a much wider spectrum of stakeholders, that includes various in-
terest groups like the civil society organisations (such as NGOs) and other political
parties typically out of office. There are many instances when agitations are ini-
tiated and carried out by interest groups who are ideologically motivated and in
others, while the issue may be initiated by one or more interest groups, political
parties step in later, and either take over from these interest groups, or conduct
the agitation in partnership with them. This is discussed further with examples
in Chapter 1, Section 0.4. There are plenty of examples in the LDC context when
political involvement appeared to have led to a grievances and pitched battles.7
All the next four chapters carry a detail discussion of many such scenarios while
some of them are mentioned in the following section to develop arguments.
Besides these ‘growth’ and ‘social justice’ factors, there are other crucial fac-
tors to influence such political involvement (for a discussion of the Indian scenario
one can refer to Chakravorty, 2013). First, is the active participation of media
which would ensure greater political mileage in case of involvement, irrespective of
whether in support or in opposition. Second, is the involvement and active partic-
ipation of interest groups in the concerned area, who not only provide necessary
EIU, retrieved from < https : //www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/158409/2014 −
infrascope.pdf >
6In the Indian context, in post-independence era there was a broad political consensus that
land acquisition, be it for building dams and public sector factories or for expanding roadways
and railways, had to be done for the sake of the nation despite being costly for those who are
displaced.
7In Indian context, such examples include active involvement of state governments in land
acquisition for industrialisation in West Bengal, Orissa, Jharkhand and Himachal Pradesh (this
is detailed in Chapter 1). Pons-Vignon and LeComte (2004) suggest that in economies like
Bangladesh, political interference follows when the differences between local and state politicians
results in land disputes and violence.
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information and support to the affected landowners, but also coordinate the initial
resistance and creates potential ‘flash-points’ which political parties can readily ex-
ploit. Further, intervention becomes politically more attractive in presence of large
land fragmentation which increases the number of affected people, and along with
economic development this creates a need to acquire multiple pieces of land.
Motivation
The thesis is motivated by a number of recent incidents of acquiring land for indus-
trial and infrastructural purposes, but there are some that need to be highlighted.
One being the infamous incident in West Bengal, an agriculture based state in
India, that was not only under continuous attention of media but also has con-
tributed to turn the political fate of 34 years old state ruling party. In 2006 the
state government (Left-wing) anticipated demand for industrialisation across the
state and brought a leading industry (TATA) to build a car manufacturing factory
in Singur. It claimed to have acquired 997 acres of prime agricultural land and the
compensation package offered was according to the archaic Land Acquisition Act
of 1894. The incident involves not only the attention of various interest groups that
formed a rainbow coalition, namely Krishi Jomi Bachao Committee (Committee to
Save Farmland), but also various political parties including the main local opposi-
tion party, the Trinamul Congress (TMC, largely driven by populist agenda). The
resistance were initiated against the state involvement in the process and while
poor land owners and sharecroppers fear losing out entirely, some locals and rel-
atively richer land owners have supported the Left-wing party’s industrialisation
agenda. The agitations were dominated by the inefficiencies in land assessments
and lack of procedural consultation and took the form of bloody violence after
being heavily politicised and with the misuse of government machineries. The
project was eventually scrapped.8
In the following year another incident took place in Nandigram, which be-
comes a ‘news’ that dominated the media and fetch international attention, when
8I will return to this incident in Chapter 1, Section 0.4 and Chapter 3, Section 0.12.
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the same state government of West Bengal, demanded 10,000 acres (4,000 ha) of
agricultural land to develop a SEZ for the Indonesian-based Salim Group to build
a chemical hub. This attempt at land acquisition was again backed by the ruling
Left Front, a coalition of leftist parties, allegedly helped by the local bureaucracy
and police. This results in massive violence, strikes and killings of farmers, threat-
ening the potential investments not only in the state but across nation.9 Although
the protest against this land conversion in Nandigram appears to be different from
that in Singur, the common links between them are the political involvement,
mis-utilisation of government machinery and the infirmities of legal institutions
to tackle conflicts at the very first place. There have been many other incidents
against land acquisition for infrastructure development across India in recent years
which took the very similar framework. Protest in Raigad district of Maharastra
against Mahamumbai SEZ of Reliance Company that resulted in cancellation of
the project and the protest against Himachal Pradesh government when land was
being taken to build an international airport and air cargo hub at Gagret in Una
district are only a few among them.
Similar conflicts in the process of land conversion are evident from across the
LDCs. For example, in Tanzania, East Africa in 1993 a cement manufacturing
company, Twiga Portland Cement Company (TPCC, formerly the Saruji Corpo-
ration) tried to acquire 61 square kilometre of land for their factory extension.
Conflict arises when landowners refuses to vacate their land after being severely
under-compensated and exempted from the promised resettlement area. Despite
the constitutional provision of property rights, the Land Acts and the Physical
Planning Acts, landowners were denied to get the right for being consulted or
being given any chance to negotiate with any authoritative bodies. This took the
form of violence when TPCC practiced a forceful eviction and triggered after being
heavily politicised (Kombe, 2010). In 2009 Nuove Iniziative Indutrialis sri (NIIsri),
an Italian company, propose to acquire 50,000 hectare of land with government
help in Dakatcha Woodlands, Kenya, to develop a bio-fuel plantation and manufac-
turing hub. Although protests from local communities were primarily dominated
9See < http : //www.livemint.com/Politics/I1CAfbH2Uend58UkV ckctV P/The −
Nandigram− story − till − now.html >
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by environmental concerns and were being carried out by environmentalists, this
also indicatively get politicised and eventually get scrapped despite being granted
licence from NEMA (Maggi and Veit, 2013).10
Such disturbing incidents are becoming more challenging for developing world
in recent decades not only to meet the demand for industrial development but
also to meet the global food crisis and to produce environment-friendly fuel sub-
stitutes. On the onset of such developmental schemes there are interplays between
imperfections like bureaucratic corruption and the extra-legal influence of various
stakeholders including political parties and civil society organisations that can un-
derpin each other and distort not only property rights but also human rights that
democratic economies constitutionally provide. Thus while the effort of making
land available for investors lays a fertile ground for economic growth, the proce-
dural inefficiencies often turn this into social turmoil – resulting from violation of
the fundamental rights of democratic citizens to even brutal killings. Although
historically people from the lower socio-economic section pay the largest share of
the ‘price’ for development, with the ease of availability of information, it is now
crucial to have a framework in which development programs adheres to economic
and social sustainability. Economic literature in this area is relatively new yet
rapidly growing, working towards achieving alternative ‘formulae’ to ensure both
equity and efficiency of these projects. But the main problem is the highly con-
textual nature of such conflicts that resulted in large but relatively segregated and
case (at large by country) specific studies across literature. Moreover, there is lack
of consolidated data on the components of imperfections which makes it harder for
policy makers to form effective policy suggestions. I refrain from detail discussion
of the literary work in the introduction and left it onto the successive chapters.
What am I looking at?
This PhD dissertation is concerned about aspects of imperfect democracy seen
all over the less developed world in the context of acquiring land for industrial
10I will discuss more examples from LDCs in detail in the subsequent chapters.
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projects. I consider the essence of outside interference and institutional inefficien-
cies in validating electoral competitions, which is the most widely used mechanism
for upholding democracy, and, their effect on decisions pertaining to the sale of
private land. One advantage of this mechanism is that, it efficiently enables large
societies to aggregate individual opinions, which would otherwise be a costly af-
fair. For elections to be free, fair and purposeful the civil society must be entitled
to some degree of freedom, both political and social, to articulate their political
beliefs, ex-ante and ex-post elections. Even so, it is difficult to achieve the heights
of all the dimensions of good democracy through one particular mechanism. Elec-
tions are not any different in this aspect as it naturally invites competitive politics
that may distort aggregate decisions. In particular when motivations of political
parties or ‘agents’ are diverse – they can be opportunistic where a ‘wedge issue’
can serve as an agenda for winning elections and thus their policy preference caters
the same of the mass or special interest groups, or, they are ideologically driven
where their policy preference is the reflection of their respective constituencies.
Albeit, democracy is perfect where strong institutional support make the com-
ponents of democratic system work efficiently, both before and after elections.
Political parties of such democracies are largely unable to either affect outcomes
directly or engage in rent seeking activities because of developed social, economic
and legal institutions so that the mechanism of elections function efficiently and
democracy seem perfectly sustained for these nations. Hence by definition the
notion of democracy and development seem complementary, however there seems
no establishment of this claim in empirical literature (Bardhan, 1999) although
there is little doubt that democracy is fragile in less developed economies where
institutions are imperfect (Przeworski, 2005).
Economic literature on land acquisition is nascent but there is not much theo-
retical work focusing on the impacts of such imperfections stemming from imper-
fect institutional support ex-ante and ex-post elections, leading to various illegal
and unconstitutional acts that defy the basic philosophy of democracy. The present
work is aimed at initiating a rigorous theoretical analysis of land acquisition is-
sues by focusing on the aspects of political influence in the process. It considers
the potential outcome of such imperfections that can range from promotion of
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rent seeking behaviour to political violence both before (vote capture, rigging,
threatening, etc.) and after (street protests, violence, strike, etc.) elections, be it
countrywide or local. The thesis introduces a new notion of holdout that is ‘buyer-
induced’ in such framework without geographic contiguity, preference irrationality
and strategic bargaining, rigorously studied in economic literature. The thesis
considers frameworks for two party competition where party strength is endoge-
nized, decision follows from an apparent free and fair local voting and captures
the essence of bureaucratic corruption and political clientelism which can result in
holdout and violence. The issue is contemporary to the LDCs where on one hand
property rights are constitutionally provided to poor farmers making land seizure
by government legally impossible, while on the other hand, path to development
calls for inevitable demand for land to build manufacturing hubs but efficient mar-
kets for land are hard to come by. Thus striking a balance becomes one of the
central concern for policymakers where such problems of accumulating land for
developmental projects persist.
An assorted repository
The discussion and incidents as mentioned above may primarily give an impres-
sion that ‘failure’ occurs in most of the projects that demanded accumulation of
vast area of connected land. While it is easy to hold such perspective, owing to
the relative absence of information on incidents that were not troublesome (such
as resistance, violence, extended negotiation etc. that has been evidenced for the
cases above) therefore less ‘newsworthy’, in practice neither the measure of land
nor the size of project can held to be the most important determinant for the suc-
cess or failure of land transfers (This is in line with the findings of Chakravorty,
2013). This can be testified with two categories of incidents: first, when large
land transfers has been successful and second, when small portion of land transfer
involved conflict. Example for the first category comes from the success of 302-
km Agra-Lucknow Greenfield expressway project in India, for which nearly 3,000
hectares of fertile, multi-cropped land has been acquired successfully by the UP
Expressway Industrial Development Authority (UPEIDA). Although there were
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some initial discrepancies about the lack of consultation with the concerned land-
holders, the project is considered to be a grand success where 30,074 farmers gave
up their land willingly and in record time, in exchange of compensation through
mutual agreement.11 Similarly, a total of 4,860 acres of land has been successfully
acquired from 700 marginal farmers, over the years of 2007-’08 for a 10 million
tons steel plant project by Jindal Steel in West Bengal’s Salboni village. Interest-
ingly, the size of land being acquired in Singur was smaller and that of Nandigram
was much bigger but both provoked conflicts and criticisms for the same left wing
state government while the success in Salboni defended them.12 Example for the
second category comes from Goa when conflict arises from allotting 613.41 acres
of land by the state government for the development of SEZ in Verna Industrial
Estate. Many other such incidents from India are enlisted in a Table format in the
Appendix B (Section 0.20).
The second point that is worth mentioning here is that the predictability quo-
tient for the outcome of such development schemes are rather low. It is not only
for the fact that each project has its own history and dynamic, and conflicts are
not sourced from definite factors such as size of project, number of affected people,
the amount of land demanded, environmental concerns, government mediation or
a lack of it, but also an onset to a broader spectrum. Each resistance is more
likely to create an information loop that pertains to particular evocative, pointing
towards the necessity of broader correctives in which the land transfer can be least
detrimental.
The third point is, there are large number of cases where land-grab followed
from commercialisation of agriculture by global capital (see for example Margulis
11See < http : //timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Indias− longest−e−way− tells−a−
story − of − land− acquisition− feat/articleshow/47451496.cms >
12Although the terms of conflicts were different in each of these scenarios. There has been
significant delay in Salboni because of continuing Maoist activities in the region, but the credit
of success goes to the compensation scheme comprising a payment in the forms of cash and equity
as well as a guarantee of one job per affected family. In Nandigram the farmers were entirely
against the idea of departing from their land while in Singur only minority of farmers were
against the sell owing to the inefficiencies in land assessment procedures resulting in discriminated
compensations.
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et al. 2013), by domestic transnational capital or in competition with them but
in no way that saved farmers from losing their land and livelihood. Moreover
catering the demand for land by foreign or transnational capital to some extent
explains the ‘urgency’ for the LDC government to lend its support as it secures
the much needed investments. However, it remains questionable when the urgency
clause is applicable and given the politics and economics of land acquisition what
exactly determines such urgency. It is also not clear whether there is any consensus
between the land-acquirer, i.e., the government and/or the private buyer and the
land-loser over such land transactions. There can be scenarios when industrial
development is rather urgent for a state and landowners’ agreement can be achieved
against suitable deals thereby can restore consensus between parties. Success of
land transactions in Gujarat (India) fall in this category13 and arguably the case
of Singur could have also included where a major share of the required land was
transferred to TATA initially. The essence of such consensus is detailed in Chapter
1 (Section 0.4) and Chapter 2 (Section 0.9).
The conflicts often seemingly portray a picture where peasants are protesting
against the private entities and government act as a mediator to sustain capital
investments. But in practice land acquisition can entail conflicts even between
government interests and peasants where land is acquired by government (state
or central) or government-affiliated institutions.14 Acquisition of land for projects
that are subjected to serve ‘public purpose’, are constitutionally given the support
of eminent domain laws. But despite being its provisions and scopes it largely
remains unclear what determines that a proposed land-use change will serve pub-
lic interests and who to held responsible to determine its authenticity. Moreover
in several occasions state governments has (mis)utilised the provision of eminent
domain, which legally permits the takings of private properties in exchange of just
compensation in the event of necessary and urgently required projects. However
while such provisions are meant to be exercised with caution and under stringent
conditions threatening the public welfare, it is often found to be used otherwise
13See < http : //www.business−standard.com/article/economy−policy/land−acquisition−
in− gujarat− less− bloody − 1091121000181.html >
14In Indian context, state projects can be responsible for as much as 90 per cent of all land
acquired that affecting and displacing people since 1947.
18
owing to the weaknesses of legal institutions. This eventually undermine the pro-
cesses of land assessments, necessary consultation and consents of the concerned
communities, scope for procedural negotiations over the rehabilitation and reset-
tlement arrangements with affected people.
Lastly, many acquisition scenarios signal that a sufficiently high compensation
package, that are mutually agreed upon between the land-acquirer and land-loser,
mitigate conflicts and causes successful land transfers. But in such cases the con-
flict is over price and thus suitable negotiation and reconsideration over compen-
sation is possible to settle issues. Even though price seems the most crucial part of
a compensation package, it is not always the only determinant here. For example,
there were violent protests against the giant oil producer Shell and the state gov-
ernment in Niger Delta when land is being claimed for development of a petroleum
plantation, that could have an immense affect on the health and environment of
local communities, forcing in demographic dislocation and material destructions.
There were violent resistance against the establishment of oil plantations in In-
donesia and Malaysia where the current land users were not ready to give up their
livelihood from forestry, fishery and timber-extraction activities. In India, farm-
ers refused to give up farming land for the development of a petrochemical hub
(seeking 1,100 acre) in Belgaum, Karnataka, and refused to give up fertile, irri-
gated land in Maharashtra for the development of Videocon’s Pune-Ahmednagar
highway and information technology SEZ (seeking 4,500 acres). Resistance to sale
can also follow from preference irrationalities of the landowners driven by exoge-
nous income and consumption shocks, owing to the missing financial markets in
LDCs. For example, the studies on Singur farmers have revealed that a part of
resistance came from their present-biased preference over expenditure of the lump-
sum amount, to be gained by selling their land. These determinants of conflicts
are discussed further in Chapter 4, Section 0.13.
Following the discussion so far there are three broader aspects over the spec-
trum of conflicts on land transfers:
• Process failure: There are incidents where resistance to sale is due to process
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failure. This includes lack of consultation or consent for land-use changes,
scope for negotiations over price, land assessments and property right issues,
forcible acquisition practices, issues with availability for exchangeable nearby
land, the assessment of the social and environmental impacts of the land-use
change and tedious court proceedings over disputes. All these are concomi-
tant to the poor land administration and legal institutional infirmities.
• Price failure: There are incidents where peasants are not at all ready to
sell their plots to which no possibility of negotiation or reconsideration over
price even exist. Historically, culturally or aesthetically preserved land are
commonly agreed as priceless but conflict arises when such pricelessness is
subjective to current land users. On a contrary there are conflicts when
price being offered for land is inadequate, to which the possibilities of land
auction or revised offers still exist. However whether such schemes will result
in successful transfers or not, largely depend on the institutional (specifically
legal and political) support ensuring equity and efficiency of such schemes.
• Political tussle: As discussed earlier, there are incidents such as Singur,
Nandigram cases in India and the TPCC case in Tanzania, that suggest in-
volvement of politics can evoke inefficiencies. Note that while involvement
of media and civil society organisation influence political involvement, evi-
dences such as in Kharagpur, India suggests it is not always true.15 Further,
it is not clear whether involvement of politics has any necessary implication
over problems like holdout and violence. Understandably while (mis)use of
political power have resulted in massive violence, its impact on non-violent
holdouts are not clear, where the inefficiency driven by the events of holdouts
are more frequent.
It is crucial to understand that conflicts over land use changes have negative
15In 1992, 217.23 acres of mono-crop land was acquired to build pig-iron manufacturing plant
by Tata Metaliks, under the pro-peasant Left Front governance. No political opposition came
to protect the unwilling farmers and the process was peaceful even if the land-losers were given
a bare minimum monetary compensation, without any resettlement arrangement. Three years
later when the company aimed to acquire another 525 acres of farmland there were weak protests
from the landowners but even media coverage cannot fetch any political attention to the matter.
The land transfer was successful and without any violence.
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impacts on productivity and welfare apart from threatening the flow of outside
investments. Irrespective of whether land transfers are successful or not, insecurity
and unpredictability arising out of these conflicts reduces the incentives of the
landowners to carry on with productivity-enhancing investments on land. Delay in
resolving conflicts may reduce the accessibility of land to either the landowners or
the potential investors, leaving the piece of land partially or totally uncultivated.
In presence of conflicting interests the fear of losing land or the inflicted crop
damage, threat of potential violence, etc. affect the incentives to supply effort
towards land’s productivity. Further the farmers who are participating in the
protests, agitations or political rallies are likely to devote significant amount of time
that could have been utilised in productive activities which then put additional
‘costs’ onto them even if they eventually could retain their plots. An essence of
this is captured in Chapter 3.
Structure of the Thesis and Main Results
This PhD thesis begins with the analysis of the holdout problem in light of in-
stitutional imperfections, in particular bureaucratic corruption and the ease of
opposition, that are endemic to LDCs. It characterises conditions under which a
private buyer’s optimal acquisition design strategically implements holdout in land
acquisition as a response to these imperfections. Interestingly in the framework de-
lay, if any, is buyer-induced and not due to either complementarity in the number
of plots, preference irrationalities or any last mover advantage, the key elements
that generate holdout in the strategic bargaining framework. I call this feature
as buyer-induced holdout. Chapter 1 (Section 0.4) includes the characterisation
of this form of holdout. Among other results it shows that while an increase in
bureaucratic corruption necessarily reduces the price of land that is sold through
political mediation, such a change may either increase or decrease the price that
is settled directly between the buyer and the sellers. Further, when a pro-industry
party impose credible threats and coerce sellers, there may be instances where a
rise in corruption may increase the price of land sold through them. Its impact on
the size of holdout is also interestingly nuanced.
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Chapter 2 (Section 0.9) examines the impact of corruption and ease of opposi-
tion on buyer-induced holdout, welfare of sellers and overall economic surplus, in
the framework developed in Chapter 1. Among other results, I develop testable
hypotheses suggesting that buyer-induced holdout (i) increases with a reduction
in bureaucratic corruption if the existing imperfections are significant, (ii) increase
with an increase in ease of political opposition to land acquisition and (iii) is more
likely to occur closer to elections than otherwise. I also show the implications
of buyer-induced holdout on the welfare of landowners and on economic surplus.
While significant changes in institutions take long time, results show that small
improvements in institutions can have an immiserising effect on economic sur-
plus. Moreover, seller welfare decreases with worsening of political institutions,
even though the very existence of opposition is good while the impact of fall in
corruption is nuanced.
Chapter 3 (Section 0.12) presents a detail analysis of political competition in
presence of legal and political hazards. It considers the mechanism for implement-
ing informed consent from the landowners and captures the challenges of legal-
institutional imperfections that breach democratic rights, leading to group-based
agitations and violence. The theoretical framework shows that in democratic so-
cieties while property rights are legally provided that makes land seizure difficult,
access to information is not an obligation and consent for sale is practiced through
landowners voting, interplay between the legal-political institutions infringe such
voting decisions. This creates potential for political violence at least at local levels.
In presence of these institutional hazards there are possibilities of low level equi-
librium trap and violent agitations, discarding industrialisation. But occurrence
of such violence is subjected to local polity’s early or late mobilisation of resources
for violence.
The thesis ends with a critical survey of the economic literature to carry a
broader analysis of the causes and consequences of conflicting land conversion pro-
grams, showcasing their impacts on the success and failure of the projects. Follow-
ing the diversity of conflicts over land-use changes this survey is necessary because:
(a) it gives an insight of the responsible factors, often inter-linked and overlapped,
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which play crucially to unfold conflicting scenarios and (b) to establish a possible
link between the driving forces that goes beyond the rehabilitation and resettle-
ment policies aimed to support the land losers and to restore efficiency. Given
the multidimensional nature of land acquisition phenomena in LDCs, the survey
broadly identified four crucial factors – the compensation and rehabilitation disar-
rangements, social wrecking from land conversions, environmental disruptions, and
institutional infirmities – that drive conflicting scenarios. The two main aspects
considered here are the ‘purpose’ of conversions and the ‘process’ of carrying this
programs, and in light of several conflicting scenarios. Chapter 4 (Section 0.13)
presents the survey. It establishes that a string that connects the causes of differ-
ent conflicting scenarios is critically linked with the institutional infirmities and
lack of good governance. This results in bureaucratic corruption, eases political
interference and mobilisation of resources for violence, the features that have been
studied in the first three chapters of the thesis. Section 0.18 includes conclusive
statements.
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0.4 Chapter 1 : Political Economy of Land Ac-
quisition and Buyer-Induced Holdout
0.4.1 Introduction
The lack of availability of land is turning out to be the biggest obstacles for in-
dustrialisation in many countries. Protests and counter protests, agitations and
counter agitations over the issue of land acquisition are an everyday feature in
many LDCs that are seeking to industrialise, and this trend is observed in some
parts of the developed world as well.16 The most common explanation that holds
in its defense is the difficulty to agree on a fair price for land to all the stake-
holders owing to the fact that land is a special asset with a fixed supply and very
high attachment values. It is even more complex because of the fact that agri-
cultural land owners have very few alternative means of livelihood. Thus many
countries, including the US and India, have promulgated ‘eminent domain’ laws
that allow acquisition of land for public purposes in exchange of fair compensation
package. But the problem persists and thereby encourages research geared towards
understanding the determinants of a fair compensation and redistribution package.
The purpose of the present chapter and this thesis is however to look beyond the
issue of compensation. It attempts to provide a ‘political economy based’ micro-
foundation of the land acquisition process, which can help understand the causes
and consequences of the various problems that seem endemic in land acquisition.
16Even in authoritarian China, and in 2005 alone, there were over 60,000 local disturbances
provoked by attempts at acquiring agricultural land (Banerjee et al., 2007). Cao et al. (2008)
report that, in the first 9 months of 2006, there were 17,900 cases of “massive rural incidents”
in China, involving around 385,000 protesting farmers. Further, between 1996-2005, 20 million
farmers were evicted from agriculture due to land acquisition, with more than 21 per cent of
arable land being converted to non-agricultural use between 1996-2005 (Goswami, 2007). In
Brazil, protests against the acquisition of farmland between 2009-2011 delayed one of its most
promising industrial projects, CISPA worth USD 40 billion (Pedlowski, 2012). According to
Quartz India reports, around USD 9 billion worth of mega projects in India are being stalled
merely due to land acquisition problems. See < http : //qz.com/398151/modis −math − is −
wrong−only−8−of−projects−are−actually−held−up−because−of−land−acquisition/ >.
In Kenya, local community protests led to the eventual scrapping of a project by Nuove Iniziative
Indutrialis Sri (NIIsri) (Maggi and Veit, 2013).
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Forms of outside interference
Agitations over land acquisition have seen the involvement of several kinds of
‘agents’ including of course buyers and sellers. In most countries, in particular in
LDCs, acquisition of land involves some mediation by the local government. Most
commonly the party that is in power supports land acquisition.17 The ruling party
can lend its support either directly, or indirectly, involving the (mis)use of govern-
ment machinery. In contrast, opposition can come from a much wider spectrum of
stakeholders – including various interest groups such as the civil society organisa-
tions and the political parties that are typically out of office. In many cases such
agitations are wholly carried out by interest groups18 and in other cases, while the
issue may be initially taken up by one or more interest groups, political parties step
in later, and either take over from these interest groups, or conduct the agitation
in partnership with them. It appears that political parties start to get involved
when certain key conditions are met (for a discussion of the Indian scenario see
Chakravorty, 2013). First, the media should become more active, which would
ensure greater political mileage in case of involvement. Second, interest groups
are active in the area, who not only provide necessary information and support to
the involved landowners, but also coordinate the initial resistance. This creates
potential ‘flash-points’ which can easily be exploited by the political parties. Fur-
ther, intervention becomes more attractive if there is land fragmentation, which
17In the Indian context, following its independence in 1947, land acquisition was key to several
large public projects, building of dams, expansion of roadways and railways, building of factories
run by public sector firms, etc. At this point of time there was a broad political consensus that
land acquisition, while costly for those displaced, had to be done for the sake of the nation. The
fact that the affected almost always belonged to the marginal sections of the society, e.g. tribes,
etc. also helped.
18Often the ideologically motivated interest groups may carry out the initial agitations. In
India, the growth of civil society has been astronomical, from around a few hundred thousand
NGOs in the 1970s, to around 3.3 million by mid-2010. Jenkins (2012) argues that two separate
strands of the civil society movement, those opposing large scale displacement, as well as those
opposing ‘neoliberal globalization’ started coming together around mid-2010. Given that land
acquisition is an emotive issue (especially in a LDC context since, in the absence of proper
rehabilitation, it can lead to serious humanitarian tragedies), such ideological stances are easy
to understand. Fernandez (2007), for example, argues that over the period 1947-2000, as many
as 60 million persons were displaced for various development projects, many of whom were not
properly rehabilitated.
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increases the number of affected people, along with economic development, which
creates a need for land acquisition.
Motivating examples
There are a number of motivating cases from India that exemplify the broad dy-
namic patterns discussed above. Recall from Section 0.3 the incident of Nandigram
in West Bengal, India that witnessed violent agitations. As mentioned in Section
0.3 this attempt at land acquisition was backed by the ruling Left Front, a coalition
of leftist parties, allegedly helped by the local bureaucracy and police.19 The agita-
tion was initially spearheaded by two interest groups, the Gana Unnayan O Jana
Adhikar Sangram Committee (Committee for Public Development and People’s
Rights Struggle) and the Nandigram Jomi Uchhed Birodhi O Jana Shakti Rak-
sha Committee (Nandigram Committee to Resist Land Ousting and Save People
Power). Later, several political parties, including the Congress and the Trina-
mul Congress joined the protests. The resulting agitations led to massive violence
requiring police involvement, and even led to farmer deaths (Banerjee et al., 2007).
Now recall the incident of Singur in West Bengal, in continuation with what
is mentioned in Section 0.3 where the state government attempt to acquire prime
agricultural land for building an automobile factory. The process was not only
championed by the ruling Left Front, it appears that, like in Nandigram, the rul-
ing coalition used the bureaucracy and the police to further its cause in this case as
well. Among other examples, one can mention that during this agitation the state
government got the government machinery to impose Section 144 of the Criminal
Procedure Code in parts of Singur, with Section 144 conferring several powers on
the government aimed at restricting personal liberty.20 The opposition to land ac-
19In the context of the Nandigram agitation, one of the opposition leaders, Partha Chatterjee of
the Trinamul Congress, stated that “the bureaucrats and top police officers are under tremendous
pressure”, arguing that this “incident has exposed their ploy to use the government machinery
for partisan purposes.” See < http : //archive.indianexpress.com/news/trinamool−s−plea−
to− bureaucrats− and− police/717234/ >.
20See < http : //timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Sec − 144 − in − Singur − illegal −
HC/articleshow/1614554.cms?referral = PM >.
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quisition was organized around the Krishi Jomi Bachao Committee (Committee to
Save Farmland) formed in 2006. Interestingly this was a rainbow coalition, consist-
ing of various interest groups, e.g. the Uchchhed Birodhi Committee (Committee
Against Forced Displacement), the Gana Unnayan O Jana Adhikar Sangram Com-
mittee, among others, but also various political parties including one of the main
local opposition parties, the Trinamul Congress (TMC), as well as parties belong-
ing to the extreme left, e.g. the CPI (ML) State Organising Committee. The
resulting agitation led to fasts, highway blockades, strikes, and even alleged rapes
and suicides. Ultimately the project had to be scrapped (see, e.g., Sarkar, 2007,
and Ghatak and Banerji, 2009).
Another relevant example is the Vedanta project, seeking to develop an alu-
minum factory in the Kalahandi districts of Orissa in 2002. While the land ac-
quisition process was supported by the ruling Biju Janata Dal (BJD) government,
and their ally the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), it was opposed by a local orga-
nization, the Save Niyamgiri Group, later joined by others like Green Kalahandi,
as well as some international organizations, including Amnesty International. In-
terestingly, while the Congress leader Rahul Gandhi was personally opposing this,
much of the opposition was actually carried out by the government machinery
of the Central Government (including the Ministry of Environment and Forests),
then ruled by the Congress party.21 Political interference was also evident in sev-
eral other land acquisition processes in India, such as by the Orissa government
for building a steel plant by Posco (Chandra, 2008), by the Jharkhand govern-
ment for building a steel plant and also a power project in Khuntia district (Basu,
2008), by the Himachal Pradesh government for building an international airport
along with air cargo hub at Gagret in the Una district (Panwar, 2008), among
others. In Bangladesh, differences between local and state politicians often result
in land disputes and violence, that lead to political interference (Pons-Vignon and
LeComte, 2004).
21I refer the readers to Chakravorty (2013) for a discussion of all these cases, as well as a broad
survey of the land acquisition process in India.
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Rationale for outside interference
The literature traces this connection to the imperfection of the institutional frame-
work in LDCs, in particular to legal and political infirmities (this will be further
discussed in Chapter 4, Section 0.13). Among legal weaknesses, it has been argued
that weak property rights form a critical bottleneck, which in turn can be traced
to outdated land records, poor land surveys resulting in improper identification
of de facto, as well as de jure owners (Ghatak and Mookherjee, 2014, Lindsay,
2012, and Feder and Feeny, 1991) and mis-classification of land quality (Ghatak et
al., 2013).22 These aspects of the land market, along with legal requirements that
land sale must involve state-level bureaucracy (see Chakravorty (2013) for the case
of India), and the fact that accessing the law is costly, exacerbates bureaucratic
corruption and results in higher transaction costs.
Weak property rights, coupled with weak law enforcement can also create a
space for activist groups to redress inequalities that are either perceived or has
actually occurred. This in turn allows political parties to interfere in the process of
land acquisition and exploit the movements to gain political mileage (Rodden and
Rose-Ackerman, 1997). The ruling party can help reduce the high transaction costs
resulting from bureaucratic corruption, thereby making their presence an attractive
option for the buyers, as well as for the sellers who wish to sell their land. The
incentive for such political intervention is greater in the presence of political parties
who have a direct stake in the process and take sides depending, among other
issues, on whether they are in power or in opposition. The party in power seems to
typically support land acquisition, so as to satisfy the growing economic aspirations
of the masses (since it is more accountable to develop industry, create jobs, etc.),
that can only be met through industrialisation. Whereas the parties in opposition
22Such weak property rights is an important reason why land markets are thin in most LDCs
(see Binswanger et al., 1995). As argued by Alston et al. (2012), the absence of de jure property
rights – as was the case in frontier regions of several countries, including Australia, Brazil and
the US – led to problems in land acquisition. Further, in case of private bargaining, ill-defined
property rights force buyers to deal with non-owners, possibly leading to conflict (Banerjee et al.,
2007). Relatedly, in Brazil, there were conflicts between landowners and squatters over property
rights (Alston et al., 2000).
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seem to typically oppose it, as they may see a scope for electoral gains from
political obstructionism.23 Moreover, opposition may also be ideologically driven
and spearheaded by interest groups, as mentioned above. Outside interference in
this framework will therefore involve be two entities: (a) one that opposes and
obstructs efficient economic outcomes from being implemented peacefully, and (b)
another that helps economic agents fight against this opposition but engages in
political rent-seeking in exchange.24
How does an apolitical and profit-maximising industrial buyer of land respond
to outside interference? How does he use the pro-industry party in his fight against
opposition forces or existing bureaucratic bottlenecks and how does that affect
delay in industrialisation or welfare of the landowners? I address these questions
in the following theoretical framework.
Theoretical framework
I consider an economy with weak institutions (that promote bureaucratic corrup-
tion and outside interference) comprising a buyer who needs plots of land from
several sellers, with the profitability of the project being dependent on the number
of plots the buyer manages to acquire.25 There are two ‘parties’, one standing
23In the Indian context, for example, while the CPM (the principal Marxist party in India)
supported land acquisition in West Bengal and Kerala when they were in power in these states,
they opposed land acquisition everywhere else. Similar examples involving the two national
parties of India, the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party, are also easy to find.
24Such outside interference - particularly by the entity opposing land acquisition - may also
be triggered by behavioural reasons that ensure that the land valuations by the buyers exceed
what may be expected from purely economic considerations. One reason could be present-
biased preferences, an issue examined in Roy Chowdhury (2013). Another reason could be that
the buyers value land for cultural and religious reasons, something that seems to have been of
importance in the Vedanta case discussed earlier. In this thesis we however abstract from such
issues.
25In contrast to our specifications where sellers are sole beneficiaries of current usage of land,
Ghatak and Mookherjee (2014) look at a scenario where a single landlord sharecrops with a
number of poor tenant-workers and faces stochastic arrival of an industrial buyer. They study
the impact of compensation rules adopted by the landlord (to pay the tenants) on the decision
of the landlord to sell the land ex-post as well as the ex-ante incentives of both the tenants and
the landlord to invest in land productivity.
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‘for’ land acquisition, called F, and the other ‘against’, called A. Following the
preceding discussion, one shall interpret F as essentially the party in power, or
elements in the government that are willing to follow the agenda of the ruling
party. On the other hand, A can be interpreted as either an interest group, and/or
a political party that opposes land acquisition, at least locally. Given the presence
of bureaucratic corruption, party F has an incentive to step in, promising ‘help’ in
resolving any problems arising out of such institutional weaknesses. To be precise,
it can lower the transactions costs associated with land sale for both the buyer
as well as the sellers by tackling bureaucratic corruption. Moreover, weak law
enforcement allows A to possibly slow down the process through various means,
legal or extra-legal, including violence. This enlarges the scope of party F since it
can help overcome this opposition.
Thus the buyer rationally decides to involve party F in the process of land
acquisition, and through F makes a take-it-or-leave it offer to the sellers. Of
course, the sellers are free to bypass party mediation and approach the buyer
directly.26 I embed this interaction within a larger game where A decides on its
level of opposition that affects party F’s operation costs to fight against it. Party
F decides on the rent it charges from the buyer in return for its participation in the
process. Thus the extent of outside interference is endogenous in our framework,
and is determined by deeper institutional parameters like level of bureaucratic
corruption and ease of organising opposition.
Endogenizing this outside interference is important for several reasons. First,
it allows us to examine if this buyer-induced holdout persists even if the degree
of interference is endogenous and parties react to forthcoming economic activities
that are shaped by the interference positions they themselves take. This enables
one to also determine equilibrium interference and rent-seeking as a function of size
of corruption and ease of opposing acquisition. Second, several key comparative
26Given our focus on building an institution-based theory of land acquisition, the model by-
passes the otherwise well studied issue of unfair compensation whereby the sellers may be forced
to sell at prices that are lower than their own valuation for the land. Our framework however
allows for a limited role for such considerations in that the valuations can be interpreted as one
that is set by some minimum price regulation aimed at protecting the sellers.
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statics results with respect to the effects of institutional changes are sensitive to
whether the interference levels are endogenous, or not. It shows that a framework
where the interference contest is exogenous may yield misleading conclusions. The
first part is included in this Chapter while the second part is included in Chapter
2.
Main Results
I solve for the equilibrium of this game. I say that the equilibrium involves holdout
if there is a positive probability that party A manages to halt the project owing
to unwillingness on part of some sellers to accept early offers from the buyer.
The interesting feature of holdout in our model is that delay, if any, is buyer-
induced and thus the central question is to characterise conditions under which
it is in the best interests of the buyer to delay the process. I then examine how
the magnitude of this buyer-induced holdout and price of land are related to the
deeper institutional parameters of this economy, namely, the level of bureaucratic
corruption and the ease of opposition.
Our first major result is a characterisation of conditions such that outside
interference leads to buyer-induced holdout, where the buyer finds it in his best
interest to reduce the powers of F and make initial offers to only a limited number
of sellers for F to deal with. It is interesting that holdout obtains even though
our framework does not allow for either complementarity in the number of plots,
or any last mover advantage, the two key elements that generate holdout in the
strategic bargaining framework (see sub-section 0.4.2 for more on this). Why
does the buyer do this? First consider the late stage of the game where the level
of opposition by A, as well as the rent being charged by party F is fixed. As
expected, I have shown that the equilibrium implements holdout whenever the per
seller rent charged by party F is significantly higher than the transactions costs
due to bureaucratic corruption, which is intuitive since acquiring too many plots
through F may be very costly for the buyer if the political rent is large. But then,
why does not party F charge a lower rent, given that doing so leads to a greater
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number of sellers under its control, thereby increasing party F’s political clout? I
have shown that the equilibrium involves holdout as long as opposing is relatively
inexpensive for A, and/or A is sufficiently motivated to gain political power. In
that case A provides significant opposition to land acquisition, so that the pro-
acquisition party, i.e. F, is forced to charge a high political rent. This in turn
ensures that there is buyer-induced holdout.
The second set of result is interesting. I have shown that an increase in bu-
reaucratic corruption necessarily reduces the price of land that is sold through
party F. Depending upon the relative bargaining powers of the two sides, such a
change may however either increase or decrease the price that is settled directly
between the buyer and the sellers. Nevertheless, the dispersion in price across
these two phases of land acquisition necessarily increases. These results remain
qualitatively intact even if party F can impose credible threats and coerce sellers,
except that now there may be instances where a rise in corruption increases the
price of land sold through party F. Moreover, while the possibility of coercion
increases both opposition and rent-seeking as expected, its impact on the size of
holdout is interestingly nuanced, and can go either way.
I also show that this buyer-induced holdout is neither hostage to the simplified
linear functions for F’s probability of winning the interference contest against
A and buyer’s revenue from the project, nor dependent on the quadratic cost
function. Buyer-induced holdout exists even with the generalised functions.
0.4.2 Related Research
Formal treatments of the holdout problem (using game theoretic arguments) were
first provided in Eckart (1985) and Asami (1988). The theoretical literature was
further developed in Cai (2000, 2003), Menezes and Pitchford (2004), Miceli and
Segerson (2007) and Roy Chowdhury and Sengupta (2012).27 These models typ-
27In the patents literature, Shapiro (2001) suggests that strategic holdout is a serious obstacle
to R&D, and consequently long-run growth.
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ically examine a strategic bargaining framework, with complementarity in the
number of plots acquired. These two aspects generate a possible last mover ad-
vantage, which can generate inefficiency in the form of delay, as demonstrated by
Cai (2003), Menezes and Pitchford (2004) and Miceli and Segerson (2007). Roy
Chowdhury and Sengupta (2012) however demonstrate that there exist equilibria
that are asymptotically efficient whenever the bargaining protocol is transparent,
so that inefficiency does not necessarily follow.
In line with this literature, this chapter also shows that inefficiency can obtain
even under complete information. However, in contrast, it provides a theory of
holdout which does not rely on technological complementarity among plots for
holdout to emerge, but rather on institutional weaknesses that allow various par-
ties to intervene in the process. Interestingly, note that it employs a bargaining
protocol which is transparent in the sense of Roy Chowdhury and Sengupta (2012),
in that all offers are publicly observable. Nonetheless, in contrast to Roy Chowd-
hury and Sengupta (2012), I show that inefficiency continues to exist. Finally note
that this literature, as well as the present chapter, contrast with the literature
on bilateral trade problems considered in Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) and
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) (amongst others), where inefficiency is obtained
under incomplete information.
This chapter also stands in contrast to several branches of the literature. Thus
unlike Collins and Isaac (2012), it does not allow for contingent contracts. More-
over, in contrast to Ghatak and Ghosh (2011), Singh (2012) and Kominers and
Weyl (2011), I show holdout even without invoking contiguity concerns. Finally, I
obtain holdout in a framework with rational players, unlike Roy Chowdhury (2013),
where preference irrationality, namely present biased preferences, is required.
Although the correlation between bureaucratic corruption, politics and eco-
nomic development is well accepted, there are two conflicting strands in the lit-
erature on this issue. While one sees corruption as an obstacle to economic de-
velopment (see for example Blackburn et al. (2006), Mauro (1995) and Murphy
et al. (1993)), the other argues that corruption may ‘grease’ the process of de-
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velopment, thereby facilitating beneficial trades and improving efficiency (see for
example Levy (2007), Egger and Winner (2005), Beck and Maher (1986) and Leff
(1964)). Turning to the empirical literature, there is anecdotal support for the
latter viewpoint, at least in the context of less developed economies (see Aidt
(2009)). Moreover, while the literature on how inefficiencies in democratic insti-
tutions affect the level of corruption is limited, there is some evidence that the
political environment affects the likelihood of successful development (see for ex-
ample, Svensson (2005), Paldam (2002), Ades and Di Tella (1997) and Bardhan
(1997)). The theory presented in this chapter unifies these various strands in the
context of land acquisition by providing conditions under which both these posi-
tions prevail. For example, I show that while a reduction in corruption reduces the
holdout problem when corruption is not too large to begin with, it may increase
holdout otherwise.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 0.5 presents the
model, while section 0.6 studies how economic decisions are shaped by the degree
of outside interference emerging in the early stages of the framework, and how that
induces buyer-induced holdout. This leads to section 0.7 that studies how the two
parties, foreseeing the actions of the buyer and the sellers, attempt to influence
the outside interference climate. Sub-section 0.7.4 and sub-section 0.7.5 study the
impact of political coercion, if practiced by F and A respectively, on price of land
and size of holdout. Sub-section 0.7.6 shows that this buyer-induced holdout is not
hostage to the simplified linear functions for F’s probability of winning interference
contest against A and buyer’s revenue from the project or quadratic cost function
by generalising them. All the proofs of this chapter are included in Appendix A,
sub-section 0.19.1. The chapter concludes in section 0.8.
0.5 Theoretical framework
Local economy and the industrial project : A representative locality whose economy
is based on land (agriculture, farming or forestry) consists of a continuum of sellers
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(of unit mass) holding identical plots of land all of which yield a non-negative return
v to their owners in their current uses.28 A buyer B wishes to buy land in order
to set up a project that yields a revenue of V (x) = λx, where 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 is the
fraction of plots used, and λ is the marginal productivity of land when used in the
project.
Bureaucratic corruption: The process of land acquisition faces several institutional
weaknesses. One such weakness stems from bureaucratic corruption associated
with land transactions in general, and in offices dealing with land transactions in
particular. As a result, any land sale between an individual seller and a buyer
involves a transactions cost of rI ≥ 0, with the buyer bearing a fraction β, and
the seller a fraction 1− β of this cost, where β is exogenous to our analysis. Thus
in our model rI is an index of bureaucratic corruption, with a higher rI denoting
higher bureaucratic corruption. I will assume throughout that λ − v ≥ rI , so
that the project is economically viable even after accounting for this bureaucratic
corruption.29
Outside interference: The buyer and sellers confront an interference process that
involves two ‘parties’ with opposing incentives, one that is for land acquisition
(called F), and the other that is against such land acquisition (called A), with F and
A being the obvious mnemonics for ‘for’ and ‘against’. F typically represents not
only the ruling political party, but also elements of the administrative machinery
that can either gain directly from ‘helping’ the locality with industrialisation, or
are simply required to follow F’s orders.30 Whereas A comprises political parties in
opposition or interest groups (or a combination of the two), whose main objective
28One can also interpret v as arising out of some minimum price legislations, where this min-
imum price exceeds the sellers’ valuation for their land. Such enactments are now prevalent in
many LDCs as well as developed nations in order to avoid problems arising from seller dissat-
isfactions. Thus this framework assumes that any problem concerning unfair compensation has
been already resolved.
29If λ−v < rI , then one would simply look at mechanisms to reduce this corruption, something
that is not the purpose of the present research.
30In the Indian context, Gould (2011) writes about the “longterm customs of interactions
between agencies of the state - government servants and police, and their engagement with local
politicians”.
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is to obstruct the process of land acquisition. The outside interference process
interacts with the process of land acquisition at several levels. First, if the project
is to be undertaken in the area, land sale must involve the pro-industrial party F,
as otherwise it becomes impossible for the buyer to overcome the opposition from
A. Further, the bureaucratic corruption cost rI described earlier can be bypassed
only if the sale is mediated by party F.
Early offers : Given that the involvement of party F is necessary for the project
to go through, the buyer initially works through party F. He specifies a plot price
q ≥ 0 and a fraction 0 ≤ k ≤ 1 of the plots that he wishes to buy through party
F, which then approaches a fraction k of the sellers with this price offer.31
Interference contest : It is natural to assume that the larger the fraction of sellers
who announce their willingness to sell early on in the acquisition process, the
greater the probability that party F (and the buyer) is going to win against any
opposition. I model this by assuming that if k sellers agree to the buyer’s offer
(intermediated by party F), then F wins the interference contest against A with
probability pi(k) = k. The formulation pi(k) = k is the celebrated Tullock lottery
contest success function (see Corchon, 2007).32
Post-contest activity and late offers : If party F wins the contest against party A,
then these k sellers commit to sell their plots at a price q, and party F leverages
its connections (e.g., in the office of land transactions) to ensure that the addi-
tional corruption costs rI are waived. The remaining 1− k fraction of sellers then
jointly enter a bargaining process with the buyer that results in a Nash-bargaining
outcome on the residual surplus.33 This determines a plot price qb at which all
31In our model, geographical connectivity can be implemented for any k given that all plots
are identical and sellers are individually insignificant. When this is violated, the problem can
become tricky and may require more careful selection and displacement mechanisms to execute
partial land sale. For more on this see Ghatak and Ghosh (2011).
32In Subsection 0.7.6 I work out the case for general functions for pi(k) (as well as V (x)) to
show existence of buyer-induced holdout.
33The modelling assumption here is that party F is not involved in the bargaining process
once the interference outcome is decided. This point is discussed in greater details later in
Section 0.6.3, where I also discuss what happens if in the late stage, all bargaining power is with
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remaining plots are sold. As discussed earlier, each such transaction entails a
transaction cost rI due to bureaucratic corruption.
Payoffs of F : In exchange for getting involved in this process and agreeing to im-
plement the buyer’s early offer (k, q), party F asks for a political rent of rP per
seller conditional on success. The ‘economic rationale’ behind this rent lies in the
fact that fighting A at the contest stage is costly for party F, both because of
opposition from A, as well as because coordinating k sellers is costly, generating a
cost of C(k) for party F, with C(k) being increasing and convex in k. For presenta-
tional clarity and algebraic ease I will work with quadratic costs, in particular the
cost function C(k) = ck2 (the main results on existence of holdout reported here
go through with general convex cost functions as proved in the Subsection 0.7.6).
Party F cares not only about its political success, captured by the project’s success
probability pi(k), but also its net rental gains pi(k)krP − ck2.34 Thus the utility of
F is given by
γpi(k) + (1− γ)[pi(k)krP − ck2], (1)
where 0 < γ < 1 measures how politically important it is for F to acquire land. I
assume that the reservation payoff of party F is zero.35
Ease of opposition and payoffs of A: From the utility function of F it follows that
ceteris paribus, a higher level of c makes it costlier for F to win the political contest.
By choosing a higher level of c, party A can therefore ensure that F faces a higher
degree of opposition. However, increasing c is costly for A and for simplicity I
assume that the marginal cost of doing so is constant at α > 0. The parameter α
is related to ease of opposition so that lower values of α makes opposition easier.
It has two possible interpretations. First, it is a measure of the robustness of
the ‘rule of law’ in this economy. Thus a higher α means better rule of law as
the buyer.
34One can also consider the case that the buyer needs to pay a part of this rent upfront. This
does not affect our results qualitatively as long as party F is a long term player and cares about
its reputation.
35While I will show that in equilibrium, F will indeed earn a strictly positive utility, the
reservation payoff can in principle be even lower in case there are political costs for F from not
participating in this process at all, as I discuss later in subsection 0.7.6.
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that makes it harder for A to interfere with the process of land transaction once
the project passes the interference stage. Alternatively it may mean that A has a
smaller presence in the area under consideration (this is discussed in more detail in
Chapter 2, Sub-section 0.10.3) and therefore less influence in the local land related
bureaucracy. Like party F, the utility of A also has two parts, the direct political
returns from stopping the land acquisition process and the costs incurred in doing
so. Thus A’s utility is given by
δ(1− pi(k))− (1− δ)αc, (2)
where 0 < δ < 1 is an index of A’s anti-acquisition conviction. It measures the
relative importance of political power which in principle can be different from γ.
A’s reservation payoff is assumed to be zero as well. In Chapter 2 (Section 0.10)
I will connect δ and γ to elections by assuming that their values are likely to be
higher during election times.
Payoffs of Sellers and the Buyer : If the project fails, then all sellers earn v and the
buyer earns 0. Otherwise, if the project goes through and if k plots are acquired
through early offers at price q (while the remaining are acquired at the bargaining
price qb), then the buyer’s payoff is
λ− (q + rP )k − (1− k)(qb + βrI),
while the payoff to an early seller is q and that to a late seller is qb − (1− β)rI .
Timeline: These interactions yield a dynamic game of complete information, de-
noted by Γα,rI , with the following timeline (schematically depicted in Figure 6):
• Endogenous emergence of interference:
– Stage 1.1 : Party A chooses its level of opposition, c;
– Stage 1.2 : Party F selects the rent per seller, rP , that it demands from
the buyer conditional on the project succeeding;
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• Early phase of land acquisition:
– Stage 2 : The buyer announces a plot price q and a fraction k of plots
it wishes to buy through party F, which then offers this price q to k of
the sellers;
– Stage 3 : Party F incurs a cost of ck2 to organise k sellers who are willing
to sell through F at price of q.
– Stage 4 : Contest between F and A takes place and the winner is decided;
if the winner is A, the game ends and the project is scrapped;36 if the
winner is F, then the project goes through and F is paid the per unit
rent of rP by the buyer;
• Late phase of land acquisition:
– Stage 5 : All sellers who are yet to sell their plots bargain with B
and settle for a price qb at which all remaining plots are sold after the
corruption cost rI is paid; the game ends.
I next turn to characterising the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (henceforth
SPNE) outcome of this extensive-form game. In this framework I say that the
outcome involves holdout if there is a positive probability that the project will be
scrapped altogether: larger this probability, greater is the holdout problem.
Definition 1. I say that Γα,rI generates buyer-induced holdout of size 1− k if in
the sub-game perfect equilibrium of Γα,rI the buyer’s offer (k, q) has k < 1.
A central objective of this chapter is to study conditions under which the
interaction between outside interference and bureaucratic corruption results in
buyer-induced holdout, and how such interactions shape the size of such holdout
and the price of land. In the next chapter I will analyse how such interactions
impact the welfare of sellers.
36To remind the reader, when F loses this contest, the payoffs are: sellers earn v, Buyer earns
0, party F earns −(1− γ)ck2 and A earns δ − (1− δ)αc.
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Figure 1: Timeline of the game Γα,rI
0.6 Optimal land acquisition design and buyer-
induced holdout
In the framework under study, decisions relating to outside interference are made
before economic variables like prices and amounts of sales in each period are deter-
mined. In this section I will assume that F participates and take the interference
variables (viz. rP and c) as given and examine the decisions made by the buyer
and the sellers across the two phases of land acquisition. Albeit constrained by the
activities of F and A and the incentives of the sellers, in our framework the buyer
has the ability to design his acquisition mechanism and his principle instruments
are k and q.
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0.6.1 Late phase of land acquisition
Suppose the game reaches Stage 5 with a fraction 0 ≤ k < 1 of sellers having
already sold their plots. The remaining 1−k fraction of sellers enter into bargaining
with the buyer (although an artefact of our modelling framework, note that since
pi(0) = 0, to reach stage 5 with positive probability, it must be that k > 0), with
the payoffs being the outcome of a symmetric Nash bargaining process involving
the buyer on one side, and all remaining 1 − k sellers on the other. The Nash
program is:
max
qb≥0
[λ− (1− k)(qb + βrI)− λk][(1− k)(qb − v − (1− β)rI)]. (3)
The following lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 1. In the late stage suppose a fraction 1 − k of sellers bargain with the
buyer to sell their plots. Then the Nash bargaining price qb =
v+λ
2
+ rI
(
1
2
− β).
Consequently, the price qb is (a) increasing in v and λ, (b) decreasing in β, (c)
increasing in rI iff β <
1
2
, and (d) unaffected by α, rP and k.
As Lemma 1 indicates, once the project passes through the interference hurdles,
the price settlement between the remaining 1−k sellers and the buyer is not affected
by the fraction k of land sold in the early phase. Neither is it directly affected
by the degree of outside interference, but is affected by bureaucratic corruption. I
next turn to determining k and the first period price q.
0.6.2 Early phase of land acquisition: a first look at buyer-
induced Holdout
I begin with stage 2 where the buyer must decide on k, the number of plots he
would wish to buy during the early phase using party F as an intermediary. Of
course, garnering more support for the project through a higher k makes it easier
for party F to win the interference game, thereby ensuring that the project goes
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through. However, the buyer does not want to attract too many sellers in the
early phase since these sales must go through party F for which the buyer will
have to pay a per unit rent of rP . Keeping this in mind I now determine the
buyers equilibrium choice of the pair (q, k).
For a given choice of k, the buyer needs to offer a price q to implement the
desired k. If he offers (q, k) and k sellers agree to sell ‘today’ at price q, then
the payoff of each such seller is pi(k)q + (1 − pi(k))v, whereas the payoff of any
seller who delays sale equals pi(k)(qb − (1 − β)rI) + (1 − pi(k))v. Clearly, if he
sets a price such that pi(k)q + (1 − pi(k))v < pi(k)(qb − (1 − β)rI) + (1 − pi(k))v,
then the sellers would prefer to wait and he cannot implement k. Thus, he would
prefer to set the minimum possible price q such that, pi(k)q + (1 − pi(k))v ≥
pi(k)(qb−(1−β)rI)+(1−pi(k))v. Hence for any fixed target k of phase one sellers,
we have
q(k) = qb − (1− β)rI . (4)
The following lemma is then immediate.
Lemma 2. The early and late phase prices of land are, respectively, q = λ+v
2
− rI
2
and qb =
λ+v
2
+ rI
(
1
2
− β) with q < qb.
Note that q and qb are neither affected by any of the interference variables rP
and c, nor by the parameters γ and δ, nor by the rule of law (or ease of opposition)
parameter α. As we shall later find, the effect of these parameters are manifested
only in the probability of holdout, i.e., 1− k∗.
Given F’s participation and Lemma 2, I now determine the buyer’s optimal
choice of k. The profit function of the buyer in stage 1 is
Π(k) = pi(k)[λ− k(q + rP )− (1− k)(qb + βrI)]. (5)
Substituting pi(k), q and qb in the above expression and simplifying further I obtain
Π(k) =
1
2
(
2(rI − rP )k2 + (λ− v − rI)k
)
. (6)
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If c is too high so that F does not find it profitable to participate, there will
trivially be holdout as the project will be scrapped with certainty. Proposition 1
below is our first main result. It assumes that F participates and demonstrates
the possibility of holdout whenever the political rent rP is large.
Proposition 1. There is holdout with F’s participation in the land acquisition
process if and only if the political rent rP is significantly higher than the transac-
tions costs, that is rP > rI +
λ−v−rI
4
. The number of plots sold in the early stage,
i.e.
k∗(rP ) =
(λ− v)− rI
4(rP − rI) , (7)
whenever rP > rI +
λ−v−rI
4
, and k∗(rP ) = 1 otherwise. Moreover, the size of
holdout increases in v and rP , but decreases in rI and λ.
From (13) it follows that in the continuation subgame that initiates economic
activities, one obtains holdout in equilibrium whenever rP exceeds rI +
λ−v−rI
4
.
Why does not the buyer seek to acquire more plots in equilibrium? Intuitively, rP
measures the marginal cost of acquiring one more plot at the early stage, whereas
the expression rI +
λ−v−rI
4
measures the marginal benefit from doing so at k = 1.
The expression rI +
λ−v−rI
4
is intuitive as the first term, rI , captures party F’s
contribution in reducing transaction costs, whereas the second part, λ−v−rI
4
, is a
measure of party F’s contribution in fighting A. In case I am in a continuation
subgame where the demanded rent rP exceeds the sum of these two contributions,
there will be holdout. With the rent rP being high, increasing the number of
plots acquired is not profitable. Relatedly, why don’t more sellers try to bypass
the interference process and approach the buyer directly? The benefit of doing
so is that she can obtain a higher price, whereas the cost is that she will have to
pay the corruption costs herself and increase the probability of the project getting
scrapped due to opposition. In equilibrium these two forces are balanced. The
proof of Proposition 1 is included in sub-section 0.19.1.
Proposition 1 generates several interesting and potentially testable implica-
tions. If the locality has land with high value (i.e. v is high), either because of
close proximity to a large city, or because of high fertility of land, then from Propo-
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sition 1 (see (13)) it follows that k∗(rP ) is smaller. The effect is similar when the
productivity of the industrial project is small. Consequently, Proposition 1 sug-
gests that urban vicinity, high land-fertility, and/or low project returns all make
holdout more likely. These predictions are also consistent with the basic thesis in
Chakravorty (2013) that increased land value was central to the problems of land
acquisition.37
I look at the pattern of land acquisition bids and their current status in Table
1 in Appendix B – successful, contested or failed – across 15 states and one union
territory of India between the years 2006-2016.38 Table 1 draws on (a) tables A1
and A2 in Chakravorty (2013) that collate instances of land acquisition that were
reported in the media for the first time between the years 2006-2011, and (b)
further work in July, 2016, that updated the cases that were reported as contested
in Chakravorty (2013). It should be pointed out that given that these cases were
reported in the media, the sample is likely to be biased towards cases that are
‘newsworthy’. Thus, for example, there could be cases where land acquisition
went through peacefully during this period, but were not reported by the media
(either due to lack of any political interference, or because the amount of land being
acquired was not large enough). As of now the other cases either continue to be
contested, or there is little evidence to suggest that these have been resolved either
way. Further it is not clear that in an event of delay, whether it was buyer-induced,
seller-induced or due to procedural inefficiencies. However it is interesting that the
data suggests that in the Indian context, land acquisitions, while often contested,
and sometimes unsuccessful, also went through in many cases, as suggested by
Proposition 1. Given the earlier caveat regarding the data and the fact that the
data size is also not large, I refrain from undertaking any analysis to suggest any
37In the case of Singur, for example, one of the triggers was that the land was very fertile,
implying a very high v. Similarly, in the case of Vedanta, the tribals had a religious and cultural
attachment to the proposed cite, which again implies that v is likely to be large. In case of the
Jamuna Expressway in Delhi, the land acquisition process encountered several delays as it was
hard to satisfy the owners to sell land that was of very high value, owing to the high fertility of
land on the banks of the river.
38 The states reported are Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Gujarat, Goa, Haryana,
Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Odisha, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and
West Bengal. Chandigarh is the only union territory in the data sample.
44
further.
0.6.3 A discussion on the modelling assumptions
It is straightforward to demonstrate that our analysis is not dependant on the sell-
ers being risk neutral. All results go through even in the presence of risk aversion.
I have also assumed that the reservation payoff of party F from participating in the
land-acquisition process is 0. In reality this might seem to be a strong assumption
as it can be politically suicidal for F to not help industrial buyers at all partic-
ularly in a developing country aspiring for economic growth. On the other hand
not agreeing to oppose industrial projects (which is equivalent to setting c = 0)
may not be that costly for A. Hence it is natural to have an asymmetry in the
two external players’ reservation utilities. It can be easily verified that with zero
reservation payoff for A (which is a normalisation now), it will never set a c larger
than δ
α(1−δ) . Assuming a more general convex cost C(k) = k
m,m > 1 (used in the
Subsection 0.7.6), it follows that F’s participation is guaranteed if its reservation
payoff falls below − δ(1−γ)
(1−δ)α .
Next, how critical is the assumption that party F can help with reducing the
transactions costs due to bureaucratic corruption? To address this issue, consider
a scenario where these transactions costs have to be borne by the buyer and the
sellers even if the transactions are mediated by party F. It is straightforward to
show that in that case q = qb =
v+λ
2
−rI(12−β), and k∗ = λ−v−rIrP . Thus the results
are qualitatively similar in that holdout is still possible.
Finally, as mentioned in footnote 33 earlier, another implicit modelling assump-
tion is that party F is not involved in the late stage of land acquisition. This is
motivated by the fact that in this stage party F has much less bargaining power
vis-a-vis the buyer (as well as the sellers) as compared to the early stage: with A
now defeated, neither the buyer, nor the sellers need the backing provided by party
F for the project to go through. Moreover, any further involvement by party F in
the process of land acquisition may have costs. For one, rent-seeking even after
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the interference battle has been won, might cast doubt on party F’s credentials
as a pro-growth party, creating an adverse reputational effect. Further, for F, the
opportunity cost of using up its bargaining chips with the administration in an
effort to waive off the corruption costs rI may be significant. Both these factors
assume a greater urgency since getting involved may not yield any further polit-
ical mileage to party F given that the political battle is already won. Given the
trade-offs involved, I have chosen to focus on the case where the costs of getting
involved outweigh the potential benefits for party F.
It may be of interest though to examine some alternative scenarios where the
trade-off is not so adverse for party F, so that it gets involved in the late stage as
well. While a complete analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter, I discuss some
possibilities. Consider a scenario where, following a victory for party F in warding
off opposition from A, it can continue demanding a rent in order to allow the buyer
and the sellers to bypass bureaucratic corruption and the buyer-seller community
has the option to avoid paying this rent and instead incur the corruption cost rI .
Preliminary analysis suggests that our results on holdout go through; however the
possibility of rent-seeking opportunity in the late phase has an ambiguous effect
on the first period rent rP when political variables are determined exogenously.
Some of the analysis can be found in Section 0.7.7.
What if late stage price is settled through take-it-or-leave-it offers from the
buyer? Then the second period price of land would be lower than under Nash
bargaining. This would increase incentives of the buyer to reduce the number of
period 1 offers, thus potentially increase holdout. In any event, the basic result
on the possibility of buyer-induced holdout is certainly not hostage to the exact
price-settling protocol in the late stage.
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0.7 Emergence of outside interference
The purpose of the theoretical model goes much beyond Proposition 1, i.e. char-
acterising the existence of buyer-induced holdout. I next embed the model exam-
ined in Section 0.6 in a broader framework and study the effects of changes in the
deeper parameters of the environment on the level of holdout, and other variables
of interest. For ease of exposition this part of analysis is captured in Chapter 2
where I will look into the effects of changes in these parameters on the level of
buyer-induced holdout, sellers welfare and economic surplus. In particular I will
be interested in the bureaucratic corruption parameter rI and the ease of opposi-
tion parameter α. In addition, endogenizing rP and c also serves as a robustness
check for the preceding analysis. While all these are included in Chapter 2, in
Chapter 1 I next turn to a study of important decisions, beginning with that of
the pro-industrial party F who I will assume finds it rational to participate. This
is captured in sub-section 0.7.1. I will then show in sub-section 0.7.2 that the equi-
librium expected payoff of F will indeed be above its reservation utility, so that
participation is guaranteed in equilibrium. Sub-section 0.7.2 includes the decision
of the opposition A on the extent of its mobilisation against this project. It is of
interest to see the effects of changes in the deeper parameters of the environment
on the extent of such mobilisation. Theorem 1 in section 0.7.3 then summarises
the results developed in these two sub-sections.
0.7.1 Equilibrium rent for support
Suppose A has announced its degree of opposition by committing to some c, where
c ≥ 0. Party F now decides on the rent per seller, rP , that it would demand from
the buyer in order to fight A, taking the level of c as given. The level of rP will of
course determine the number of plots that the buyer will wish to acquire through
F’s mediation, which is something that party F factors in.
I need some notations before discussing my next result, namely Proposition 2
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(to follow). Let r∗P denote the solution to party F’s problem. Further, let
rˆP :=
(1− γ)(2c− rI)(λ− v − rI) + γrI
(1− γ)(λ− v − rI) + γ and c¯ :=
(
7
8
)
rI +
1
8
(
γ
1− γ + (λ− v)
)
Proposition 2 below solves for the payoff-maximising choice of rP , showing that,
depending on the magnitude of c, the solution may or may not involve holdout.
Proposition 2. Consider a subgame initiated by A through a choice of opposition
level c. Then in the SPNE of this subgame
(i) if c ≤ c¯, then r∗P = rI + λ−v−rI4 , and there is no holdout,
(ii) whereas if c > c¯, then r∗P = rˆP > rI +
λ−v−rI
4
, and there is holdout.
Proposition 2 is intuitive. Recall that party F derives its utility from two
sources, political (defeating A) and economic (net monetary gains from rents).
Whenever c, the degree of opposition from A is relatively weak (to be precise
c ≤ c¯), the monetary benefits are sufficiently large so that the political benefits
become relatively more attractive at the margin. In that case party F finds it
optimal not to raise its demand for rent rP by so much that the buyer’s willingness
to acquire land through party F is lowered. Thus it chooses the maximum rent
r∗P = rI +
λ−v−rI
4
that ensures that there is no holdout (from Proposition 1 we
know that the buyer finds it optimal to set k∗ = 1). When c exceeds this cutoff,
party F finds this low rent unsustainable and raises it beyond rI +
λ−v−rI
4
. This
makes the buyer set a lower k∗ and there is holdout. The proof of Proposition 2
is included in sub-section 0.19.1.
As Proposition 2 establishes, the degree of opposition c chosen by A is critical
to our analysis. The next sub-section is devoted to analysing A’s optimal choice
of this opposition.
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0.7.2 Equilibrium Opposition
Given that an industrial project may happen, A has to decide on the extent of its
mobilisation against this project, i.e. c. This decision is critical to the success of
the project as it determines the rent rP to be charged by party F and consequently
the size of holdout and the probability that the project goes through. If A foresees
that conditions are such that the rent charged by party F will be low (so that
the buyer will opt to purchase all the plots), it would like to stay away from the
contest (by setting c = 0). Otherwise it will oppose this project. The conditions
that determine the extent of such opposition turn out to depend on the ease of
opposition α, as well as δ, the motivation level of party A. Proposition 3 below
deals with this. In order to state this proposition, define two critical values, one
for the degree of opposition c and the other for the ease of opposition α:
cf := rI +
√
δ(λ− rI − v)
8α(1− δ) and α¯ :=
(
δ
1− δ
)(
λ− rI − v + v1−γ
(λ− rI − v + γ1−γ )2
)
.
Proposition 3 shows that there is holdout if and only if α < α¯ and δ is sufficiently
large.
Proposition 3. In the SPNE of Γα,rI , the following hold:
(i) Suppose opposition is sufficiently difficult, formally α ≥ α¯. Then there is no
opposition in equilibrium, i.e. c∗ = 0.
(ii) On the other hand if α < α¯ so that opposition is not very difficult, then there
exists 0 < δ˜ < 1 such that if δ ≤ δ˜ then c∗ = 0, while if δ > δ˜ then c∗ = cf ,
with cf being
(a) increasing in λ and decreasing in v and α;
(b) decreasing in rI if and only if (λ− v)− rI is sufficiently high.
As is clear from Proposition 3, the fragility of the rule of law and/or strong
local presence of A – as captured by a small α so that ease of opposition is high
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– is of primary importance to A’s decisions. If α is very high, A finds it optimal
to not oppose at all. This is because to generate any delay via holdout, rP has to
be very large, which requires the level of c itself to be very high as well. With a
large enough α this becomes unsustainable for A. While setting a high c becomes
feasible for A when α falls, it should also be sufficiently motivated (that is δ should
be sufficiently large). I have characterised a threshold value δ˜ (obtained from 33
in Appendix A) such that A mounts significant opposition and there is holdout
only when the marginal returns from this opposition is large (δ > δ˜). The proof
of Proposition 3 is again included in sub-section 0.19.1.
The interesting case is naturally when the parameters of the model allow for
buyer-induced holdout. Now that we know the equilibrium amount of opposition
c∗ = cf in such situations, I use Propositions 1, 2 and 3, to compute the ‘overall’
equilibrium demand for political rent r∗P that induces holdout in the economy. It
is also of interest to see how does the equilibrium r∗P get affected by the various
parameters of the model. Corollary 1 deals with this.
Corollary 1. Suppose α < α¯ and δ > δ˜ so that there is holdout. Then the
equilibrium rent r∗P is given by
r∗P =
(1− γ)
(
rI + 2
√
δ(λ−rI−v)
8α(1−δ)
)
(λ− v − rI) + γrI
(1− γ)(λ− v − rI) + γ , (8)
where r∗P is
(i) monotonically increasing in λ and monotonically decreasing in v and α;
(ii) increasing in rI if (λ− v)− rI is sufficiently high and decreasing otherwise.
It is straightforward to see that the rent per seller rP charged by F is increasing
in λ, and decreasing in α. Consider an increase in v. Following this, the buyer’s
initial price offer q (as well as qb) must rise. This becomes economically infeasible
for the buyer unless F provides room for the buyer by reducing rP . These forces
work in the exact opposite direction when λ increases. Hence for projects where
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land has high marginal productivity, rents are high as well. I now address the
non-monotonicity of equilibrium rent in the degree of bureaucratic corruption rI .
Suppose rI is large so that (λ− v)− rI is small. A further increase in rI makes it
too attractive for the buyer to buy out more plots today as a rise rI increases the
gap between q and qb significantly (see Fig. 2 below). This increase in demand for
F-administered sale gives room to party F to finance its war against A and earn
enough returns from it so that it finds optimal to increase this demand optimally
through a reduction in rent. On the other hand when rI is small so that (λ−v)−rI
is sufficiently high, the buyer does not dislike second period purchase except that
it still requires a sufficient amount of F-administered sales in order to overcome
the period 1 political hurdle. Party F can therefore coerce the buyer with a higher
rent knowing that this would not force the buyer to reduce first period purchase
significantly. The proof of Corollary 1 is included in sub-section 0.19.1.
Finally I demonstrate that Party F’s equilibrium payoff is positive, so that
F finds it optimal to participate. Note that F’s payoff is zero at k = 0 and is
increasing in k whenever rP > c. In equilibrium, c
∗ = cf and r∗P − cf simplifies to
r∗P − cf =
(3(1− γ)(λ− v − rI) + γ)
(√
δ(λ−rI−v)
8α(1−δ)
)
(1− γ)(λ− v − rI) + γ > 0
since 0 < γ < 1, 0 < δ < 1 and λ > v + rI .
0.7.3 Equilibrium buyer-induced holdout
I am now in a position to report the equilibrium of the full game by collecting the
analysis in Sections 0.6, 0.7.1 and 0.7.2 in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let k∗ denote the equilibrium fraction of land acquired through the
intermediation of party F.
(i) k∗ = 1 if either (a) α ≥ α¯, or (b) α < α¯ and δ ≤ δ˜; otherwise k∗ =
(1−γ)(λ−rI−v)+γ
8(1−γ)(cf−rI) < 1.
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(ii) In the early phase, the fraction k∗ of land is sold at price q = λ+v
2
− rI
2
. In case
party F wins the political contest against party A, then the remaining plots
are sold in the late phase at price qb =
λ+v
2
+rI(
1
2
−β); thus qb = q+rI(1−β)
so that q < qb for all 0 < β < 1.
Theorem 1 provides an overview of the study so far. If it is hard for A to oppose,
i.e. α is high, or A’s ideological drive against industrialisation is not too strong,
i.e. δ is small, then A will not oppose land acquisition at all. In that case the rent
demanded by party F is small, thus the buyer buys all land using party F and the
project takes place with probability 1. Otherwise, A offers significant opposition
to land acquisition, which forces party F to charge larger rents. This induces the
buyer to acquire a smaller fraction of plots through party F, thereby opening up
the possibility of A winning the political contest with F and stalling the project.
In such a situation, the price offered in the initial phase, i.e. q, is smaller than the
eventual price qb. Interestingly, all sellers end up with equal payoffs irrespective
of whether the project is stalled (in which case each earn v) or whether it goes
through (in which case early phase sellers earn q while the late phase sellers earn
qb− rI(1−β) where equilibrium equalises these two quantities). However, there is
land-price dispersion that increases with the degree of bureaucratic corruption (as
is evident from Figure 2) but remains unaffected with ease of opposition unless the
ease of opposition is small (viz. α large) in which case all land is sold at a single
price. As expected of course, the degree of price dispersion is also affected by the
bargaining power of the buyer vis-a-vis the sellers once they are free to negotiate
the price without involving party F. In particular, as the sellers’ power increases,
the price dispersion increases.
Note that Theorem 1(i) suggests that not all land acquisition processes lead to
external opposition. There was none when the West Bengal government, then led
by the Left Front, acquired 217.23 acres of mono-crop land in Kharagpur to build a
pig-iron manufacturing plant by Tata Metaliks (Guha, 2007). Even media coverage
did not provoke any opposition in support of the unwilling farmers. Considering the
period 1994-2004, Guha (2007) argues that more than 70 percent of the displaced
farmers were not properly rehabilitated and left with little monetary compensation.
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Figure 2: Effect of change in rI on price of land (q and qb)
There were some local protests from the landowners when the state government
proposed to acquire another 525 acres of farmland in the same area, but these
protests fizzled out due to the lack of strong political backing (Guha, 2007). In
fact, even at the time the Singur agitation was alive, the Jindal group of companies
managed to acquire land for their factory in West Bengal without any political
intervention or external support.39 Further, in certain states of India like Gujarat,
land acquisition, even in the absence of government intervention, seems relatively
trouble free.40 What can one say about conditions required for holdout to be
absent in equilibrium? I have proved that if α ≥ α¯ or δ ≤ δ˜, then there is no
opposition (c∗ = 0), and so there will be no outside interference. These conditions
that thwart opposition turn out to be both necessary and sufficient to have no
39See < http : //archive.indianexpress.com/news/unlike − singur − salboni −
farmers − look − forward − to − land − acquisition − −/33349/2 > and < https :
//www.ukessays.com/essays/history/study − of − salboni − land − acquisition − history −
essay.php >, accessed on 24.4.2016.
40See < http : //www.business − standard.com/india/news/land − acquisition − in −
gujarat− less− bloody/377151/ >, accessed on 23.4.2016.
53
holdout in equilibrium.
0.7.4 Coercive pro-industrial party F: a digression
The above framework assumes that sellers are free to decide whether they want to
sell their plots through party F, or wait and negotiate directly with the buyer once
all interference hurdles are overcome. Note though that in our framework, party
F has a strong incentive to coerce sellers to sell their plots early since, with more
first period sales, the probability of victory increases for party F. Such coercion
is widespread; there are many instances around the world where landowners were
threatened by a political party to sell their lands.41 How would this possibility
affect the equilibrium variables like rent, degree of opposition, price of land and
the magnitude of holdout?
To address this issue, I look at a simple extension of our model in the following
subsection where refusal to participate in the first period offer (q, k), if approached
by party F, results in a personal penalty of amount χ > 0 to the seller.42 Given
the discussions above, it is only natural to assume that in an LDC, party F is
typically endowed with the required political and state machinery to execute this
threat costlessly.
Details on Coercion: Consider a scenario when the pro-industrial party F is coer-
cive and coercion, if exercised, imposes a direct cost of amount χ > 0 on any seller
who refuses to sell land in the early phase through the party. Proposition 4 below
captures report on the equilibrium under this possibility. It shows that while in
equilibrium coercion will not be executed, credibility of the threat itself will affect
41The recent verdict by the Supreme Court of India is suggestive of coercive land sale in Singur.
See for example < http : //timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Supreme − Court − raises −
questions−on−Singur−land−allocation−for−Tata−Motors/articleshow/52134670.cms >.
42The analysis goes through without any modifications even if I assume that in case of
even a single offer being refused, all the villagers would be punished. In this context we
note that in Singur, the then industries minister of West Bengal threatened to cut off all de-
velopmental works in this region, which is a group penalty rather than a private one. See
< http : //www.mainstreamweekly.net/article101.html >.
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the size of holdout and price of land. This is because the buyer incorporates this
aspect in his first period offer that makes the early sellers exactly indifferent be-
tween selling and refusing to do so, and then waiting to negotiate with the buyer.
This of course affects the first period price which now depends upon both χ, as
well as the amount of first period sales k (see Figure 3 below). In particular, this
makes the relationship between the early phase price q and the size of bureaucratic
corruption rI non- linear. Otherwise, the possibility of coercion is analytically sim-
ilar to the effect of a ‘jump’ in the value of λ in the baseline framework (without
coercion). It is this jump-effect that yields the interesting result that size of co-
ercion may both increase or decrease the size of holdout (driven by the fact that
size of coercion is non-monotonic in λ (this part is detailed in Chapter 2 (section
0.9) and is reported in Corollary 3 there).
Proposition 4. Suppose the pro-industrial party F is coercive and coercion, if
exercised, imposes a direct cost of amount χ > 0 on any seller who refuses to sell
land in the early phase through the party. Then the following is true in equilibrium:
(i) If λ and χ are sufficiently small, then the possibility of coercion reduces
holdout. However, for sufficiently large λ, coercion increases holdout. For
intermediate values of λ, holdout increases only if χ is sufficiently large;
(ii) Political rent-seeking (rP ) and degree of opposition (c) are both higher in the
presence of coercion; however no seller pays the coercion penalty χ;
(iii) (a) Land price in the late phase (as determined by direct bargaining between
the buyer and the sellers, i.e., qb) is not affected;
(b) Land price in the early phase (as settled through party F, i.e., q) neces-
sarily falls when bureaucratic corruption is high (viz. high rI) and may
even fall below v;
(c) An increase in bureaucratic corruption, i.e., an increase in rI , reduces
q for small level of corruption (viz. small rI). However, this happens
at a decreasing rate, and q may even increase if the existing level of
corruption is already very high and party F is highly motivated.
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Note that given (q, k), if there is no refusal then the second period price remains
qb =
λ+v
2
+ rI
(
1
2
− β) as before. So consider a unilateral deviation by a seller who
now refuses when approached while a fraction k accepts. Then his payoff from this
deviation is pi(k)[qb−(1−β)rI ]+(1−pi(k))v−χ, while by not deviating he obtains
pi(k)q+(1−pi(k))v. Thus for a fixed target of period 1 sales k, a profit maximising
price offer from the buyer must equalise these two expressions, yielding period 1
price equal to
qcoercion = qb − (1− β)rI − χ
k
. (9)
Contrast (9) with (4). There is a fundamental distinction where although in equi-
librium there is no refusal and therefore no seller incurs the cost χ directly, the
threat of coercion affects the buyer’s first period price offer, allowing him room
to reduce it by an amount χ
k
. Replacing the expression for qcoercion in the buyer’s
profit function (see (6)), it is easy to verify that the impact of a positive χ is equiv-
alent to an increase in λ by an amount 2χ. Hence, it follows from Proposition 1
that there is holdout if and only if rP > rI +
(λ+2χ)−v−rI
4
with first period sales
given by
kcoercion(rP ) =
(λ+ 2χ)− rI − v
4(rP − rI) .
Hence ceteris paribus, the size of holdout falls under coercion. Of course the
possibility of coercion may now affect the equilibrium value of the political variable
rP directly as well as indirectly via a change in the equilibrium value of the other
political variable c.
Given that χ is never exercised in equilibrium, irrespective of the source of
this threat or the cost of administering it, the rest of the analysis turns out to
be equivalent to what I have undertaken in Sections 0.7.1 and 0.7.2. Since the
equilibrium response of rP is positive with λ in our baseline model, introduction of
coercion increases rP (see Corollary 1). The same conclusion can be drawn about
c∗ (see Proposition 3 part 2(a)). Thus with the possibility of a coercive F party, it
is clear that both political rent-seeking and political opposition rises.
What about holdout once political variables are chosen in equilibrium? We
have seen that in the benchmark analysis, the impact of a rise in λ on k∗ is non-
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monotonic: it’s positively related if λ < v + rI − γ1−γ and otherwise negatively
related. Hence I can conclude that if λ and χ are sufficiently small, then the pos-
sibility of coercion increases k∗ thereby reducing holdout. However, for sufficiently
large λ, coercion decreases k∗ thereby increasing holdout. For intermediate values
of λ, holdout increases only if χ is sufficiently large. The rest of the proof is moved
to Appendix A, subsection 0.19.1.
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Figure 3: Effects of a change in rI on the price of land (qcoercion and qb) when party
F is coercive and has a high γ.
Fig. 3 depicts and compares the period 1 prices with and without coercion. As
indicated in the figure, if party F is highly motivated, so that γ is large, then, for
very high values of rI , the period 1 price can rise as corruption increases, i.e., rI
increases. Also note that with the possibility of coercion, the price of land can
be even less than v whenever the size of corruption is large (larger than r¯I in the
figure) and γ is high.
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0.7.5 What happens when party A practice coercion?
Suppose once the game reaches the late phase of land acquisition, where a fraction
of k sellers have agreed to sell in the early stage and the remaining (1-k) fraction
of sellers can now enter into a bargaining with B, party A can be coercive and
using its power can threaten these (1-k) fraction of sellers in case they decide to
sell through bargaining. This incurs an individual cost d to the sellers for deserting
party A and joining B in the event party F wins the contest so that the project
takes place in the locality.
Suppose in the bargaining stage there is a fraction t of sellers who is ready to
pay the cost d and forms a group of size t(1 − k) to bargain with the buyer over
price qb while the remaining (1− t)(1−k) fraction of sellers don’t. The outcome is
determined through a symmetric Nash bargaining process involving B on one side
and the t(1 − k) sellers on the other. The Nash program is: maxqb≥0[(k + t(1 −
k))λ−k(q+rP )−t(1−k)(qb+βrI)−(λk−k(q+rP )][t(1−k)(qb−v−(1−β)rI−d)].
This simplifies to,
max
qb≥0
[t(1− k)λ− t(1− k)(qb + βrI)][t(1− k)(qb − v − (1− β)rI − d)]. (10)
The following lemma is then straightforward.
Lemma 3. In the late stage suppose a fraction t(1− k) fraction of sellers bargain
with the buyer to sell their plots. Then the Nash bargaining price qb =
λ+v+d
2
+
rI
(
1
2
− β). Consequently, the price qb is (a) increasing in v, d and λ, (b) decreasing
in β, (c) increasing in rI iff β <
1
2
, and (d) unaffected by α, rP and k.
Note that the results are similar to what we have obtained without such coer-
cion by party A except that the bargaining price qb is now higher. This effect is
very similar to a scenario when the productivity of the plots in industrial use, i.e.,
λ rises.
Following Subsection 0.6.2, in stage 2 the buyer must decide on k using the
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intermediation of party F. For a given choice of k, the buyer needs to offer a price
q to implement the desired k. Following the same analysis as Subsection 0.6.2
each of the k sellers who agree to sell at the early stage at price q, gets a payoff
if pi(k)q + (1 − pi(k))v, whereas the payoff of any seller who delays sale equals
pi(k)(qb − (1− β)rI − d) + (1− pi(k))v. Thus, if he sets a price such that pi(k)q +
(1− pi(k))v < pi(k)(qb− (1− β)rI − d) + (1− pi(k))v, then the sellers would prefer
to wait and he cannot implement k. Thus, he would prefer to set the minimum
possible price k such that, pi(k)q+(1−pi(k))v ≥ pi(k)(qb−(1−β)rI−d)+(1−pi(k))v.
Hence for any fixed target k of phase one sellers, I now have
q(k) = qb − (1− β)rI − d. (11)
This immediately follows that the early phase price is now smaller than the
case with non-coercive A, as now q = λ+v
2
− rI
2
− d.
Note that given this coercion by party A, I now have to consider the sellers’
payoff (when the project is taking place) from participating in phase 2 bargaining.
The payoff of a seller from joining the bargaining group is qB− (1−β)rI − d while
his payoff from non-participation is v. Clearly, if qB − (1 − β)rI − d > v then
it is individually profitable for the sellers to participate in the bargaining stage.
Otherwise if qB − (1 − β)rI − d < v, then it is individually rational for them to
stay out of it. Thus, for participation of all remaining sellers it must be that
qB ≥ (1− β)rI + d+ v.
Substituting qB in the above expression yields the condition
d ≤ λ− v − rI .
Thus there are two possible cases: (i) the cost of coercion is relatively small such
that d ≤ λ−(v+rI) and (ii) the cost of coercion is too high such that d ≥ λ−(v+rI).
Case (i): Suppose d ≤ λ − v − rI . Given F’s participation and the prices q
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and qB, I now determine the buyer’s optimal choice of k. The profit function of
the buyer in stage 1 is thus
Π(k) = pi(k)(λ− k(q + rP )− (1− k)(qb + βrI)). (12)
Substituting pi(k), q and qb in the above expression and simplifying further I obtain
k
(
λ− v − rI − d
2
+ k(rI + d− rP )
)
.
Lemma 4 below captures the conditions for HO. It assumes that F participates,
considers that the cost of coercion by party A in phase 2 is relatively small such
that d ≤ λ − v − rI and demonstrates the possibility of holdout whenever the
political rent rP is large.
Lemma 4. There is holdout with F’s participation and with relatively small cost of
coercion such that d ≤ λ− v− rI , if and only if the political rent rP is significantly
higher than the transactions costs, that is rP > (rI + d) +
λ−v−(rI+d)
4
. The number
of plots sold in the early stage, i.e.,
k∗(rP ) =
λ− v − (rI + d)
4(rP − (rI + d)) , (13)
whenever rP > (rI + d) +
λ−v−(rI+d)
4
, and k∗(rP ) = 1 otherwise. Moreover, the size
of holdout increases in v and rP , but decreases in rI , d and λ.
Note that for any rP significantly higher than the transaction costs, the pres-
ence of 0 < d ≤ λ−v−rI increases the value of k∗(rP ) as compared to the scenario
when such a coercive A was absent. This is intuitive. If party A becomes coerce
so that it is more costly for the sellers to sell tomorrow, it drives up the price in
the late phase. This takes away incentives of the buyer to buy land tomorrow and
this drives up k∗(rP ). Moreover, when it comes to k this is similar to a rise in rI
in our initial framework with no coercion in the bargaining phase. Thus all results
on F and A are valid by simply replacing rI by (rI + d) as d does not enter into
party F and A’s utility functions.
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Case (ii): Suppose d > λ − v − rI . Given F’s participation and the prices
q and qB, I now determine the buyer’s optimal choice of k. Recall that for such
significantly high cost from coercion no rational seller is likely to participate in
the bargaining phase. Given this the payoff of a seller from selling in phase 1 is
pi(k)q+(1−pi(k))v while his payoff from delaying is pi(k)v+(1−pi(k))v. Following
the same analysis as earlier, setting a price such that pi(k)q + (1 − pi(k))v <
pi(k)v + (1− pi(k))v, would not let B to implement k and thus, he would prefer to
set the minimum possible price such that, pi(k)q+(1−pi(k))v ≥ pi(k)v+(1−pi(k))v.
Hence for any fixed target k of phase one sellers, I now have
q(k) = v. (14)
The profit function of B in stage 1 is thus
Π(k) = pi(k)(λk − k(q + rP )), (15)
that B wants to maximise w.r.t. k. Substituting pi(k) and q in the above expression
yields
Π(k) = k2(λ− v − rP ).
The first order derivative of the buyer’s profit function in 15 gives
Π′(k) = 2k(λ− v − rP ), (16)
where note that Π′(0) = 0, and Π′(1) = 2(λ − v − rP ) > 0. Further, the second
order derivative of the profit function gives
Π′′(k) = 2(λ− v − rP ),
so that Π′′(k) > 0 for all rP < λ − v. Let k˜(rP ) denote the choice of k that
maximises Π(k). For rP < λ− v, Π(k) is increasing and convex. Thus k˜(rP ) = 1
and there is no HO.
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I am now ready to examine the impact of changes in the deeper parameters of
our framework on buyer-induced holdout and the key economic variables in our
framework. While the sizes of these important parameters are not expected to
change significantly in the ‘short run’, they may undergo small improvements or
deteriorations. The next is to examine whether the existence of buyer-induced
holdout is hostage of linearity of functions. The impact of changes in deeper
institutional parameters is examined in Chapter 2, while in the present chapter I
turn to examine whether the existence of buyer-induced holdout is subjected to
the simplified linear functions for pi(·), V (·) and quadratic cost function C(·).
0.7.6 Holdout with general pi(k), V (k) and C(k) functions
In the previous sections we have found robust sufficient conditions for which k∗ < 1
(what I called the incidence of holdout). I now show that this result is not hostage
to the simplified linear functions for pi(·) and V (·) or quadratic cost function C(·).
I will assume that A’s reservation payoff is zero while that of F is not above
− (1−γ)δ
(1−δ)α which ensures F’s participation. Otherwise I retain all the basic features
of the original model to characterise the problem of holdout except that now
the pi(·), V (·) and C(·) functions are more general. In particular, I assume that
C(k) = km,m > 1 while V (·) and pi(·) are at least twice differentiable and strictly
concave with the following properties: pi(0) = 0, pi(1) = 1, pi′(1) ≥ 0, and pi(k)
kpi′(k) = ,
(i.e., pi(·) exhibits constant elasticity, an example being pi(k) = kα, 0 < α ≤ 1);
and V (0) = 0, V (1) ≥ V ′(1).
Let
ψ(k) =
V (1)− V (k)
1− k .
Thus ψ(0) = V (1) and ψ(1) = V ′(1). Note that given the concavity of V (·)
function ψ′(k) =
V (1)−V (k)
1−k −V ′(k)
1−k < 0 and ψ”(k) =
−V ”(k)(1−k)
(1−k)4 ≥ 0. Moreover
ψ′(0) = V (1) and ψ′(1) = V ”(1)
2
.
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A buyer’s direct bargaining with 1 − k fraction of sellers in the second phase
yields
qb =
ψ(k)
2
+
v
2
+ rI
(
1
2
− β
)
.
I now determine the fraction of sellers k joining party F in stage 3 where the
indifferent seller k is again given by q(k) = qb − (1 − β)rI . Hence the profit
function of the buyer in stage 2 is
Π(k) = pi(k)[V (1)− k(q + rP )− (1− k)(qb + βrI)].
Substituting q, qb in the above expression I obtain
Π(k) = pi(k)
(
V (1)− ψ(k)
2
− v
2
− rI
2
− k(rP − rI)
)
, (17)
so that Π(0) = 0 and Π(1) = 2V (1)−V
′(1)−2rP+rI−v
2
.
The buyer’s objective in stage 2 is then to maximise Π(k) by choosing k. Denote
the optimal choice by k˜(rP ). The first derivative of his profit function in (17) gives
Π′(k) =
1
2
(pi′(k)(2V (1)− 2k(rP − rI)−ψ(k)− v− rI) + pi(k)(2(rI − rP )−ψ′(k))).
Let ¯ = pi
′(k)/k
pi”(k)
. Note that given the concavity of pi(·) we have ¯ ≤ 0. Moreover
¯ = 
1− . Substituting  in the first derivative of the buyer’s profit gives
2Π′(k) = pi′(k)(2V (1)− 2k(rP − rI)(1 + )− ψ(k)− v − rI − kψ′(k)). (18)
To obtain an interior solution for k and thereby getting holdout I need to show
that Π(k) has the following properties: Π′(0) > 0, Π′(1) < 0 and Π′′(·) < 0. Using
the properties of ψ(·) equation (18) yields
2Π′(0) = pi′(0)(V (1)− v − rI) > 0,
63
and
2Π′(1) = pi′(1)(2V (1)− 2(rP − rI)(1 + )− V ′(1)− v − rI − V
′′(1)
2
).
The necessary FOC for an interior equilibrium is as follows and this implicitly
gives the value k∗(rP ).
2V (1)− 2k∗(rP − rI)(1 + )− ψ(k∗)− v − rI − k∗ψ′(k∗) = 0. (19)
Further the second order derivative of the profit function gives
2Π′′(k) = pi′′(k)(2V (1)−2k(rP−rI)−ψ(k)−v−rI)+2pi′(k)(−2(rP−rI)−ψ′(k))−pi(k)ψ′′(k).
Substituting  and ¯ in the above expression yields
2Π′′(k) = pi′′(k)(2V (1)−ψ(k)−v−rI−2k(rP−rI)(1+)(1+¯)−kψ′(k)(+¯(1+))−¯k2ψ′′(k)).
(20)
Notice that given the concavity of pi(·), Π′′(k) < 0 if and only if 2V (1)−ψ(k)−
v− rI − 2k(rP − rI)(1 + )(1 + ¯)− kψ′(k)(+ ¯(1 + ))− ¯k2ψ′′(k) > 0. Note that
2V (1)−ψ(k)− v− rI > 0 since ψ′(k) < 0 and given ψ′′(·) ≥ 0,  > 0 and ¯ ≤ 0 we
have ¯k2ψ′′(k) ≤ 0. Observe that 2k(rP − rI)(1 + )(1 + ¯) < 0 whenever rP > rI
holds.
Consider the following set of conditions denoted by Condition P :
• + ¯(1 + ) < 0, and
• 2V (1)−V ′(1)−v− rI > 2(rP − rI)(1+ )(1+ ¯)+ V ′′(1)k(+¯(1+))2 + ¯k2ψ′′(1).
This yields the following observation:
Observation 1. Suppose Condition P holds. Then there is holdout if and only if
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the size of political rents is significantly higher than the size of legal rents, that is
rP > rI +
2V (1)−V ′(1)−v−rI−V ”(1)2
2(1+)
.
To see this suppose rP < rI such that Condition P is violated. Then Π(k) is
increasing and convex. Thus k˜(rP ) = 1. Otherwise if Condition P holds then Π(k)
is concave. Hence k˜(rP ) = min{k∗(rP ), 1}. 
Given the above analysis I now move to the activity of party F. For a given
c ≥ 0 by A, the objective of party F is to
max
rP≥0
Z(rP ) ≡ γpi(k˜(rP )) + (1− γ)[pi(k˜(rP ))k˜(rP )rp − ck˜m(rP )] (21)
where m > 1 so that the cost is convex. In the main text I have used m = 2.
Thus in case when rP induces no holdout so that k˜(rP ) = 1, then Z(rP ) =
γ+ (1− γ)(rp− c) and Z(rP ) is increasing in rP . In case when rP induces holdout
so that k˜(rP ) = k
∗(rP ), then
Z(rP ) = γpi(k
∗(rP )) + (1− γ)[k∗(rP )(pi(k∗(rP ))rp − ck∗(m−1)(rP ))].
Note that for any 0 < γ < 1, we get Z(rP ) > 0 if rP ≥ ck∗(m−1)(rP )pi(k∗(rP )) .
Thus for any rP that induces holdout, we have
∂Z(rP )
∂rP
=
∂k∗(rP )
∂rP
(pi′(k∗(rP ))(γ+(1−γ)k∗(rP )(1+rP ))−(1−γ)mck∗(m−1)(rP )).
Recall that the interior equilibrium k∗(rP ) is implicitly obtained from the necessary
FOC of the buyer’s profit function given in equation (19). Hence I take total
derivative of this FOC to obtain
∂k∗(rP )
∂rP
=
2k∗(rP )(1 + )
−2(rP − rI)(1 + )− ψ′(k∗(rP ))(1 + )− k∗(rP )ψ′′(k∗(rP )) < 0,
since 2k∗(rP )(1+) > 0 and−2(rP−rI)(1+)−ψ′(k∗(rP ))(1+)−k∗(rP )ψ′′(k∗(rP )) <
0 for any rP > rI . Thus
∂Z(rP )
∂rP
< 0 if and only if pi′(k∗(rP ))(γ + (1− γ)k∗(rP )(1 +
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rP ))−(1−γ)mck∗(m−1)(rP ) > 0. For ease of exposition I define Y ≡ pi′(k∗(rP ))(γ+
(1− γ)k∗(rP )(1 + rP ))− (1− γ)mck∗(m−1)(rP ).
If rP induces holdout then I denote the optimal choice of F by rˆP that solves
Y = 0. This implicitly gives rˆP
rˆP =
c(1− γ)mk∗(m−1)(rˆP )− pi′(k∗(rˆP ))(γ + (1− γ)k∗(rˆP ))
(1− γ)pi(k∗(rˆP )) .
Let
RI = rI +
2V (1)− V ′(1)− v − rI − V ”(1)2
2(1 + )
,
and
cˆ =
(
RI +
1

+
γ
(1− γ)k∗(rˆP )
)
pi(k∗(rˆP ))
mk∗(m−1)
.
Note that given the characteristics of V (·) and  I have rI < RI < cˆ.43
Observation 2. There is a unique SPNE for each subgame initiated by A through
a choice of c. Let r∗P denotes the optimal choice of party F,
(a) if c ≤ cˆ and Y |rP=RI > 0 then r∗P = RI , and there is no holdout,
(b) if c > cˆ and Y |rP=RI < 0 then r∗P = rˆP > RI and there is holdout.
From Observation 1 we know that for any rP ≤ RI there is no holdout on the
equilibrium path. Thus party F’s utility is γ + (1− γ)(rp − c) and it is increasing
in rP . I now argue whether Z(rP ) is decreasing for any rP > RI . To see this I
first consider a small c such that ck
∗(m−1)(rP )
pi(k∗(rP ))
≤ RI . If party F chooses any rP > RI
then Y |rP=RI = pi′(k∗(rP ))(γ + (1 − γ)k∗(rP )(1 + rP )) − (1 − γ)mck∗(m−1)(rP ).
Consequently Z(rP ) is positive at rP = RI but is decreasing in rP . Hence optimally
party F sets r∗P = RI for this region and there is no holdout. I next consider c
43Note that here RI corresponds to rI +
λ−v−rI
4 and cˆ corresponds to c¯ in the linear pi(·) and
V (·) case.
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is large such that ck
∗(m−1)(rP )
pi(k∗(rP ))
> RI . If Z(rP ) is increasing in this region, then
party F optimally chooses r∗P > RI for this region. From Observation 1 for any
rP > RI there is holdout, and the optimal rP is then implicitly obtained from the
necessary FOC. Note that if Y |rP=RI = pi′(k∗(rP ))(γ + (1− γ)k∗(rP )(1 + RI))−
(1− γ)mck∗(m−1)(rP ) > 0, so that Z(rP ) is decreasing then optimally party F sets
r∗P = RI and there is no holdout. Otherwise if Y |rP=RI = pi′(k∗(rP ))(γ + (1 −
γ)k∗(rP )(1 + RI))− (1− γ)mck∗(m−1)(rP ) < 0, so that Z(rP ) is increasing in rP ,
then optimally party F sets r∗P = rˆP and the outcome involves holdout. Note that
for sufficiently large c such that c > cˆ we have rˆP > RI . Hence if c > cˆ and Z(rP )
is increasing in rP (obtained from Y |rP=RI = pi′(k∗(rP ))(γ + (1 − γ)k∗(rP )(1 +
RI)) − (1 − γ)mck∗(m−1)(rP ) < 0), then optimally party F sets r∗P = rˆP and the
outcome involves holdout. This verifies Observation 2. 
Finally I consider the initiation of this whole game and find conditions under
which A’s equilibrium choice of c yields a SPE with holdout. A’s objective is to
max
c≥0
D ≡ δ(1− pi(k˜(rP )))− (1− δ)αc, (22)
where k˜(rP ) is the buyer’s optimal choice of k.
Observation 3. Suppose D|c=cˆ > 0 and Y |rP=RI < 0. Then a SPNE choice of
opposition level by A is c∗ = cˆ and the outcome involves holdout.
From Observation 2 we know that the region where c ≤ RI there is no holdout.
Since α > 0 it must then be optimal for A to choose c∗|c≤RI = 0. In this case A’s
payoff is 0. Now consider the region where rP > RI that induces holdout. From
observation 2 we know that for a large c such that c > cˆ and Y |rP=RI < 0 we have
r∗P = rˆP . Thus party A
′s payoff in c is
D = δ(1− pi(k∗(rˆP )))− (1− δ)αc,
and the necessary FOC: ∂D
∂c
= 0 implicitly gives the value of cˆ(k∗(rˆP ))44. The
party’s payoff from choosing cˆ(k∗(rˆP )) isD|c>cˆ = δ(1−pi(k∗(rˆP )))−(1−δ)αcˆ(k∗(rˆP )).
44This corresponds to cf in the linear pi(·) and V (·) case.
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Note that if D|c>cˆ > 0 then party A optimally chooses c∗ = cˆ. This holds true for
α sufficiently close to 0. Now rˆP > RI if and only if
cˆ =
(
RI +
1

+
γ
(1− γ)k∗(rˆP )
)
pi(k∗(rˆP ))
mk∗(m−1)
.
Since ∂k
∗(rˆP )
∂rˆP
< 0 the above holds true for sufficiently large rˆP . Since we are at
the region when c > cˆ, we have rˆP > RI . Hence we have sufficient conditions for
holdout. 
0.7.7 Involvement of party F in late stage of land acquisi-
tion
Consider a scenario in which once the project passes through the political battle,
party F can get involved in the bargaining that takes place between the buyer and
the remaining 1 − k sellers if and only if all parties agree. Of course in this case
party F leverages its connections in local institutions to ensure that the additional
transaction costs rI are waived in this stage as well. In return, it asks for a per-
unit rent of amount b that is to be shared between the buyer and the sellers in the
proportion β and 1− β as was for the case of sharing rI .
Suppose the game reaches Stage 5 and party F sets this rent b. Then Nash
program is:
max
qb≥0
[λ− (1− k)(qb + βb)− λk][(1− k)(qb − v − (1− β)b)].
Also, it is easy to see that in equilibrium, party F will set b = rI just to make
all bargaining parties indifferent between paying rI , or paying party F to avoid
paying rI . Hence, the two prices of land will remain as in the benchmark model
(Lemma 2). It then immediately follows that with exogenous politics in the early
stage (that is, when rP and c are fixed), Proposition 1 remains intact.
Now consider the optimal demand for the first period rent by party F. The pos-
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sibility of future involvement and the equilibrium behaviour in that continuation
game changes F’s period 1 payoff from (1) to
max
rP
Z(rP ) = γpi(k
∗) + (1− γ)[pi(k∗)(k∗rP + (1− k∗)rI)− c(k∗)2],
where k∗ is as in Proposition 1. It is again routine to show that for c large enough,
this rent is given by
r′P =
(1− γ)(λ+ 3rI − v)rI + 2c(1− γ)(λ− v − rI)− 4γrI
(1− γ)(λ+ 3rI − v) + 4γ .
Since the payoff function of A remains intact, the rest of the analysis is qualitatively
identical. However, party F’s new political rent in phase one (i.e., r′P ) can be higher
or lower than the rent it asked in the initial model (i.e., rˆP ). For example, suppose
γ = 0.8. Then r′P > rˆP if λ− v + rI > 10 and r′P < rˆP if λ− v + rI < 10.
0.8 Conclusion
Chapter 1 develops a theoretical framework that allows us to study how insti-
tutional infirmities, in particular bureaucratic corruption and extra-legal outside
interference from political parties (and motivated civil society organisations), af-
fect land acquisition. I characterise conditions under which these imperfections
generate holdout, where, given these institutional constraints, the buyer in his
own interests designs the acquisition process in such a fashion that there is some
chance that acquisition may fail. Further, I demonstrate that urban vicinity, high
land-fertility or low project returns, all add to the chances that outside interfer-
ence of this nature will cause the buyer to induce holdout. In addition, whenever
the buyer induces holdout, one also obtains dual pricing of land in that the price
of land sold during the early phase of the acquisition process is necessarily lower
than what sellers obtain at a later stage. Moreover these results are qualitatively
robust to whether there is coercion by political parties or not.
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Let us now discuss several aspects of the land acquisition process that the study
has abstracted away from till now. It has assumed that the reservation utility from
land is identical for all sellers. In reality, although one would not expect too much
of a variation (since geographic vicinity largely determines the quality of land and
thus plot value), there may be instances where this is violated. In that event
one interesting issue is whether the buyer would target high yield plots for early
acquisition through politics, leaving low yield plots for laissez-faire bargaining, or
the other way around. Another important theme is the uncertainty that poor
landowners face when they sell their plots and look beyond traditional means of
livelihood. One can incorporate this aspect in our framework by assuming that
the buyer will have to compensate for this additional cost borne by sellers. Hence
all our results will go through qualitatively.
In the next chapter I will discuss the impact of relevant parameters on the size
of buyer-induced holdout, sellers’ welfare and economic surplus. In this chapter, it
is considered that opposition can come from a broader spectrum including civic-
society organisation and local political parties that is typically out of office, who
utilises the platform to gain the support of landowners. However, one can think of
scenarios when local political opposition leads the movements against land acqui-
sition ordeals to achieve greater political benefit beyond the scope of the success
of these local movements. Keeping this in mind, Chapter 2 takes a brief look on
the impacts of some short term institutional changes not only on the local sellers
but also on non-local political constituencies. Chapter 3 then takes a detail look in
the conflicting scenarios and analyses the importance of early or late mobilisation
of resources for violence by the local polity in resulting violent conflicts.
70
0.9 Chapter 2: Impact Of Institutional Parame-
ters On Buyer-Induced Holdout,
Seller Welfare And Economic Surplus
0.9.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I analysed a theoretical framework where weak institutions,
specifically the ones that promote bureaucratic corruption and allow for outside
interference, can result in delays in land acquisition programs. I see that the
equilibrium involves holdout if in presence of an organised opposition there is a
positive probability of the project being stalled, resulting from reduction of the
number of sales through an initial take-it-or-leave-it offer, being proposed to the
sellers. The interesting feature of holdout in this framework is that delay, if any, is
buyer-induced. The previous chapter presents conditions under which it is in the
best interests of the buyer to delay the land acquisition process. I then examine
scenarios when political parties can impose credible threats and act coercively. Its
impact on the size of sale of land as well as on price are then interestingly nuanced.
The present chapter is in continuation with this framework of buyer-induced
holdout. In this chapter I examine how the magnitude of this buyer-induced hold-
out is related to the deeper institutional parameters of such an economy, namely,
the level of bureaucratic corruption, the ease of opposition and timing of elections
that may tilt preferences of political parties towards political gains. I also examine
the impact of a change in these deeper institutional parameters on sellers welfare
and overall economic surplus. Of course one understands that changes in insti-
tutions take long time and thus impacts of such changes are rarely visible with
alteration of one policy. However one can expect to see changes in ‘short run’
and predict their impacts on an economy. In this chapter I attempt to examine
such small changes in deeper institutional parameters. It is also of interest to see
whether the effects of institutional changes are sensitive to whether the interference
levels are endogenous or not.
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Finally I want to examine the impact of nearby elections on the concerning
variables, as with approaching elections it is more likely that political motivations
increase. One can predict that in such a scenario there are two opposing effects on
the size of holdout - while it would tend to decrease as the pro-industry party gets
more motivated, it would tend to increase as opposition also gets more motivated.
It would be interesting to see the net effect of these two forces.
The main questions that I ask here are as follows: how does a reduction in
corruption affect the magnitude of buyer-induced holdout? Can one expect to
see a rise in economic surplus as the bureaucratic corruption falls in an economy?
Does the presence of organised opposition help sellers to gain more in land deals?
Main Results
Our first major result relates to the effects of changes in the degree of bureau-
cratic corruption on several measures of welfare, namely buyer-induced holdout,
aggregate seller utility and economic efficiency. I demonstrate that a reduction in
corruption affects both the magnitude of holdout, as well as the economic surplus
in a non-monotonic fashion, with the results depending on whether I am dealing
with a relatively developed nation (i.e., one with relatively low levels of corrup-
tion), or a LDC (where corruption is relatively high), to begin with. I have shown
that while a fall in corruption reduces holdout when corruption is low, it necessar-
ily increases holdout when corruption is high. This generates a testable hypothesis
that one can potentially take to data. Why does the effect depend upon whether
corruption is large or small to begin with? Intuitively, a reduction in transactions
costs has two effects, one direct, in that it increases a seller’s incentive to sell her
plot, and one indirect, in that it makes it less attractive for the buyer and the
sellers to work through party F since F responds to a decrease in corruption by
increasing the political rent it charges. This in turn reduces party F’s political
clout in that a smaller number of sellers sell via political intermediation, making
holdout more likely. If corruption is large to begin with, so that party F is more
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motivated (relative to the net returns from the project), then the political consid-
erations that drive the indirect effect becomes quite important, hence the indirect
effect dominates.
The effects of a change in bureaucratic corruption on the economic surplus is
also interestingly nuanced, with a decrease in corruption can reduce the economic
surplus in a LDC where the existing levels of corruption is already high, whereas
it can increase the economic surplus in a relatively developed economy. The result
of course follows from the fact that a reduction in corruption in land sales can
either increase or decrease holdout depending on whether it is easy to oppose due
to institutional weakness, or not. The effects of an improvement in the rule of
law on short term economic surplus is also interestingly nuanced and can go either
way.
I then show that by and large, buyer-induced holdout is more likely to occur
when elections are nearby and the concerned projects are large. I also find that
typically seller welfare goes down for projects under acquisition in periods close to
elections provided the projects are large.
I then turn to the implications of sellers’ welfare with respect to deeper in-
stitutional parameters and find that an increase in bureaucratic corruption or a
decrease in ease of opposition unambiguously hurt sellers. However, there is a
non-monotonic seller preference for opposition from A given that party F exists.
They all want opposition, irrespective of whether this opposition enables them to
retain their bargaining power with the buyer or not, but only up to existence; once
opposition exists sellers want to minimise its presence.
I then consider a small extension of the model to find the effects of having
organised political opposition, that typically comes from a local opposition party
out of office who exploits the platform to extract greater political benefit, on the
non-local welfare as well as on the total welfare of a LDC (where bureaucratic
corruption are endemic and it is challenging for parties to reduce degree of cor-
ruption in short term). I aim to examine the impact of extortionary activities in
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the institutions that rises level of corruption on different measures of welfare, in
particular on non-local welfare and total welfare on the economy. While I show
that the effects are non-monotonic, for both non-local welfare and total welfare,
this non-monotonicity results from an interplay between political parameters such
as the size of non-local constituencies, ideological motivations of the parties and
the relative size of population of the non-sellers in the economy. A summary of
results find that even if a party in power can make some institutional improve-
ment to reduce bureaucratic corruption, it is hard to predict which party, being in
power will make such incremental changes in corruption. Interestingly this result
is irrespective of whether the party in power is pro-industry or not.
In Chapter 1 I mentioned the importance of endogenizing the outside inter-
ference. In this chapter I show that several key comparative statics results with
respect to the effects of institutional changes are sensitive to whether the interfer-
ence levels are endogenous, or not (this is examined in subsection 0.10.7). Thus
a framework where the interference contest is exogenous may yield misleading
conclusions.
This chapter is organised in the following manner. In Section 0.10 includes
the analysis of how changes in the deeper institutional parameters and preference
parameters of our framework affects several variables of interest, including the level
of buyer-induced holdout, seller welfare and the economic surplus. This followed
by an indirect empirical investigation on this form of holdout through a set of
testable hypotheses. In sub-section 0.10.3 I include some crucial discussions on the
existence and strength of local opposition. Sub-section 0.10.4 then includes the
impact of having a coercive pro-industry party F on the sellers. Sub-section 0.10.5
and sub-section 0.10.6 include the impacts of changes in the deeper institutional
parameters and preference parameters on economic surplus in different numerical
examples. Section 0.11 and sub-section 0.11.2 include all results of an increase in
bureaucratic corruption on non-local and total welfares. All the proofs are included
in Appendix A, sub-section 0.19.2. Sub-section 0.11.4 concludes this chapter.
74
0.10 Impact of corruption and ease of opposition
on holdout, seller welfare and economic sur-
plus
I am now in a position to examine the impact of changes in the deeper parameters
of our framework, namely the degree of bureaucratic corruption (viz. rI) and ease
of opposition (viz. α) and the preference parameters of F and A (viz. γ and δ) on
the key economic variables in our framework. While the sizes of these important
parameters are not expected to change significantly in the ‘short run’, they may
undergo small improvements or deteriorations. I now ask how small changes in
these parameters affect the degree of hold out, welfare of the sellers and the overall
economic surplus from land acquisition for industrial growth.
0.10.1 Impact on Holdout
Consider an economy where current levels of bureaucratic corruption and ease
of opposition result in hold out. How does an improvement in either of these
parameters affect the extent of holdout that makes the process of industrialisation
uncertain? Theorem 2 deals with this.
Theorem 2. Suppose that α < α¯ and δ > δ˜, so that there is holdout in equilibrium.
(i) The magnitude of holdout, i.e. 1 − k∗, is non-monotonic in the level of
bureaucratic corruption, i.e. rI ; to be precise, 1 − k∗ is increasing in rI if
rI < (λ− v)− γ1−γ , but is decreasing in rI otherwise.
(ii) The magnitude of holdout decreases monotonically with a decrease in the ease
of opposition, i.e. an increase in α.
(iii) Further, if rI < (λ − v) − γ1−γ so that a fall in corruption reduces holdout,
a simultaneous fall in ease of opposition dampens this reduction; if rI >
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(λ − v) − γ
1−γ so that a fall in corruption increases holdout, a simultaneous
fall in ease of opposition dampens this increase. Formally, ∂(1−k
∗)
∂rI
> 0 if
∂2(1−k∗)
∂α∂rI
> 0, while ∂(1−k
∗)
∂rI
< 0 if ∂
2(1−k∗)
∂α∂rI
< 0.
Ir0
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Figure 4: Size of holdout (viz. 1 − k∗) as a ‘function’ of degree of corruption rI
and ease of opposition α.
Theorem 2(i) shows that while an increase in bureaucratic corruption rI in-
creases holdout when rI is small, it decreases holdout when rI is large, so that
the impact is non-monotonic. Why does the effect of a change in rI depend upon
whether corruption is large or small to begin with? Suppose bureaucratic corrup-
tion rI increases. From Proposition 1 in Chapter 1, note that the direct effect
of this change in rI will be to increase holdout. Moreover, there is an indirect
effect stemming from the fact that an increase in rI induces party F to reduce
the political rent charged by it, and consequently induces A to reduce the level
of its political opposition c. This reduces the political space available to party F,
and increases that for party A, so that holdout would tend to decrease. When
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party F is very highly motivated relative to the net returns from the project, i.e.,
λ− rI − v < γ1−γ (which is likely to be the case for LDCs where rI can be expected
to be large), then the indirect effect will be large enough to overturn the direct
effect, so that holdout decreases. Otherwise, the direct effect dominates, so that
holdout increases.
An increase in α on the other hand reduces the space for opposition since it
increases the marginal cost of increasing c. Theorem 2(ii) suggests that this would
reduce the magnitude of holdout, which is expected.
Theorem 2(iii) then demonstrates that the effect of a change in rI on holdout is
always enhanced when α increases. Thus, if there is a lot of existing bureaucratic
corruption in the system (i.e., rI is large), then reducing corruption increases
holdout to a greater extent if the rule of law is robust so that opposing land
acquisition is costly. Whereas if there is not much existing bureaucratic corruption
in the system (i.e., rI is small), then reducing corruption further reduces holdout
to a greater extent if the rule of law is robust. Figure 4 provides a graphical
representation of Theorem 2, plotting the relation between 1 − k∗ and rI for two
values of α, where the observed inflection point at λ− v− 3γ
1−γ is easy to establish.
Finally, note that Theorem 2(i) and (ii) are both critically dependent on the
fact that interference is endogenous. In case rP and c are taken to be exogenous,
then Proposition 1 of Chapter 1 shows that an increase in bureaucratic corruption
necessarily increases holdout, which is exactly the reverse of our result in case of
LDCs. The difference can be traced to the fact that with an endogenous rP , an
increase in rI reduces the political space available to party F (as clarified while
discussing Theorem 2(ii)), so that there is an additional channel through which rI
affects holdout. Further, with an exogenous rP and c, the level of holdout does
not depend on α at all.
Remark 1 (Coase theorem). The theorem states that in absence of any institu-
tional distortions (that affect transaction costs) an efficient solution towards re-
solving interdependent uses of resources is achieved through a bargaining process
among the relevant property holders. In its full stretch, lower transaction costs
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should result in Pareto improving resource allocations regardless of the initial dis-
tribution of property rights. Interestingly, in the present model such frictions have
a non-monotonic impact on the efficiency of the equilibrium outcome (through a
non-monotonic impact on holdout). As captured in Theorem 2 deterioration in
institutions that increases transaction costs (viz. a rise in rI) improves efficiency
when the existing institutions are sufficiently bad, otherwise such an increase in
transaction costs decreases efficiency. Although apparently this stands against the
Coase theorem, the present model considers closely interlinked two institutions
where worsening of the one leads to the improvement in other and the aggregate
impact can improve the efficiency of the equilibrium outcome. In presence of high
level of bureaucratic corruption in the system (viz, rI is large), reducing corruption
increases holdout to a greater extent if the rule of law is robust so that opposing land
acquisition is costly. Whereas with relatively small level of existing bureaucratic
corruption in the system (i.e., rI is small), reducing corruption reduces holdout to
a greater extent if the rule of law is robust. This is because while the direct ef-
fect of an increase in bureaucratic corruptions increases holdout, the indirect effect
that comes from the political conflict tend to decrease holdout - higher transaction
costs induces F to reduce the political rent charged by it to facilitate land transfers
and consequently induces A to reduce its level of political opposition to thwart the
project.
It is now straightforward to see the impact of motivation parameters of the
interfering parties (viz. δ and γ) on the size of holdout. Corollary 2 is then imme-
diate. The proofs of Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 are included in sub-section 0.19.2.
Corollary 2. Suppose that α < α¯ and δ > δ˜, so that there is holdout in equi-
librium. The magnitude of holdout, i.e., 1 − k∗, is monotonic in the degree of
ideological motivations of the interfering parties F and A. To be precise, 1− k∗ is
monotonically increasing in A’s ideological motivation i.e., δ, but is monotonically
decreasing in F’s ideological motivationγ.
Political motivations of party F and A (viz. γ and δ) also play an interesting
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role in Theorem 2. This immediately gives Corollary 3 that mimics the arguments
in Theorem 2.
Corollary 3. The level of holdout 1 − k∗ is decreasing in γ, but increasing in δ.
Further, 1− k∗ decreases with λ and v if and only if rI < λ− v − γ1−γ .
Given Corollary 3, consider the effect of elections being imminent on the size
of holdout. If I assume, as seems natural, that political motivations increase as
elections approach (viz. both γ and δ rise), then there are two opposing effects on
the size of holdout; while it would tend to decrease as F gets more motivated, it
would tend to increase as A also gets more motivated. What is the net impact?
Corollary 4 captured the results. The proofs of Corollary 3 and Corollary 4 are
again included in sub-section 0.19.2.
Corollary 4. Suppose as elections approach, both γ and δ rise proportionately,
that is dγ
γ
= dδ
δ
. Then the following is true: (i) If 2δ(1− δ) ≤ γ(1− γ) then buyer
induced holdout increases unambiguously, and (ii) If 2δ(1 − δ) > γ(1 − γ) then
there exists a threshold value Λ > 0 such that buyer induced holdout increases if
and only if λ− v − rI > Λ.
It is easy to verify that 2δ(1 − δ) > γ(1 − γ) whenever both γ and δ lie in
the interval [0.15, 0.85], so that Corollary 4(ii) holds. Thus over a ‘large’ range
of parameter values, one would expect approaching elections to increase buyer
induced holdout provided the net returns from the project (viz. λ−v−rI) is large
enough.
Empirical implications : Identifying buyer-induced holdout in land acquisition re-
quires one to observe more than the mere incidence of delay in a land acquisition
process. It requires information about (i) whether there was outside interference
even if sellers were willing to sell their plots, and if so, (ii) how the buyer had
approached the outside party and (iii) what was the initial size of land purchased
through the party in power. I recognise that data about these aspects are hard to
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come by, and I leave such an important empirical study on buyer-induced hold-
out for future research. Nevertheless Theorem 2 and Corollaries 3 and 4 allow us
to undertake indirect empirical investigation on this form of holdout through the
following testable hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 : An increase in bureaucratic corruption, i.e., in rI , increases
buyer-induced holdout if the economy is relatively developed, i.e., the exist-
ing value of rI is relatively small, but decreases holdout if the economy is
underdeveloped, i.e., rI is relatively large to begin with.
Hypothesis 2 : An increase in the ease of opposing land acquisition, i.e., a
decrease in α, increases buyer-induced holdout.
Hypothesis 3 : The incidence of buyer-induced holdout is larger for larger
projects, i.e., larger λ, as well as if land is more productive, i.e., larger v,
provided bureaucratic corruption is large.
Hypothesis 4 : The incidence of buyer-induced holdout increases as an elec-
tion becomes more imminent provided the net returns from the project is
large enough.
One starting point for such an empirical exercise might be to develop a the-
oretical framework that allows for both buyer-induced, as well as seller-induced
holdout, and compare the predictions across the two. One can then try and take
these predictions to data. Again, I leave this for future work.
One can predict some general observations from the theoretical analysis in
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 though. For a less developed economy like India, one
would expect that bureaucratic corruption (viz. rI) is large enough to begin with
across all states. Our theory then predicts that, ceteris paribus, the level of holdout
would be lower in states within India where corruption is relatively higher (viz.
Hypothesis 1), and that holdout should be more in states where it is relatively
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easier to organise opposition (viz. Hypothesis 2). The idea is that if a state has
a history of higher political violence, it suggests that institutions in these states
are not effective enough in dealing with protests in general. Further, given that
institutions change relatively slowly, this difference across states should persist
over the period I would be interested in. One reason could be that the political
violence measure used here is conflating two different aspects of political violence;
while it captures the ease of opposition, which would tend to increase holdout,
it may also capture the ease of coercion, which would tend to decrease holdout,
rendering the net effect ambiguous. The theory presented here largely bypasses
this possibility. In future work, I plan to extend the theory so as to allow for this
and also take up the issue of empirically testing more nuanced versions of these
hypotheses in greater depth.
0.10.2 Impact on seller utility
I next turn to an analysis of how changes in the degree of bureaucratic corruption
and ease of opposition affect the welfare of the sellers. Theorem 3 deals with it.
Theorem 3. Suppose that α < α¯ and δ > δ˜ so that there is buyer-induced holdout.
Then a rise in bureaucratic corruption rI reduces seller welfare, while an increase
in the ease of opposing land acquisition α increases it.
Interestingly, the result obtains despite the facts that (i) a higher corruption
always reduces period 1 prices q, (ii) its impact on period 2 price qb depends upon
the relative bargaining powers of the buyer and the sellers, and (iii) its impact
on buyer-induced holdout depends upon the net productivity of the project (as
obtained in Chapter 1). Intuitively, the extent of holdout is decreasing in rI
iff party F is very motivated, i.e., γ
1−γ > λ − v − rI . In that case, holdout is
unlikely to be too large in any case, so that the effect of any further decrease in
the extent of holdout will be small. The proof of Theorem 3 is again included in
sub-section 0.19.2.
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In Section 0.10.7 I demonstrate that this result is critically dependent on the
fact that interference activity is endogenized. I have shown that the result may
in fact be reversed if this activity is frozen, in that an increase in rI increases
seller utility whenever the political rent paid to F is at an intermediate level! This
underscores why it is important to explicitly model interference in this context.
As for the case of holdout, we have the following two accompanying Corollaries
for Theorem 3.
Corollary 5. Sellers welfare is increasing in γ, the motivation of party F, and
decreasing in the motivation of party A, i.e., δ. It is increasing in the value of the
project λ, and the value of land v.
Corollary 5 is intuitive. Sellers from more valuable regions are better off while
higher is the buyer’s marginal revenue from the project, the overall payments
are higher. Similarly, if the pro-industrial party cares more about industrialisation
than the costs of fighting the political contest, it helps the sellers while the opposite
is true when it comes to the opposition party. Turning to elections, we have
Corollary 6. Proofs of both Corollary 5 and Corollary 6 are included in sub-
section 0.19.2.
Corollary 6. Suppose as elections approach, both γ and δ rise proportionately.
Then the following is true: (i) If 2δ(1−δ) ≤ γ(1−γ) then sellers’ welfare decreases
and (ii) If 2δ(1 − δ) > γ(1 − γ), then there exists a threshold value Λ > 0 such
that sellers’ welfare rises if and only if λ− v − rI < Λ.
Our conclusion therefore is similar to those drawn from Corollary 4. Corol-
lary 6(ii) applies for a large range of parameter values, so that the imminence of
elections should by and large increase sellers’ welfare but only for relatively small
projects.
I then discuss some additional nuances dealing with seller utility. Section 0.10.3
below shows that all landowners prefer that A exists, rather than it does not. At
the same time, however, they do not like it to be too powerful, i.e., they don’t
want α to be too small.
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0.10.3 On existence (and strength) of opposition
The preceding discussions bring us to a fundamental question: Do the sellers
benefit from, or are harmed by the presence of party A given that it opposes land
sale? How does the absence of party A affect the relationship between the other
stakeholders? It is possible that the bargaining power of the seller in the late
stage actually derives from the presence of party A. In that case, the sellers have
no bargaining power in the absence of party A, and the buyer can drive down the
sellers to their reservation utility in the late stage. To check this suppose in such
a framework, A is absent. Then the buyer’s choice is simple: if he involves F, then
he offers v to each seller and the buyer’s total cost is v+ rP ; if he does not involve
F then the buyer’s total cost is v+ (1−β)rI +βrI = v+ rI . Knowing this party F
demands rP = rI so that each seller receives v. Since in our baseline model price
is more than v, it follows that A’s presence is good for the sellers.
Next suppose that sellers can retain their bargaining power even in absence of
A in the locality. Suppose in such a scenario A is absent and party F announces
an rP to be paid by a buyer who wants to purchase land through party F. The
minimum land price the buyer can offer at this stage is v. Of course the buyer will
involve party F if and only if v + rP ≤ qb + βrI , otherwise he will directly bargain
with the sellers for a unit price of land. Knowing this, F sets rP = qb + βrI − v
if it is positive. But qb is as given in Chapter 1 (Section 0.6) and so replacing it
in the RHS I obtain rP =
λ−v+rI
2
which is strictly positive given our assumptions.
Thus, the price of land without A is simply v. Arrival of A raises this price as
both q and qB are higher than v. To see this, since q < qB it suffices to note that
q = λ+v−rI
2
> v since λ − v − rI > 0. So opposition raises prices and therefore
A has an indirect positive impact on the villagers; of course it also increases the
chances of no sales at all. One can now compute the equilibrium expected benefit
of A for the sellers, but since cancellation of the project yields v to each seller,
introduction of A necessarily increases villagers’ welfare as well.
It is interesting to note that in this model although sellers want to sell – pro-
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vided party F is not coercive – and A opposes any sale of land, ex-ante, the
existence of opposition is unambiguously preferred by the sellers, irrespective of
whether or not A’s presence provides the sellers with some bargaining power. As
alluded to before in Chapter 1, α can also be seen as a proxy for A’s local presence.
Given ∂US
∂α
> 0, this means that sellers would want α to be as high as possible.
Put together, this suggests a non-monotonic seller preference for opposition. Given
that party F exists, interestingly, sellers prefer the presence of A when their bar-
gaining power stems from the presence of A, it turns out that they never want it
to be too powerful.
What if party F did not exist? Then no acquisition would take place if A still
existed and in our framework that is strictly worse as discussed above. Finally if
both parties were absent, then land acquisition would be fully successful but sellers
would be made indifferent between selling and not so that their payoff would be v
which is again strictly less than what they obtain in our equilibrium. Hence outside
interference in general is beneficial to the sellers. This conclusion is irrespective
of the size of bureaucratic corruption.
0.10.4 Impact of coercive pro-industry party F on sellers
welfare
In Chapter 1, sub-section 0.7.4 we have seen that when party F has the ability to
coerce unwilling sellers, hold out may fall, as does the early phase price, i.e., q.
While a reduction in holdout increases the probability that the project clears the
interference hurdles and thereby increases expected seller utility, a fall in period
1 price hurts this welfare. What is then the net effect on seller welfare? I have
shown that in the presence of coercion, the existence of party F is a mixed blessing
for the sellers.
While they dislike coercion, the presence of party F does help with getting
the project through. In relation with from sub-section 0.7.4, I look at a simple
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extension of our model where refusal to participate in the first period offer (q, k),
if approached by party F, results in a personal penalty of amount χ > 0 to the
seller. The following analysis then easily show that there exists a unique χ¯ such
that if χ < χ¯, then sellers prefer to have F even if it is coercive; but if χ > χ¯, then
they prefer not to have a party F to having a coercive F.
Detail on Coercion by party F: I address this issue of having a coercive party F
on seller utility in relation to the discussion in sub-section 0.10.3. In presence of
coercive party F the welfare of the sellers is
US(coercion) =
√
2((1− γ)(λ+ 2χ− v − rI) + γ)
4(1− γ)
√
δ(λ+2χ−v−rI)
α(1−δ)
(
λ− 2χ− v − rI
2
)
+ v.
Hence, US(coercion) ≥ US iff
(1− γ)(λ+ 2χ− v − rI) + γ)√
δ(λ+ 2χ− v − rI)
(λ−2χ−v−rI) ≥ (1− γ)(λ− v − rI) + γ)√
δ(λ− v − rI)
(λ−v−rI).
Given that the LHS of the preceding expression equals the RHS at χ = 0, and that
the LHS is decreasing in χ while the RHS is independent of χ, the above is never
true whenever χ > 0, that is, there is coercion. Thus it yields US > US(coercion).
This means that the seller’s benefit from a lower size of holdout is more than
compensated by the drop in period 1 price (recall the impact of having a coercive
party F on k∗ and prices from sub-section 0.7.4 in Chapter 1). Thus no amount
of coercion is liked by the sellers.
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0.10.5 Impact of changes in corruption and ease of oppo-
sition on economic surplus
I next turn to analysing the effects of changes in corruption and ease of opposition
on the economic surplus (ES) from land acquisition, where the ES is the sum of
the buyer’s utility UB and the seller’s utility US, net of monetary costs (k
∗2 +α)c∗
incurred by the society due to outside interference. Since (k∗2+α)c∗ is a deadweight
loss to the society, we have
ES(α, rI |λ, v) = UB + US − (k∗2 + α)c∗, (23)
where, the buyer’s payoff is
UB = pi(k)(λ− k(q + rP )− (1− k)(qb + βrI)).
Assuming that there is hold out, we have
UB =
√
2((1− γ)(λ− rI − v) + γ)
8(1− γ)
√
δ(λ−rI−v)
α(1−δ)
×
√2((1− γ)(λ− rI − v) + γ)
2(1− γ)
√
δ(λ−rI−v)
α(1−δ)
rI − (1− γ)
(
rI + 2
√
δ(λ−rI−v)
8α(1−δ)
)
(λ− rI − v) + γrI
(1− γ)(λ− rI − v) + γ
+ (λ− rI − v)
 ,
k∗ =
√
2((1−γ)(λ−rI−v)+γ)
4(1−γ)
√
δ(λ−rI−v)
α(1−δ)
and c∗ = cf > 0.
An important distinction between relatively developed and under-developed
economies is that both higher corruption and easier opposition, particularly through
unconstitutional means such as armed agitation, are expected to be less in the for-
mer. Keeping this distinction in mind, how do the impacts on surplus compare
across the developing and the developed world? The impacts of rI and α on the
sellers’ utility US is straightforward as shown in subsection 0.10.2 above. Their
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impacts on the degree of opposition (that determines the deadweight loss to the
society due to interference) is also relatively simple as summarised in Proposition 3
(that characterises the equilibrium degree of opposition c∗). However their impacts
on the buyer’s utility UB depends on a far more complex interplay between the
preference parameters of the interfering parties (viz. γ and δ) and the economic
parameters of the industry and land use (viz. λ and v). The extent of this com-
plexity is worsened by the fact that k∗ and r∗P are non-monotonic in rI so that a
general analysis of surplus becomes uninformative.
To obtain some clear insight with respect to the questions I ask above, I make
the following simplifications. I set λ = 2 and v = 1 (so that industry is twice as
productive as agriculture) that also means that the maximum degree of corruption
is normalised to 1 (viz. rI ≤ 1) to keep the problem interesting. Further, I
start with focus on a benchmark case where the relative weights on motivation
and economic returns are balanced for the interfering parties, i.e., γ = δ = 1/2.
Observation 5 and 6 then consider scenarios where these preferences of interfering
parties are not balanced.
Observation 4. Suppose that λ = 2, v = 1 and both parties have balanced pref-
erences, i.e. γ = δ = 1/2. Then in presence of buyer-induced holdout the short
term economic surplus is decreasing in both rI and α, irrespective of the degree of
institutional imperfections. Thus while institutional improvements that decrease
the degree of bureaucratic corruptions (viz. a fall in rI) increase economic surplus,
institutional improvements that decrease the ease of opposition (viz. a rise in α)
decrease economic surplus.
As argued earlier, both higher corruption and easier opposition are expected in
a LDC. Observation 4 then suggests that, in LDC, economic surplus would decline
with an improvement in institutions that toughens opposition (i.e., increases α)
but would increase with an improvement in institutions that decreases corruption
(i.e., declines rI). The intuition for the effects of a change in α is interesting.
An improvement in rule of law that toughens opposition would decline economic
surplus, stemming primarily by the fact that in this case sellers welfare is going
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to decline (see subsection 0.10.3) even when holdout is going to fall (see Theorem
2(ii)).
The possibility that institutional improvement that reduces bureaucratic cor-
ruption (viz. a fall in rI) increases economic surplus while institutional improve-
ment that reduces the ease of opposition (viz. a rise in α) reduces economic surplus,
as come out starkly in the benchmark reported in Observation 4, need not be a
universal phenomenon. For example, one can show that when party F is highly
rent-seeking and A is extremely motivated, reducing bureaucratic corruption even
hurts short term economic surplus if existing corruption is high compared to the
ease of opposition. In such a scenario increasing the cost of opposition also hurts
short term economic surplus irrespective of the degree of bureaucratic corruption.
Nonetheless, the possibility of immiserising institutional improvements in LDCs
holds for a large class of parameter values, even if it is not universal. In contrast,
when party F is extremely motivated but A’s motivation to oppose is low,45 institu-
tional improvement that reduces the ease of opposition (viz. a rise in α) decreases
short term economic surplus if the existing institution is relatively bad. In such a
scenario institutional improvement that reduces bureaucratic corruption, increases
short term economic surplus irrespective of the institutional imperfections. I col-
lect these two cases under Observation 5 and Observation 6 below. The proofs of
Observation 4, Observation 5 and Observation 6 are included in sub-section0.19.2.
Observation 5 (Immiserising Reforms). Suppose λ = 2v = 2 and institutional
imperfections are such that there is buyer-induced holdout. If there is strong ideo-
logical local opposition and strong rent-seeking local support for the project (δ = 8
10
and γ = 2
10
) then:
(a) economic surplus is rising in rI for relatively low α and is decreasing other-
wise;
(b) economic surplus is falling in α irrespective of the degree of bureaucratic
corruption.
45This can be compared with a scenario similar to the one in Salboni, West Bengal (as men-
tioned in Chapter 1) where opposition of farmers were segregated and not attracted any support
from civic society organisations or political parties even if there were media coverage.
88
As argued earlier, both higher corruption and easier opposition are expected in
LDCs. Observation 5 then suggests that, in LDC economic surplus would decline
with an improvement in institutions that decreases corruption (i.e., declines rI) and
also with an improvement in institutions that toughens opposition (i.e., increases
α). What is the basic intuition? Consider a drop in bureaucratic corruption in an
LDC, where rI has been large, and α is small. The decline in economic surplus
is driven primarily by the fact that in this case holdout is going to increase (see
Theorem 2(i)), which in turn is driven by the presence of adversarial interference,
as brought out in the discussion following this theorem. The intuition for a rise in
α directly follows from the discussion following Observation 4.
Observations 5 interestingly shows that this is not the case in relatively de-
veloped economy. Consider a drop in bureaucratic corruption where rI has been
low and α has been high. The increase in economic surplus in this case is driven
primarily by the fact that in this case holdout is going to decrease (see Theorem
2(i)). While the impact of improvements in ease of opposition remains similar to
Observation 4, it is again not universal. This would be seen in Observation 6.
Observation 5 has interesting implications. Given that in less developed economies
it requires a deterioration in the rule of law in order to make short term improve-
ments in economic surplus, these economies might be in a trap in that they may
have little incentive to encourage institutional reforms in the short-run and instead
wait for a ‘big push’ to restore efficiency of land acquisition programs, that never
comes by. This result is critically dependent on the fact that the level of inter-
ference is endogenous. In sub-section 0.10.7 I will show that keeping interference
exogenous can yield misleading conclusions.
Observation 6. Suppose λ = 2v = 2 and institutional imperfections are such that
there is buyer-induced holdout. If there is strong ideological local support for the
project and relatively weak local opposition (viz. γ = 8
10
and δ = 2
10
) then:
(a) economic surplus is falling in rI irrespective of the degree of ease of opposi-
tion;
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(b) economic surplus is rising in α when rI is sufficiently small and is decreasing
otherwise.
Observation 6 has an interesting implication. The economies that are relatively
more developed where the degree of bureaucratic corruption is not that severe and
institutional reforms can start with improvements in the rule of law so that it
decreases the ease of opposition (viz. an increases in α), it improves the short
term economic surplus. But for the severely underdeveloped economies where the
degree of bureaucratic corruption is large to begin with, improvement in rule of law
that decreases the ease of opposition, decreases the short term economic surplus.
The intuition follows from Observation 4 that this decline in short term economic
surplus with respect to the improvement in rule of law is primarily due to the
decline in sellers welfare.
0.10.6 Impact of changes in preference parameters of in-
terfering parties on economic surplus
In this section I turn to examine the impact of changes in preference parameters,
namely the motivation parameter of the pro-industry party F (viz. γ) and that of
the opposition A (viz. δ), on economic surplus. I follow the approach used in sub-
section 0.10.5 in order to find results for this. As explained in sub-section 0.10.5
that even if it is straightforward to show the impacts of γ and δ on sellers’ utility US
(as captured in Corollary 5) and on the degree of opposition (that determines the
deadweight loss to the society due to interference) as summarised in Proposition 3,
their impacts on buyer’s utility UB depends on the institutional parameters (viz.
rI and α) as well as the economic parameters of the industry and land use (viz. λ
and v) so that a general analysis of surplus becomes uninformative. I have
ES(γ, δ, α, rI |λ, v) = UB + US − (k∗2 + α)c∗,
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where UB and US are as mentioned in sub-section 0.10.5. Moreover, c
∗ = cf and
k∗ =
√
2((1−γ)(λ−rI−v)+γ)
4(1−γ)
√
δ(λ−rI−v)
α(1−δ)
.
To obtain some clear insight on the impacts of interfering parties, I make the
following simplifications. I set λ = 3 and v = 1 so that industry is significantly
more productive as compared to agriculture. I consider a LDC scenario where the
degree of corruption is normalised to 1 (viz. rI = 1) and the ease of opposition is
high (viz. α = 1/5) to keep the problem interesting. Further, I first consider a case
where the party F’s motivation and economic returns are balanced, i.e., γ = 1/2.
The following observation then captures the impact of A’s preference parameter
(i.e., δ) on ES.
Observation 7. Suppose λ = 3, rI = v = 1 and consider a LDC scenario when
opposition is less costly (viz. α = 1/5). Given this when party F’s motivation and
economic returns are balanced (viz. γ = 1/2), then economic surplus is decreasing
in δ whenever A’s motivation to oppose land acquisition is relatively high, such
that 0.36 < δ < 1.
Observation 7 is intuitive. It considers a LDC framework when bureaucratic
corruption is embedded in the system and small changes in institutions are inef-
fective to reduce corruption. In such a framework if institutions are inefficient to
strengthen the rule of law so that opposition against land acquisition is easy, then
economic surplus decreases when the opposition is strongly motivated to interfere
in the process. This result is stemming from the fact that (i) a strongly motivated
opposition increases buyer-induced holdout (as captured in Corollary 2) and (ii)
higher presence of opposition in more valuable regions decreases sellers’ welfare
(as shown in Corollary 5). In this case the second effect dominates the overall
outcome.
I next turn to check the impact of the motivational parameter of party F (viz.
γ) on economic surplus. For that I follow the example from Observation 7 where
λ = 3, v = 1 so that the degree of corruption is normalised to 1 (viz. rI = 1) and
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the ease of opposition is high (viz. α = 1/5). In this I consider that the ideological
motivation of opposition’s is sufficiently strong, such that δ = 8/10. The following
observation then captures the impact of F’s motivation parameter (i.e., γ) on ES.
Observation 8. Suppose λ = 3, rI = v = 1 and consider a LDC scenario when
opposition is less costly (viz. α = 1/5). Given this when there is strong ideological
local opposition (viz. δ = 8/10), then economic surplus is increasing in γ if F’s
ideological motivation for industrialisation is sufficiently low, such that 0 < γ <
0.06.
Observation 8 is intuitive. Following Observation 7 it also considers a LDC
framework when bureaucratic corruption is embedded in the system and small
changes in institutions are ineffective to reduce corruption. In such a framework if
institutions are inefficient to strengthen the rule of law so that opposition against
land acquisition is easy, then in presence of a highly motivated local opposition,
economic surplus decreases when the local political support is relatively more mo-
tivated for industrialisation. This result is stemming from the fact that (i) a
strongly motivated local support decreases buyer-induced holdout (as captured in
Corollary 2) while (ii) highly motivated local support increases sellers’ welfare (as
shown in Corollary 5). In this case as the opposition is highly motivated coupled
with the fact that the inefficiency in the rule of law makes it easier for A to oppose,
it can now afford a higher cost of opposition (i.e., cf ) (see Proposition 3 ). This in
turn put a pressure on F to seek more rent that then induces the buyer to purchase
less land through F. But as higher presence of local opposition is not preferred by
the sellers, they want more presence of F in settling land deal with buyer. Thus in
order to have an industry in the locality buyer accepts a relatively higher political
rent (i.e., rP ). Given that the marginal productivity of the project is sufficiently
high, buyer can afford this higher rP . Party F exploits this opportunity and seek
more rent. This higher rent-seeking by party F in turn increases the overall ES.
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0.10.7 Exogenous interference: a misleading specification
for seller welfare and economic surplus
I begin with Seller utility. Consider a scenario where rp and c are fixed. Recall that
the sellers’ payoff is pi(k)(qk+ (1− k)(qB − (1− β)rI)) + (1− pi(k))v. Substituting
the values of k∗, q and qB from Chapter 1 I get
US =
λ− v − rI
4(rP − rI)(
λ− v − rI
2
) + v =
(λ− v − rI)2
8(rP − rI) + v.
Now,
∂US
∂rI
=
(λ− v)2 − r2I − 2rP (λ− v − rI)
8(rP − rI)2 .
Note that ∂US
∂rI
> 0 if and only if rP <
(λ−v)2−r2I
2(λ−v−rI) . Next recall that there is
holdout whenever rP > rI +
λ−v−rI
4
. Thus both these inequalities hold iff
(λ− v)2 − r2I
2(λ− v − rI) > rP > rI +
λ− v − rI
4
.
It is routine to check that
(λ−v)2−r2I
2(λ−v−rI) > rI +
λ−v−rI
4
for any parameter configuration.
Thus, whenever rP is neither too large, nor too small, an increase in bureaucratic
corruption unambiguously improves seller utility.
Next consider the case of Economic Surplus. Consider rP and c as given pa-
rameters. Using the expression for UB and substituting the values of k
∗ (from
(13)), q and qb (from Lemma 2), I get
UB =
(λ− v − rI)2
16(rP − rI) ,
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so that
ES =
(λ− v − rI)2
8(rP − rI) + v +
(λ− v − rI)2
16(rP − rI) −
((
λ− v − rI
4(rP − rI)
)2
+ α
)
c.
For ease of exposition I analysis this section in relation to Observation 4. Thus
I consider λ = 2 and v = 1 so that industry is twice as productive as agriculture
and the maximum degree of corruption is normalised to 1 (viz. rI ≤ 1). This
yields
ES = 1 +
3(rI − 1)2
16(rP − rI) − c
(
(rI − 1)2
16(rP − rI)2 + α
)
.
Now, ∂ES
∂α
= −c < 0 and
∂ES
∂rI
=
(1− rI)(2c(rP − 1) + 3(rI − rP )(2rP − rI − 1))
16(rP − rI)3 .
Recall that there is holdout whenever rP > rI +
λ−v−rI
4
. Thus the term 16(rP −
rI)
3 > 0. And for given rI ≤ 1 the term (1 − rI) > 0. Thus ∂ES∂rI > 0 whenever
2c(rP − 1) + 3(rI − rP )(2rP − rI − 1) > 0. Since rP − 1 > 0 for given rP > r1
so that holdout takes place, I get that for ∂ES
∂rI
> 0 it must be true that 2c >
3(rP−rI)(2rP−rI−1)
rP−1 .
Note that if c = 0 (which is not equivalent to non-interference of A) the above
condition never holds. But if the opposition choses a fixed c > 0 then for an optimal
decision on rP that is not very large (so that the above condition violates) I get
∂ES
∂rI
> 0. This suggests clear impacts of change in rI and α on economic surplus
when interference is exogenous. In particular, in an economy when conditions for
buyer-induced holdout exist, worsening of institutions (a fall in α or a rise in rI)
increase economic surplus. Such conclusions are clearly misleading. 
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0.11 Welfare of the non-local constituency
Non-local welfare is essentially rooted in the ideological split within the population
who are not involved in the local problem studied so far. The ideology there is
either for industrialisation or against land-sale. I considered that the opposition
can come from a broader spectrum of the society that includes civic-society organ-
isations and political parties. In chapter 1 I mentioned examples when political
parties that are typically out of office take over such opposition. In this section
I take a look at a scenario when local political opposition (I now call them party
A) interferes in the land acquisition process with an aim of exploiting the readily
available information from the civic-society organisations (that initiated movement
against acquisition) to gain political mileage. In here the non-local population
that supports industrialisation forms party F’s non-local constituency while that
against land sale forms party A’s non-local constituency. The importance of this
non-local population is denoted by η that is the fraction of the population in the
economy who are non-sellers of land.
Note that the number of buyers in the total population is insignificant so that
their payoffs are not considered in this welfare measure. For the same reason I do
not consider the political parties in this welfare measure as their relative strength is
also insignificant, especially under democratic provisions. In this section I analyse
the welfare of this η fraction of the population.
Thus the definition of the welfare of non-local constituency, as obtained from
land acquisition ordeal is as follows:
WN(k, q, qb) = φpi(k
∗) + (1− φ)(1− pi(k∗))
where 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 is the size of the constituency that supports the pro-industrial
party F.
WN with no political interference: When there are no political hazards it follows
that k∗ = 1, the non-local welfare yields WN(k, q, qb) = φ.
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WN with both high bureaucratic corruption and ease of opposition: When there is
no holdout then k∗ = 1 and the non-local welfare WN(k, q, qb) = φ.
In what follows I will consider the case of holdout. From Theorem 1 we know
that if there is buyer-induced holdout in the local land acquisition process then
k∗ =
√
2((1−γ)(λ−rI−v)+γ)
4(1−γ)
√
δ(λ−rI−v)
α(1−δ)
. This yields the non-local welfare function,
WN(k, q, qb) =
√
2((1− γ)(λ− rI − v) + γ)
4(1− γ)
√
δ(λ−rI−v)
α(1−δ)
(2φ− 1) + (1− φ). (24)
The following two observations then immediately capture two alternative sce-
narios: one in which the marginal productivity of the industrial project is suffi-
ciently small and/or the local unit of party F is sufficiently ideological, and, the
other in which the marginal productivity of the industrial project is sufficiently
large and/or the local unit of party F is sufficiently profit driven. Results show that
the rise in the extortionary activities in the institutions can even enhance non-local
welfare. The proofs of these two observations are included in sub-section 0.19.2.
Observation 9. Suppose there is buyer-induced holdout in local land acquisition
(viz. α < α¯ and δ > δ˜) and the marginal productivity of the industrial project is
sufficiently small and/or the local unit of party F is sufficiently ideological (i.e.,
λ− rI − v < γ1−γ ).
(a) If the constituency that supports party F is larger than that supporting party
A (i.e., φ > 1
2
) then a rise in the extortionary activity in the institutions that
rises level of corruption (i.e., rise in rI), enhances non-local welfare.
(b) If the constituency that supports party A is larger than that supporting party
F (i.e., φ < 1
2
) then a rise in the extortionary activity in the institutions that
rises level of corruption (i.e., rise in rI), decreases non-local welfare.
Observation 10. Suppose there is buyer-induced holdout in local land acquisition
and the marginal productivity of the industrial project is sufficiently large and/or
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the local unit of party F is sufficiently profit driven (i.e., λ− rI − v > γ1−γ ).
(a) If the constituency that supports party A is larger than that supporting party
F (i.e., φ < 1
2
) then a rise in the extortionary activity in the institutions that
rises level of corruption (i.e., rise in rI), enhances non-local welfare,
(b) if the constituency that supports party F is larger than that supporting party
A (i.e., φ > 1
2
) then a rise in the extortionary activity in the institutions that
rises level of corruption (i.e., rise in rI), decreases non-local welfare.
I consider that there is holdout in the local land acquisition process and now ask
whether the non-local welfare rises if there is an increase in the non-local support
base of the pro-industry party. The following observation deals with this and the
proof of this is again included in sub-section 0.19.2.
Observation 11. Suppose there is holdout in local land acquisition process. Then
there exists a 0 < δ′ < 1 such that a rise in the non-local support base of the pro-
industry party enhances non-local welfare if and only if the local unit of party A’s
marginal returns from politics is relatively low such that δ < δ′. Otherwise if the
local unit of party A is sufficiently ideological such that δ > δ′ then the non-local
welfare falls with the non-local support base of the pro-industry party.
The next two observations then capture how the ideological motivations of
local units of F and A affect the non-local welfare. The proofs are included in
sub-section 0.19.2.
Observation 12. Suppose there is buyer-induced holdout in local land acquisition
process. Then a higher degree of ideological motivation of the local unit of party
F (viz. γ) enhances the non-local welfare if and only if the constituency that
supports party F is larger than that supporting party A (i.e., φ > 1
2
). Otherwise, if
the constituency that supports party A is larger than that supporting party F (i.e.,
φ < 1
2
) then a higher degree of ideological motivation of the local unit of party F
decreases the non-local welfare.
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Observation 13. Suppose there is holdout in local land acquisition process. Then
a higher degree of ideological motivation of the local unit of party A (viz. rise in δ)
enhances the non-local welfare if and only if the constituency that supports party A
is larger than that supporting party F (i.e., φ < 1
2
). Otherwise if the constituency
that supports party F is larger than that supporting party A (i.e., φ > 1
2
) then a
higher degree of ideological motivation of the local unit of party A decreases the
non-local welfare.
0.11.1 Local Welfare
The local welfare involves the payoffs of the local landowners who are willing to
sell their plot of lands for the industrial project, that is
WL(k, q, qb) = US(k, q, qb) (25)
Hence following sub-section 0.10.2 and sub-section 0.10.3 I get the following:
WL with no political interference: When there are no political interference it follows
that k∗ = 1 and the local welfare yields WL(k, q, qb) = q = λ+v2 − rI2 .
WL with both high bureaucratic corruption and ease of opposition: When there is
no holdout that follows k∗ = 1, then the local welfare yields WL(k, q, qb) = q =
λ+v
2
− rI
2
.
So suppose there is buyer-induced holdout and recall from proposition 3 that in
presence of both institutional imperfections holdout in the land acquisition process
takes place if and only if α < α¯ and δ > δ˜. Then I get k∗ =
√
2((1−γ)(λ−rI−v)+γ)
4(1−γ)
√
δ(λ−rI−v)
α(1−δ)
,
c∗ = cf and r∗P = rˆP . The local welfare thus yields
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WL(k, q, qb) =
√
2((1− γ)(λ− rI − v) + γ)
4(1− γ)
√
δ(λ−rI−v)
α(1−δ)
(
λ− v − rI
2
)
+ v. (26)
Remark 2 (Sellers’ ballot and holdout). : As explained before, α is a proxy for
party A’s local presence. In a democracy, albeit imperfect, it is then natural to
assume that α is a falling function of the fraction of sellers who vote for party A.
This remark is in relation with sub-section 0.10.2 and sub-section 0.10.3 where I
have shown that ∂WL
∂α
> 0 and discussed that sellers like the presence of party A,
it turns out that they never vote in a preceding election in order to keep α as high
as possible. This also implies that the constituency of party F is φη + (1− η).
In sub-section 0.10.2 we have seen how the local welfare (WL or US) changes
with institutional parameters, in particular with the levels of bureaucratic corrup-
tion and ease of opposition (viz. with the changes in rI and α). I next turn to the
analysis of total welfare of the economy that comprises all the landowners both
local and non-local, who are non-sellers.
0.11.2 Total Welfare
For any given η, the fraction of the population in the economy who are non-sellers
of land, the total welfare is defined as follows:
WT ((k, q, qb)) = ηWN + (1− η)WL.
When there is no holdout or when there is no political interference, WT = ηφ +
(1 − η)(λ − rI) that unambiguously falls in rI . So suppose next that there is
buyer-induced holdout.
I first analyse how the total welfare changes with the rise in the extortionary
activity in institutions that increases corruption (i.e., with the rise in rI) if the
non-local constituency that supports party F is larger than that supporting party
A. The following proposition deals with it.
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Proposition 5. Suppose there is buyer-induced holdout in local land acquisition
process and the non-local constituency that supports party F is larger than that
supporting party A (i.e., φ > 1
2
). Then a rise in extortionary activity in the
institutions that increases corruption (i.e., increases rI) enhances the total welfare
if and only if the local unit of party F is sufficiently ideological such that γ > γˆ
for some 0 < γˆ < 1 and there is a larger population of the non-sellers in the
economy such that η > η′ for some 0 < η′ < 1. Otherwise if γ < γˆ then a rise in
extortionary activity in the institutions that increases corruption (i.e., increases
rI) reduces the total welfare.
The next proposition is then immediate.
Proposition 6. Suppose there is buyer-induced holdout in local land acquisition
process and the non-local constituency that supports party A is larger than that
supporting party F (i.e., φ < 1
2
). Then a rise in extortionary activity in the
institutions that increases corruption (i.e., increases rI) enhances the total welfare
if and only if
(a) either the local unit of party F is sufficiently ideological such that γ > γˆ for
some 0 < γˆ < 1 and there is a smaller population of the non-sellers in the
economy such that η < η′,
(b) or the local unit of party F is sufficiently profit driven γ < γˆ for some 0 <
γˆ < 1 and there is a larger population of the non-sellers in the economy such
that η > η′.
The analysis in subsections 0.11 and 0.11.1 obtains the following proposition
that is now easy to prove.
Proposition 7. Suppose there is holdout in local land acquisition process.
(a) If the non-local constituency that supports party F is larger than that sup-
porting party A (i.e., φ > 1
2
) then
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(a) a higher degree of ideological motivation of the local unit of party F
unambiguously enhances the total welfare, and
(b) a higher degree of ideological motivation of the local unit of party A
unambiguously decreases the total welfare.
(b) If the non-local constituency that supports party A is larger than that sup-
porting party F (i.e., φ < 1
2
) then there exists some 0 < ηˆ < 1 such that
(a) a higher degree of ideological motivation of the local unit of party F
increases the total welfare if and only if η < ηˆ, and
(b) a higher degree of ideological motivation of the local unit of party A
enhances the total welfare if and only if η > ηˆ.
0.11.3 Identification of ruling party and Institutional im-
provements
Institutional changes can only be incremental in the short run. We end our analysis
by asking the direction of change in rI that one would expect as a function of the
identity of the party in power. In this regard, from Remark 2 it follows that in a
simple-majoritarian democracy, party F is in power if and only if φη+(1−η) > 1/2.
Our final result is Corollary 7 that follows directly from the welfare analysis above.
Corollary 7. Suppose the political party in power can make incremental changes
in rI and denote this by ∂rI . If δ > δ˜ and α < α¯ then the following is true.
• Irrespective of which party is in power, ∂rI > 0 if φ > 12 and λ−rI−v < γ1−γ ,
• Irrespective of which party is in power, ∂rI < 0 if
– either φ > 1
2
and λ− rI − v > γ1−γ ,
– or φ < 1
2
, λ− rI − v < γ1−γ and η > η˜ for some 0 < η˜ < 1.
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• If φ < 1
2
and η < η˜, then (a) if λ − rI − v < γ1−γ then ∂rI > 0 if F is in
power but ∂rI < 0 if A is in power and (b) if λ− rI − v > γ1−γ then ∂rI > 0
if A is in power but ∂rI < 0 if F is in power.
0.11.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I retain the basic model of buyer-induced holdout and examined
the impact of changes in deeper institutional parameters on the size of holdout,
sellers welfare and economic surplus. Interestingly an increase in bureaucratic
corruption has a non-monotonic effect on several measures of economic efficiency,
in particular holdout and the economic surplus. I have shown that if institutions
are weak to begin with, which is likely in LDCs, then a decrease in corruption may,
in fact, increase holdout, and consequently reduce economic surplus, a phenomenon
I call immiserising reforms, suggesting that LDCs may not have too much of an
incentive to focus on institutional improvements. With a decrease in bureaucratic
corruption, selling via party F is less attractive for the buyers, thus reducing party
F’s political clout, which in turn may increase holdout. When it comes to seller
welfare I have shown that an increase in bureaucratic corruption always makes
them worse off; however, while the sellers prefer that the opposition party be
there, they also prefer that this opposition is not too strong.
In a small extension of the model I have shown the effects of having organised
political opposition, typically coming from a local opposition party out of office who
exploits the platform to extract greater political benefit, on the non-local welfare
as well as on the total welfare of a LDC. While the effects are non-monotonic, for
both non-local welfare and total welfare, this non-monotonicity results from an
interplay between political parameters such as the size of non-local constituencies,
ideological motivations of the parties and the relative size of population of the
non-sellers in the economy. Thus it is hard to predict that once a party in power
can make incremental changes in the degree of bureaucratic corruption, it would
bring institutional improvements to do so. Interestingly this result is irrespective
of whether the party in power is pro-industry or not.
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In the next chapter I will take a detail look at the interim competition between
the political supports for industrial progress and the emerging opposition. It will
provide a theoretical framework that considers mechanism for taking informed
consent from the landowners on selling their plots. But in presence of institutional
imperfections this results in group formation, agitation and can take the form of
violence, that carries potential of discarding industrialisation.
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0.12 Chapter 3
An Economic Theory of Agitation,
Group Formation and Political Violence
in Land Acquisition
0.12.1 Introduction
Land acquisition for industrialisation in LDCs becomes most challenging when
legal-institutional imperfections breach the democratic rights, leading to group-
based agitations, even violence. The previous chapters have provided framework
to analyse inefficiency arising out of buyer-induced delay, where the focus has
been on full characterisation of this new notion of holdout and its implications
on two forms of welfare - sellers welfare and the overall economic surplus. In
this chapter I abstract away from hold up problems and analyse a framework
to help understand the interim political competition, resulting in another form
of inefficiency - agitation, group formation and political violence. This chapter
will show that in democratic societies while property rights are legally provided
so that land seizure is difficult and consent for sale is practiced through voting
by the landowners, interplay between the legal-political institutions infringe such
decisions and creates potential for political violence, at least at local levels. It will
also show that occurrence of inefficiency is subjected to early or late mobilisation
of resources for violence by the local polity.
In the recent array of development, with the increasing population pressure
and highly fragmented landholdings, availability of land for industry and infras-
tructure seem to take a central position in driving conflicts. As industrialisation
is feasible in vast area of connected land with good infrastructural facilities, it is
highly unlikely that such lands are left without any alternative use and more often
those are found to be used in agriculture.46 Land acquisition for such projects thus
46Note that to an extent, the complementarity of industrial and infrastructural developments
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inevitably leads to eviction of people whose lives and livelihoods traditionally sur-
round land, and this often attempted without prior consultation with the affected,
resulting in a proliferation of pitched clashes challenging massive investments.47
This is because on one hand some of these nations provide efficient institutions
to guarantee property rights to poor landholders (for example, India, Brazil) so
that forced taking of land is prohibited by law but on the other, the landowners’
perception of having minimal outside option or their high attachment values to
land raising concerns on inadequacy of the compensation packages, thereby ques-
tioning such redistributive schemes. This chapter however takes a look beyond
the redistributive mechanisms and provide an analysis of the conflicts in the land
acquisition process from a political economy perspective and in presence of in-
formed consent contributing towards a better understanding of their causes and
consequences.
Land acquisition - a political issue
Despite the constitutional provisions and amendments in attempt to resolve the
conflicts arising out of land conversions (such as the ‘eminent domain’ laws in In-
dia, Brazil), they continually threaten the much needed pace of industrialisation.
Evidences suggest that the conflicts are not always driven by the inadequacy of
compensation amounts but also by the lack of consultation with the land-losers
thereby threatening their democratic rights. The problem goes much deeper with
the legal-institutional inefficiencies (in particular towards the adherence of prop-
erty rights and enforcement of law and order), partisan politics and the provision
of feasible ‘outside options’ for resettlement of the dispossessed. Moreover when
such conflicts goes beyond the scope of negotiations and agitations take the form
of (at least local) violences, highway strikes, suicides, bloodsheds and destruc-
explains government involvement in the process of acquiring land for large scale private industries
(See Levien, 2011, Banerjee et al., 2007 and Sarkar, 2007).
47As mentioned in Chapter 1, such examples include China’s 75,000 local conflicts during 2005
and 2006 and the eviction of 20 million rural farmers between 1996-2005. In India (see the list of
incidents in Appendix B), Brazil and Kenya where massive protests impeded billions of dollars
of investment from promising industrial projects (see Chapter 4 for details).
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tion of properties, they put a serious threat for regional socio-economic growth by
hampering future (local) investments.
Given the need for industrialisation, mediation by the local government is more
commonly accepted in LDC context than promoting private bargaining.48 Inter-
estingly the protests of the dispossessed and affected people are more against the
mediating state than against the concerned private investors. On one hand this is
because displacements for the projects under state-domains such as infrastructure
or welfare developments are far greater than the displacements due to industries,
and further, private industrial projects are often expedited by the state govern-
ments to ensure inflow of investments in states.49 Further an incumbent govern-
ment’s support to acquire land comes with the state’s long-run growth agenda
of generating income and employment opportunities that feed its political ideolo-
gies and partisan benefits, going beyond the scope of the project per se. On the
other hand resistance to acquire land often becomes politically viable for some
parties especially in attempts to gain political mileage in spaces dominated by
other parties. Thus the party typically out of office often lend their support to
even minority of resisting landholders, as evident in Singur. In line with Chakra-
vorty (2013), in presence of ongoing information revolution, political agitations
favouring the rights of minority of people (too small to win elections) with ‘wedge
issues’ or ‘hot button issues’ plays a significant role in partisan politics. This
counterintuitively explains the interchangeable roles of parties as well as political
personalities as being pro-acquisition and anti-acquisition in favourable settings.50
In the present neo-liberalisation era land acquisition for industrialisation has be-
come such a wedge issue.
In Chapter 1 (Section 0.4) I discussed involvement of various interest groups
48I will return to this point with greater detail in Chapter 4.
49Chakravorty (2013) suggested that in India only around 15 per cent of displacement-impact
is due to private industrial and mining developments while 66 per cent of displacement-impact
is due to water, transportation, welfare and administrative projects.
50This explains the partisan support for wedge issues such as immigration or sexuality in
Australia and the US and anti-Muslim violence or caste-based reservations in India. For examples
on Indian context see Chakravorty (2013).
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and their evolution in Indian context, how political parties readily utilise infor-
mation obtained by these interest groups and how the involvement of the party
in power results in (mis)utilisation of government machinery to acquire land.51
Knowing that resistance involving interest groups (and/or nearby elections) can
attract support from political parties which gets more organised with partisan
support, the central objective of this chapter is to investigate whether such in-
volvement of politics in the process increases the potential of agitations to turn
into violence. Interestingly while agitations against such farmlands acquisition
are more commonly turned into protests against the incumbent government, it
counterintuitively testifies the motivation for involvement of out-of-office political
opposition. Of course one can easily understand that the legal-institutional ineffi-
ciency, in particular towards the efficient enforcement of law and order, is critical
for such violence to take place.52
Motivating Examples
The practical motivation for this chapter comes from a number of recent incidents.
First let us consider the case of Singur in West Bengal, an agriculture based state
in India. Following from Section 0.3, the scenario evidenced group formation, agi-
tation and political violence, that eventually moved the project from West Bengal
to Gujarat. When the West Bengal government brings TATA to develop land in
Singur and there were sparks of segregated conflicts, the then political opposition
(some time driven by populist agenda) anticipated to gain rural poor support in
upcoming Assembly elections (of the year 2011) through generating support of
Singur landowners who may not want to sell their plots. Although the agitation
was primarily organised by the Gana Unnayan O Jana Adhikar Sangram Com-
mittee (Committee for Public Development and People’s Rights Struggle) and the
51For a detail discussion on this in Indian context one can also refer to Jenkins (2012).
52It is easy to find that the incidents of politicised and violent land conflicts are typically seen
in LDCs where inefficiency of the legal-institutions are endemic. Further, in contrast with the
developed nations where land conflicts are being resolved through legal proceedings, number of
court cases are significantly low in less developed ones where landowners often struggle to afford
the litigation costs and/or prolonged periods of court judgements.
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Nandigram Jomi Uchhed Birodhi O Jana Shakti Raksha Committee (Nandigram
Committee to Resist Land Ousting and Save People Power), it took the form of
violence after being heavily politicised and eventually scrapped despite being mo-
mentous for the state’s industrial development (see for example, Sarkar, 2007 and
Roy Chowdhury, 2013).53
Cases of such violent land conflicts are not new. It was evident in the cen-
tury old enclosure movement54 or more recent protests in Tanzania, East Africa
in 1993, when Twiga Portland Cement Company (TPCC) attempted to acquire
61 square kilometre of land in exchange of severely low compensation and denied
the promised resettlement area. As mentioned in Section 0.3 despite the legal
provision of constitutional rights, the Land Acquisition and the Physical Planning
Acts, landowners have not even received any chance to consult or negotiate with
authoritative bodies. Further to this, TPCC practiced a forceful eviction. Conse-
quently, landowners’ grievances turn into violent protests that trigger after being
heavily politicised (Kombe, 2010). Similar incidents of violent land conflicts are
evident from across the nations such as Kenya, Brazil and Cambodia.55 Remark-
ably in most of these cases, land conflicts turned into violence when the process
of eviction was forceful (see for example Sarkar, 2007 and HRW, 2009).
53There have been struggles against land acquisition that entails political involvement across
India in recent years that inspire our current work. Political violence in Nandigram (2006),
when the West Bengal State Government demanded 10,000 acres (4,000 ha) of land to develop
a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) by the Indonesian-based Salim Group for building a chemical
hub, gives us a very similar picture (See Chapter 1, Section 0.4 for a detail on this or refer to for
example Banerjee et al., 2007). Protest in Raigad district of Maharastra, against Mahamumbai
SEZ of Reliance Company, protest against Himachal Pradesh Government when land was being
taken to build an international airport and air cargo hub at Gagret in Una district (Panwar,
2008 and Roy Chowdhury, 2013) are only a few among them.
54The rapid increase in price for wool resulted in large scale eviction of people from their
traditional livelihood primarily to meet the rising demand of sheep-grazing land in pre-industrial
revolution more than 100 years old England (see Fairlie, 2009).
55In Kenya, in 2009, when Nuove Iniziative Indutrialis sri (NIIsri), an Italian company, propose
to acquire 50,000 hectare of land in Dakatcha Woodlands, to develop a bio-fuel plantation and
manufacturing hub. Protests from local communities and environmentalists scrapped the project
despite being granted licence from NEMA (Maggi and Veit, 2013). In Rio de Janeiro during
2009, protests were reported when the State government expropriated around 7,200 hectares
of productive farm land to build an industrial complex CISPA (Pedlowski, 2012). There are
increasing number of protests against forceful evictions in recent Cambodia where families are
evicted from their livelihoods even without compensation (Rudia et al., 2014).
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Role of democratic institutions and political violence
It is commonly perceived that if democratic institutions are relatively less per-
fect to sustain the rights (property rights in concern) of its citizens, societies may
end up in having more frequent incidents of violent conflicts. Of course the legal
provisions of property rights are not identical in countries. While the constitution
guarantees land ownership as a fundamental right in some countries such as in
India, it is not well defined in others such as in China (see Li, 1996). Incidents
across the nations suggest that the issue of land conflict is persistent irrespective
of the extent of provision of property rights. In this chapter I thus restrain our
focus from the inefficiency in property rights per se and focus on the interplay
between imperfect legal and political institutions that fail to uphold these rights.
The other eminent factor of democratic societies is the freedom for expressing
opinions. In this context it is crucial that landowners must be aware of the net
local benefits of industrial projects and being consensual to it. But in conflicting
scenarios it is often found that the landowners’ grievance pitch up in absence of any
consultation regarding such conversions. This follows enactments of the ‘consent’
clause as part of social impact assessments in land acquisition processes.56 This
chapter incorporated such phenomenon by considering that landowners’ informed
consent on selling their land comes through voting. While the absence of voting
rights empowers the Government to suppress the protesting voices, presence of it
inevitably establishes landowners’ perceptions regarding development to be con-
sidered. However efficient enforcement of law and order is crucial to preserve this
right as otherwise it is easy to distort an apparently free and fair voting system
and even to execute violence, especially when industrialisation comes with parti-
san benefits beyond the implementation of a local project. This chapter includes
such inefficiency of the institutions but restraint from any informational fallacies
that distort landowners’ voting decisions.
Agitations in the process of land acquisition then boils down to two crucial
issues: (i) the compensation package offered to the dispossessed landowners and
56I will discuss the social impact assessment programs in Chapter 4, Section 0.13.
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(ii) the political influence on the issue. While in most scenarios the monetary com-
pensation has been criticised as being the root cause, the problem often lies in the
non-monetary provision of rehabilitation packages including support for resettle-
ment of the dispossessed and lack of consultations with local self-governing entities
and landowners. These raises concerns for policy makers and countries are under-
going continuous revisions of land acquisition processes to reduce inefficiencies
but focusing mostly on the compensation mechanisms. However, renegotiations
over compensations or its upscaling fails to establish a long run solution for such
conflicting scenarios. As evident in India, scope of renegotiations over prices of
land had resolved conflicts in Rampur Hydro Project in Himachal Pradesh, high-
way project in Gujarat or Yamuna Expressway project in Uttar Pradesh but an
upscaled compensation cannot save the project in Singur, West Bengal.57 Ow-
ing to the violent land conflicts in recent India the parliament passed a new act
on land acquisition in 2013, replacing the age old Land Acquisition Act of 1894,
that includes the increment of legal limit on land prices and mandated consent of
the project affected people (The Gazette of India extraordinary, 2013). But even
such benchmark increment of monetary compensations fail to resolve conflicts as
between 2013 and 2014 alone there were more than 250 conflicts at attempts of
acquiring land with this increased compensation.58 This chapter aims to explore
such phenomena in greater detail.
Amongst the fastest growing economies such as Africa, India and China where
conflicts are rising (both in number and severity) proportionately with rising de-
mand for land conversions, inefficiencies amid legal and political institutions have
repetitively turned to be the central issue. Of course the revised laws are not
perfect and their failure in providing definitive guide persists, it is crucial to anal-
yse the inefficiencies in the enforcement of law and order that fails to uphold
57See < http : //blogs.worldbank.org/endpovertyinsouthasia/how − fair − fair −
compensation − under − india − s − new − land − acquisition − act > and < http :
//archive.indianexpress.com/news/from − bhatta − parsaul − to − dalit − homes −
rahu.../921057/ >
58See < http : //www.business− standard.com/article/economy − policy/250− conflicts−
over − land− acquisition− recorded− in− 2013− and− 2014− 114123100051.html >
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the constitutional provisions.59 There have been multiple occasions when poor
land registration and land development such as in Africa made land transfer both
costly and time consuming affair, coercive land switches and absence of conse-
quential payment schemes such as in China, restricted role of land markets and
lack of scientific basis for land valuation such as in India, led to arbitrariness
of the revised laws.60 In this present chapter I thus restrain my focus from de-
termining any compensation mechanisms by considering an exogenous valuation
procedure and concentrate to investigate on causes of such violent conflicts in light
of political-economic construct.
This chapter thus analyse situations when (i) compensation amount is exoge-
nously determined and is above a landowner’s reservation utility, (ii) the landown-
ers’ informed consent to sell their plots of land are taken through voting. Since
the acquisition of land is politicised, landowners must join a party that supports
them in the cause. Thus landowners who agree to sale their plots of land have to
vote for the pro-industry party that strengthen it to fight against the opposition.
Otherwise the landowners have to vote for the opposition party to save their land.
It is of interest to investigate whether such involvement of political parties leading
to group formation result in violence in the process of acquiring land. As indus-
trialisation has become an ‘wedge issue’ politics and parties’ political benefits go
beyond the scope of project implementation in the locality, their commitment to
approach such an issue contribute crucially in determining the extent of their sup-
port (both for and against such acquisitions). While the power of early and costly
mobilisation of resources are the devices for parties to fulfil their commitments,
I argue that it is the institutional infirmities especially towards the enforcement
of law and order in implementing land acquisition programs result in inefficiency.
This not only eases the politicisation of land acquisition process, if and when the
59Failure to bring clarity in the definitions of ‘market value’ of land, limitations on the usage of
‘eminent domain’ law and the determinants of ‘public purpose’ of proposed projects have raised
issues in several incidents in the LDCs where poor land administration, faulty land records and
thin land markets are endemic. A greater detail on this has been included in Chapter 4.
60In Africa only 10 per cent of rural lands are registered and more than 202 million hectares
are left underdeveloped. See < http : //www.business − standard.com/article/economy −
policy/need − for − scientific − land − valuation − to − curb − realty − conflicts − study −
114012200325.html >
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political parties intend to do so, but also eases the mobilisation of resources for
political violence to take place, at least at local levels.
Testimony for such political involvement comes with the following examples.
In contrast with the evidences of Tata Nano project in Singur, SEZ project in
Nandigram or the TPCC project in Tanzania where conflicting scenarios turn into
armed violence after being heavily politicised (as mentioned earlier), evidences such
as the cases of Tata Metaliks and Century Textiles and Industries Ltd. projects
in India shows that even if the discrepancies in compensations and resettlement
arrangements have raised media concerns, poll boycott and scattered protests, lack
of political support reduced the intensity of these protests and did not turn into
armed violence.61 Such incidents more prominently suggest that politicisation of
the land acquisition process carries potential for violent land conflicts and our
present work aims to explore this connection in some detail.
The objective of this chapter is to build a theory of land acquisition where the
legal and political institutions are inefficient to uphold democratic decisions and
studies the consequences of partisan commitment power on political violence in
land acquisition processes where political competition leads to group formation in
a locality in concern.
Theoretical Framework
I consider an economy with weak legal (fails to implement proper law and order)
and political (fails to uphold democratic decisions) institutions whose economy
61In 1992, 217.23 acres of mono-crop land was acquired in Kalaikunda, near Kharagpur India,
to build pig-iron manufacturing plant by Tata Metaliks (TML), under the pro-peasant Left Front
governance. No political party came to support those farmers who were unwilling to give up their
land and the acquisition process was smooth even with improper monetary compensation and
without job or land as the promised resettlement arrangements. Three years later when Century
Textiles and Industries Ltd. (CTIL) aimed to acquire another 526.71 acres of farmland to build
a sponge and pig-iron industry, there were series of failed private negotiations, stiff resistance
from the landowners, memorandum for upcoming parliamentary election boycott (of 1996), but
due to lack of political support from any opposition parties and resistance from ruling left parties
this brief yet significant localised peasant movement eventually lost its intensity (Guha, 2007a,
2007b).
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is based on land (for example agriculture or forestry), that comprises a private
industrialist who wants to buy multiple plots of land to build an industrial hub
where perfect complementarity is normalised to one. There is large fragmentation
of land and each landowners possesses an equally productive piece of land in similar
use where the use-value of these plots are identical to all landowners. Landowners
are considered to have full property rights over land so that they can accept or
deny sale of their plots when applies. The ruling (local) political party, aiming to
achieve global political return that goes beyond the territory of any local success,
brings the private investor to the village for building an industrial project that
requires land.
The private industrialist has a positive return from the project with the price of
land being exogenously determined by law and I assume that buyer is a non-actor
when it comes to deal with the sale of land. However, the buyer affords to pay a
price per unit of land that sufficiently covers the use-value of land to its current
owner and for simplicity of the formal analysis this use-value of land is normalised
to zero. Local political opposition supports the landowners who are against the sale
of land and the party’s motivation to do so is again driven externally. Democratic
rights are preserved in the locality in the sense that there is no forced sale and in
absence of it landowners announce their decision of selling or retaining their plots
of land by voting for either parties contesting over implementation of this project.
Since the local industrialisation is subject to the outcome of political contest, this
endogenised party strengths act crucially in parties’ decision to mobilise resources
to fulfil their commitments. I rule out the possibility of abstention in this model.
This ends up in group formation in the village and the decision of conversion of
land is dependent on the relative strengths of these two groups.
This process of land conversion brings a potential for violence due to the legal-
political imperfections in the economy when the local political opposition initiates
it. Pursuance of violence yields a cost to the parties that is self-financed by them
and this cost decreases higher the degree of imperfections. The violence is also
privately costly to the villagers. This cost is normalised to zero if a concerned
landowner is in support for the winning party and it is positive if he remains in
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the party that loses in violence. I analyse such imperfections in two scenarios -
one in which the local polity cannot mobilise resources for post-voting violence
earlier in the process and such late mobilisation of resources makes the political
decision to follow landowners’ voting decision, thereby the strengths of parties.
The other is when the local polity can mobilise resources for post-voting violence
early in the process, before the landowners even cast their vote for and against in-
dustrial progress, where parties’ early or late mobilisation of resources for violence
is common knowledge.
Main Results
Our first main result shows that political violence in the process of land acquisi-
tion occurs only if the local political parties can indulge in early mobilisation of
resources for post-voting violence. In presence of legal-institutional infirmities that
eases such early mobilisation of resources, if democratic institutions are sufficiently
imperfect and the local drive for industrialisation is sufficiently large so that the
political rent achievable from violence exceeds its cost to the parties, then the
equilibrium outcome involves violence. In such a scenario the equilibrium strength
of the pro-industry party is higher, making industrialisation more probable in the
locality. Otherwise if the legal-institutional infirmities are relatively low so that
local polity cannot mobilise resources for post-voting violence early in the process
but must wait to make their decision once the landowners have announced their
support for either parties, then the equilibrium outcome never involves any armed
conflict. In such a scenario, there is always a possibility that all the lands are being
converted for local industrial use and the entire process is completed peacefully.
Thus political parties’ resource mobilisation power, rather than the mere involve-
ment of the ideologically conflicting political parties plays crucially in resulting
political violence in equilibrium. In other words, if voters can use their votes to
affect the incentives for violence then we show that group formation is such that
violence is minimised. On the other hand, if parties carry their agendas of post-
voting violence, then it is not clear that they can implement voting patterns that
are successful in avoiding violence.
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Our second main result shows that when legal-institutional imperfections are
sufficiently low so that parties cannot mobilise resources for post-voting violence
early in the process, then in presence of sufficiently large democratic imperfections
there can be multiple equilibria. In such a scenario there exists a possibility of
low-level equilibrium trap where conversion of land is significantly small, pointing
out that even a sufficiently high monetary compensation cannot ensure efficiency
in equilibrium (i.e., full conversion of land without any political violence).
The benchmark analysis establishes that a perfect institutional framework re-
stores efficiency as expected. But efficiency can still be achieved with sufficiently
perfect democratic institutions, irrespective of whether the legal-institutional in-
firmities make the local polity to indulge in early or late mobilisation of resources
for post-voting violence. However, with parties’ power to mobilise resources for
post-voting violence early in the process, even sufficiently perfect democratic insti-
tutions create possibilities of violent agitations that discard local industrialisation.
Among other results, I also show that given a choice the political parties do
not always prefer to mobilise their resources early. There are scenarios when the
local opposition can be indifferent between early or late mobilisation of resources
for post-voting violence. Interestingly it can also choose a late mobilisation of re-
sources even when doing so results in successful acquisition of land. This is because
whether the local drive for industrialisation is large enough (determining whether
the majority of landowners vote for or against the industrial project), crucially
determines the parties’ political mileage from the project. Since in this framework
landowners’ voting for the project determines the relative party strength in post-
voting violence, landowners contribute crucially in parties’ decision to mobilise
resources early or late in the process by forming groups for and against land ac-
quisition. Further, since the threat from violence also puts cost to the landowners,
it crucially determines whether efficiency will be achieved in equilibrium or not.
Related Literature
Inefficiency in land acquisition for infrastructure and industrial developments have
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long been subjected to economic literature. The most crucial reasons for such in-
efficiencies have been the compensation mechanisms and the contiguity issue that
attracted a great body of literary works including that of Cao et al. (2008), Keith
et al. (2008), Kominers and Weyl (2011), Ghatak and Ghosh (2011), Singh (2012)
and Ghatak and Mookherjee (2014). There is one strand of literature that consid-
ers endogenous price determination of land, where determination of compensation
follows from direct negotiation as in Cao et al. (2008), through auction mechanisms
and resolving further geographical disconnects as in Ghatak and Ghosh (2011). It
also considers compensation rules with ex-ante incentives of tenants and landlords
towards productivity enhancing investments that affect decision of selling land ex-
post to an industrial developer as in Ghatak and Mookherjee (2014). The other
strand of literature such as of Keith et al. (2008), highlights the importance of
acquisition procedures including property valuations be it by independent agen-
cies based on market value approach, through replacement cost model (especially
for economies with thin land markets) or negotiations. This also includes Bhat-
tacharya and Kundu (2014) that recommends minimum price legislative policy to
submerge protests by land owners but that must effectuate communally to signal
the demand for redistribution to the government. While my present work bypasses
the former strand of literature by considering a compensation mechanism that is
exogenously given, it captured the essence of the later by considering procedural
mechanisms such as public declaration of land price and landowners’ informed
consent towards the acquisition of land. In contrast to the empirical study by
Ghatak et al. (2013) I show that in presence of legal-political institutional imper-
fections inefficiency can result even if there is no discrimination in compensations
and in presence of consultation with landowners. This also stands in contrast
with Ghatak and Ghosh (2011), Singh (2012) and Kominers and Weyl (2011) as
it obtains inefficiency without concerning on contiguity issues.
Our present work considers the essence of group formation for and against land
acquisition, as raised by Ghatak and Banerji (2009), by conceding that decision
on the sale of land, amidst the uncertainty of institutional benefits from saving
large cash or government’s monthly income schemes, divides landowners from the
same locality into two groups. Due to missing financial markets in LDCs, lack of
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complementary human capital, exogenous income and consumption shocks or a
combination of any, landowners often differ in terms of their preference for non-
cash payments over ‘any’ lump sum amount owing to the differing reservation
utilities from current holdings. Studies such as of Ghatak and Banerji (2009) and
Roy Chowdhury (2013) found that group of landowners even protest against ac-
quisition of land to resist such lump sum cash inflow. While there exists a group
of landowners’ concerning over financial security and rehabilitation such that land
selling does not affect their future productivity, there is another group for whom
land as an intrinsic asset carries huge potential for investment. Ghatak et al.
(2013) found that those who inherited land rather than invested in it, are rela-
tively more interested to sale their land. But unlike this stand of literature, I show
that group formation is resultant of political intervention and partisan power of
mobilising resources for post-voting violence towards industrialisation. Moreover
in my framework it is shown that inefficiency is neither due to differentiated reser-
vation utilities stemming from discriminated outside options (as studied in Ghatak
and Banerji, 2009 and Ghatak et al., 2013) nor due to any preference irrationalities
(as seen in Roy Chowdhury, 2013).
I share common perspective with Banerjee et al. (2007) that private bargaining
has many inefficiencies and concurs to the crucial role of local or state government
as a mediator, that has been increasingly exercised in many economies over the
last two decades (see for example Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva, 2003, Bortolotti
and Siniscalco, 2004, Cavaliere and Scabrosetti, 2008 and Estrin et al., 2009). As
discussed earlier, acquiring land often becomes wedge issue politics that encourage
political opposition to extend its support to unwilling and poor landowners even
when the size of landowners are insignificant to build a winning constituency.
While this essence is captured in our framework that aligned with the incidents
discussed earlier, the present work differs from a number of political-economic
studies, from Strom (1990) to Van-De-Wardt et al. (2014) and Hillygus and Shields
(2014), who analysed the involvement of political opposition over wedge issues
based on direct rewards and risks in forms of electoral outcome, government de-
stabilization or strategic coalitions. It also differs from Roy Chowdhury (2013)
that considers political parties to be decisive in membership sizes that affects
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bargaining power over compensation with the buyer but does not address party
competition or voluntary membership and certainly not violence. Instead I show
the impact of such wedge issue politics on the violence over land acquisitions that
the LDCs are facing currently and also consider party competition with voluntary
membership. Also in contrast to Dixit (1987) I show that early mobilisation of
resources in contests is not driven by a parties’ local popularity and such early
mobilisation of resources to post-voting violence makes polity to lead decisions
in fetching the fate of local industrialisation. In the present framework a party
can prefer early mobilisation even when it is less probable to win in contest and
it is legal institutional inefficiencies that makes it easier for parties to indulge in
political violence.
In line with Ellman and Wantchekon (2000) I also consider a framework for two
party competition. Ellman and Wantchekon (2000) consider a party to be ‘strong’
if its policy proposal faces no threat of disruption from an inside or outside agent,
which otherwise weakens the party and suggested that if the strong party wins it
sticks to its ideal policy but if the ‘weak’ party wins then it always implement a
policy that is a compromise with the threatening agent. The present chapter has
a flavour of it but unlike Ellman and Wantchekon (2000), in our framework party
strength is endogenized. Further, while decisions follow from an apparent free and
fair local voting in our model, it also captures the essence of political clientelism
following a strand of empirical literature such as Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007),
Bardhan et al. (2009), and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2012) who found that
politics in LDCs such as in (rural) India, exhibit clientelism where local voters
join party clubs. Further in contrast to Ray (2007, Ch. 14) and Bhattacharya and
Kundu (2014) I do not consider any information gap to play a role in the political
economy of redistributions and/or in violent protests and show that inefficiency
results even in absence of any informational discrepancies. This chapter also stand
in contrast with the conflict literature such as Mitra and Ray (2014) where conflict
is driven by economic changes such as varying land prices within the groups.
Finally the present work stands in contrast with the one developed in Chapter
1, Section 0.4, that shows how the interplay between imperfections in democratic
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institutions like bureaucratic corruption and extra-legal influence of political par-
ties, state machineries and motivated civic societies induces a buyer to strategically
delay land acquisition processes. In the present framework buyer is inactive when
it comes to determine price of land and the quantity of sale. It also abstracts away
from any hold up issues resulting from strategic bargaining (seller augmented),
inconsistency in bargaining protocols (buyer augmented), contingency issues or
due to information asymmetry (the literature is captured in the literature review
section of Chapter 1). Here I show that institutional imperfections that eases the
mobilisation of resources for violence, not only can reduce the size of industrial
land conversions but also result in political violence. I also show that resistance
can occur without any rent-seeking motivation on the part of political parties,
thereby sharing the premise of Bhatttacharya and Kundu (2014) but contrasting
that of chapter 1.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 0.12.2 I present
the formal model, Section 0.12.4 comprises the analysis of the model by consider-
ing the scenario in which parties practice late mobilisation of resources for post-
voting violence where political parties’ decision to indulge in violence follows the
landowners’ voting outcome. The summary of results are given as propositions,
followed by discussions and proofs. Section 0.12.5 considers an alternative sce-
nario where parties pursue early mobilisation of resources for post-voting violence
where landowners’ voting decision follows the strategy choice of the parties. In
this section I analyse the framework of such early mobilisation of resources and
then compare the results with the scenario when parties pursue late mobilisation
of resources. All the results are then summarised as propositions and discussed
along with the subsequent proofs. Section 0.12.6 concludes the chapter.
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0.12.2 The formal model: Local economy and landowners’
reservation utility
The model considers a representative locality whose economy is based on land
that comprises a set N = {1, . . . , n} of landowners each holding a unit plot of
equally sized land. These plots are privately productive (for example, agriculture,
farming, etc.) to the landowners each of whom yields an identical utility v62 from
their respective plots. This implies that (i) all lands are equally productive in
agriculture, (ii) all landowners have same outside option, and (iii) all are equally
skilled in farming (or in their respective professions).63 For simplicity of the model
I normalise this utility to zero, i.e., v = 0.
Landowners’ property rights
The model assumes that the landowners have full property rights over land so
that they can deny sale of their plots if and when a proposal for sale arises. This
assumption is necessary to abstract away from land acquisition issues arising out of
inefficient and overlapping land entitlements, forced sale and associated transaction
costs.64 This model abstracts away from any such hold-up problems and denotes
by k = {0, . . . , n}, the number of landowners who are willing to sell their respective
plots.
Industrialisation and exogenous price of land
Industrialisation is a political process (as discussed in section 0.12.1) and the local
polity involves two parties called P (who is a ‘pro-industrial’ party) and O (who
62One can consider v as the reservation utility of a landowner that equates the landowner’s
valuation of his plot and an opportunity of sale must involve a price offer at least equal to this
reservation utility. This is now enacted by many countries around the world, both developed
and LDCs to avoid problems arising out of landowners dissatisfaction in an occasion of sale.
63This is a simplifying assumption to abstract away from land acquisition issues arising out
of locational and ecological variety of the land, lack of skill variety or skill formation programs
that could result in hold-up problems.
64More on this is discussed in Chapter 1 or see Alston et al. (2012).
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‘opposes’ the sale of land). Party P brings with it a buyer who wishes to build an
industrial project and is ready to pay a unit price p > v(= 0) that is determined
exogenously by legislation.65
Complementarity and buyer’s return
In this framework perfect complementarity is normalised as the minimum number
of plots that is required to build the project is one, so that the buyer’s return
from the project, V (k) = 0 if k < 1. Otherwise if 1 ≤ k ≤ n plots are used
to build the project, it gives a total return of V (k) > 0 to the buyer, where
V exhibits an increasing returns with respect to the plot-size to the buyer, in
particular V (k + 2)− V (k + 1) > V (k + 1)− V (k) for all k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 2.66 Of
course the project is feasible for the buyer if and only if V (k) ≥ kp for all 0 ≤ k ≤ n
and I assume that V (1) > p for the project. These two together imply that the
buyer wants to buy whatever number of plots are available for sale. Throughout
the chapter I will consider that the buyer is a non-actor when it comes to deal
with the sale of land.
Group formation and political return for parties
Incentive of local polity to involve in the land acquisition process comes from their
respective political returns where party P earns a political return if the project
takes place but this return is driven by some external inducement beyond the
implementation of this project. Party O that opposes the sale of land, do so again
65One can easily relate p as arising out of a minimum price legislation, where this minimum
price exceeds the sellers’ valuation for their land. Such enactments prevail in many developed and
LDCs in order to tackle seller dissatisfactions due to inadequate compensations. Hence in this
framework I assume that any problem regarding unfair compensation has been already resolved.
66This framework allows for flexibility in terms of project implementation with any plot size
(k ≥ 1) and thus abstracts away form the problems associated with assembling large scale land
and the failure of the project due to partial acquisition of land. For discussions on such issues
see for example Miceli and Segerson, 2007, 2011 and O’Flaherty 1994.
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due to the political return earned elsewhere.67 O announces its presence in the
village to support the landowners who are not willing to sell their plots. Whether
the project will be implemented or not in the locality is decided over a contest
between these parties. This ends up in group formation in this village where
villagers announce their decision of selling plots by voting for either parties but
cannot abstain from membership. The political return to the parties is denoted by
b and I define b := b (k) where b(·) is increasing with respect to party membership
strength but the marginal return is constant, in particular b(k) = k. If the project
is implemented then party P receives a political return of b(k) > 0 while party O
receives −b(k). If the project is scrapped then party P receives a political return
of −b(k) while party O receives b(k). An obvious assumption here is that the
political returns are insignificant or null if no landowner wants to sell their plots,
such that b(0) = 0.
Political violence and its costs
Due to imperfections in the political market the matter doesn’t end there and in
spite of apparent free and fair voting in the locality there is a chance of political
violence, in particular once the villagers have made their choices. While the parties
may or may not be able to mobilise resources early for the post-voting violence,
the success of violence (if used) depends on the relative size of party memberships.
If violence takes place then I denote by pi, the probability with which P wins in
violence. I assume that pi := pi (k) with pi(·) increasing in party P ’s membership
strength. In particular pi(k) = k
n
, for all k = 0, 1, . . . , n so that pi(0) = 0 and
pi(n) = 1. As N is sufficiently large, let pi(1) < 1
2
. If P wins the project gets
implemented with k plots that its member landowners then sell with the unit
price p, but if O wins then there is no land sale and the project gets scrapped. Of
67The involvement of Indian National Congress party in the land acquisition in Yamuna
Expressway project in Uttar Pradesh was one of their 2012 Assembly Election agenda (see
< http : //archive.indianexpress.com/news/from − bhatta − parsaul − to − dalit − homes −
rahu.../921057/ >) or the involvement of Trinamul Congress (TMC) in cases of Singur and
Nandigram in West Bengal have claimed to be given significant political mileage to the party in
upcoming state assembly election (see for example Chakravorty, 2013).
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course, any uncontested violence wins. Moreover, since there is no forced sale the
project is automatically abandoned if no landowner agrees to sell their plots. Note
that violence is costly to the parties as well as to the landowners. In this respect,
let c > 0 be the individual cost of violence (if it takes place) to the parties that
they finance themselves to pursue violence. Let d ≥ 0 be the individual cost to
landowners owing to the loss of welfare resulting from the violence. Precisely, d is
normalised to zero in case a landowner supports the winning party but d is positive
if he supports the party that loses in violence. Given these costs of violence both
of the political parties can choose to accommodate (strategy A) with each other
in consent to project implementation, otherwise, party O can choose to initiate
violence (strategy F for fight) to which party P can retaliate (choose F ).
Payoff of landowners
In absence of any political violence, if 0 < k ≤ n landowners agree to sell their
plots then each of these landowners receives a price p from the sale. Hence the
net utility of an individual landowner who joins party P is p − v = p (since
v = 0). A landowner who joins party O continues to receive the utility v = 0
from keeping his plot. However, in presence of political violence the outcome is
stochastic and the expected payoff of those 0 ≤ k ≤ n landowners who support
party P is pi(k)p + (1 − pi(k))(−d) while that of the landowners support O is
(1− pi(k))0 + pi(k)(−d).
Timeline
The framework yields a dynamic game of complete information. This section
considers that the parties cannot pursue an early mobilisation of resources for
post-voting violence and the decisions then comply with the following timeline:
• Exogenous price announcement :
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– Stage 0 : Unit price of land p is announced exogenously by an authority
who may not be directly involved in the land acquisition process;
• Voting phase:
– Stage 1.1 : Landowners independently and simultaneously determine
party memberships where membership is irreversible and common knowl-
edge.
– Stage 1.2 : Two groups are then formed - landowners who are willing
to sell their plots join party P , others who are not willing to sell join
party O;
• Political conflict phase:
– Stage 2 : Once the size of membership for each party is determined,
party O chooses between A and F ;
– Stage 3 : Observing O’s choice, party P chooses between A and F ;
• Outcome on local industrialisation:
– Stage 4 : Outcome is determined and if the project is implemented the
unit price of land p is delivered to each of the member landowners in
P , otherwise the project is scrapped and no land sale takes place. The
game ends here.
In what follows I characterise the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcomes
of this dynamic game denoted by Gpi,c. The central objective of the chapter is to
find the conditions under which democratic imperfections lead to political violence
where,
Definition 2. Political violence is a hostile or aggressive collective struggle per-
suaded to achieve political goals that involves strikes, riots or agitations and protest
movements. In the game Gpi,c political violence takes place when both of the polit-
ical parties choose to play F . Otherwise there is violent opposition when only one
party plays F .
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Voting Phase
Stage 2 : Given the respective membership sizes, party O makes a choice 
between A and F
Party P wins, then the 
project passes through the 
political contest
Political Conflict Phase
Stage 3: Party P  chooses A, the 
project is implemented and price 
p is paid to k landowners, the 
game ends. 	
Stage 4 : All 
landowners 
who agreed to 
sell their plots 
and joined 
party P, are  
now paid the 
per unit price 
p, there is 
either full or 
partial 
conversion of 
land, the game 
ends
Outcome on local 
Industrialisation
 The unit price 
of land p is  
exogenously 
determined 
Stage1.1: Landowners 
independently and 
simultaneously 
determine party  
memberships where 
membership is 
irreversible and 
common knowledge.  
Stage 1.2: Group 
formation - 
landowners who are 
willing to sell  
their plots join party 
P, otherwise they 
join party O  
A F
Stage 3: Party P  chooses between 
A and F - there is either violent 
opposition or political violence	
A wins,  the game ends and the 
project is scrapped
Figure 5: Timeline of the game Gpi,c
Since execution of violence is a costly process for the parties, political violence
is not worthy for the parties unless they get support from the local landowners. It
is a collective struggle because the probability of any party winning in the conflict
is directly related to the number of landowners support the party in conflict,
while participation in conflict is as well costly to the landowners. However, legal-
institutional inefficiency eases the execution of such violence for the parties. In
this regards I say that,
Definition 3. Democracy is imperfect when political institutions are not strong
enough to uphold the local electoral outcomes leading to possible violence where the
degree of imperfections of democracy is inversely related to the cost of violence c
to the political parties. Hence, democracy is perfect if c =∞.
In section 0.12.4 I analyse the above time frame when the legal-institutional
infirmities are relatively low so that the local political parties cannot indulge in
an early mobilisation of resources for post-voting violence but must wait to make
their decision once the landowners have announced their support for either par-
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ties. In such scenarios when mobilisation of resources for post-voting violence is
late, parties’ decision follows their relative membership strengths stemming from
landowners’ voting decision. In Section 0.12.5 I consider an alternative scenario
where the legal-institutional infirmities are relatively large so that the local polity
can easily afford to take their decision prior to landowners’ voting. Thus they
pursue an early mobilisation of resources for post-voting violence.
0.12.3 Perfect Democracy
Democracy is perfect when political institutions strongly uphold the electoral out-
come and/or the strong legal-institutional support makes political violence unaf-
fordable for the parties. In this model where price is determined exogenously I
use perfect democracy as a normalised benchmark where two things are granted:
(a) it is rational for the buyer to buy all available plots and (b) it is individu-
ally rational for each landowner to sell his plot irrespective of the decisions of
other landowners. The first one is guaranteed by the assumption that the project
yields an increasing returns (with respect to the number of plots being sold for the
project) to the buyer, which implies buyer’s average return from the project rises
with the number of plots sold and the buyer’s minimum average return exceeds
the unit price he pays for plots, i.e., V (1) > p. Hence it is a strictly dominant
strategy for the buyer to purchase all available land. The following Lemma deals
with perfectly democratic scenario.
Lemma 5. If democracy is perfect then the process of land acquisition is peaceful
and the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE) is k∗ = n where all landowners
unanimously decide to sell their plots of land.
Under perfect democracy, a single landowner sells his plot when no one else is
selling if and only if the utility he gets from the sale is higher than what he gets from
keeping the plot, i.e., p > v. I impose this condition that the unit price of land p is
sufficiently large to compensate the landowner for selling his land by normalising
v to zero. This condition then ensures that it is individually rational for all other
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landowners to sell their plots for a higher payoff of p than resisting the sale and
get 0. Hence under ideal circumstance (without any political imperfections) it is
a strictly dominant strategy for any landowner to sell their respective plots. As
the buyer is a non-actor in our model he earns a net profit of V (k) − pk from
the successful implementation of the proposed project, otherwise he earns 0 in
absence of any willing land-seller. Hence under perfect democracy the unique
Nash Equilibrium denoted by k∗ is achieved when all the landowners unanimously
decide to sell their plots of land and k∗ = n. Given perfect democracy as a
normalised benchmark I now turn to analyse the impacts of imperfect democracy
on the equilibrium of the model. Given the outcome under perfect democracy, I ask
how do post-electoral uncertainties due to the ease of executing violent opposition
affect incidence of political violence and impact the size of industrialisation? Who
is responsible for political violence? Is it economics driven by individual incentives
or politics driven by party incentives?
0.12.4 Politics with late mobilisation of resources for post-
voting violence
One of the endemic characteristics of less developed nations is their weak legal-
institutional support that fails to enforce proper law and order in the society.
Democratic rights that are more often than not provided by the constitution,
fails to sustain in the less developed nations due to the inefficiencies in the legal-
institutions - higher degree of inefficiency brings down the cost for the political
parties to distort the democratic outcomes. As defined earlier, democracy is im-
perfect when political institutions fails to uphold the electoral outcome and/or
the weak legal-institutional support reduces the cost of political violence for the
parties. Under imperfect democracy whether the project is to be implemented or
stalled is decided in the following game of conflict where each party can either
choose to accommodate (strategy A) or to fight (strategy F ). As mentioned in
section 0.5, if both parties accommodate, then the project is implemented using k
plots and the payoffs of parties P and O are b(k) and −b(k) respectively. Other-
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wise, a party can indulge in a costly fight where cost of violence is a measure of
the degree of legal-institutional imperfections. If party O is the only party that
fights then the project is scrapped and the respective payoffs of P and O are −b(k)
and b(k)− c. Similarly, if party P is the only party that fights then the respective
payoffs of P and O are b(k)− c and −b(k). Finally, if both parties fight then the
outcome is stochastic and the expected payoff of party P is b(k)[2pi(k) − 1] − c
while that of party O is b(k)[1− 2pi(k)]− c.
Denote the political rents from violence (net of costs) of party P and O by
RP(k) and RO(k) respectively. In any sub-game perfect equilibrium, for violence
to take place it is necessary that each party’s political rent from violence is strictly
greater than its cost. Note that for party O to initiate violence it must be true
that b(k)[1 − 2pi(k)] − c > −b(k) and for P to retaliate it must be true that
b(k)[2pi(k)− 1]− c > −b(k). These yield
RP(k) = pi(k)2b(k) > c,
and
RO(k) = [1− pi(k)]2b(k) > c.
Clearly given pi(·) and b(·) these political rents have following characteristics:
rent of the industrial party RP(k) is strictly increasing in k for any 0 < k < n
and its marginal rent from violence is also increasing in its own membership size
so that RP(k + 2) − RP(k + 1) > RP(k + 1) − RP(k), for all k = 0, 1, . . . , n − 2.
The political rent of the opposition party RO(k) is strictly increasing in k for any
k < n
2
, maximises at k = n
2
and falling thereafter. Moreover, its marginal rent
is diminishing with respect to k (or increasing in its own membership) so that
RO(k+ 2)−RO(k+ 1) < RO(k+ 1)−RO(k), for all k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 2. Note that
in presence of these political representations, if no landowner is willing to sell his
plot then RP(0) = 0 = RO(0), and if all villagers unanimously agree to sell their
plots then RP(n) = 2n while RO(n) = 0. This brings us to the following facts:
Fact 1. Assumption on pi(·) and b(·) ensure that RP(1) < RO(1) and there exists
a unique kˆ = n
2
such that RP(kˆ) = RO(kˆ) = n2 .
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Fact 2. Assumptions on b(·) and pi(·) also ensure that there exists a unique k˜ = n
2
that maximizes RO(k). Note that k˜ = kˆ.
Fact 1 essentially implies that both the political parties are equally probable to
win in violence at kˆ since pi(kˆ) = 1− pi(kˆ) = 1
2
. However, whether the project will
be implemented in equilibrium and if so, whether the process will remain peaceful
or not, depends on the relative membership strength of the two parties.
To analyse the impact of relative group sizes on the incentives of the parties at
the post-electoral stage, the industrial party membership size k = 0, . . . , n needs
to be categorised into four subsets such that 0, 1, . . . , n = {K−− ∪ K− ∪ K+ ∪
K++}. The sequence in which these subsets appear on the equilibrium path has
consequence on the equilibrium outcome. These subsets are defined as follows:
(a) {K−−} = {k−−, . . . , k¯−−}, such that for all k ∈ {K−−}, RP(k) < RO(k) < c
that implies P does not retaliate when O initiates violence, but O plays A
on the equilibrium path,
(b) {K−} = {k−, . . . , k¯−}, such that for all k ∈ {K−}, RP(k) < c ≤ RO(k)
that implies P does not retaliate when O initiates violence, and O chooses
to fight (F ) on the equilibrium path,
(c) {K+} = {k+, . . . , k¯+}, such that for all k ∈ {K+}, c < min{RP(k), RO(k)}
that implies P retaliates when O initiates violence, and O initiates violence
(F ) on the equilibrium path, and
(d) {K++} = {k++, . . . , k¯++}, such that for all k ∈ {K++}, RO(k) < c ≤ RP(k)
that implies party P retaliates when O initiates violence, but O plays A on
the equilibrium path.
I will assume whenever necessary that the relevant sets are non-empty. Our
first main result is captured in Proposition 8.
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Proposition 8. If democracy is sufficiently perfect such that the cost of violence
exceeds the maximum political rent achievable by party O (i.e., c > RO(k˜)), then no
party takes up arms and the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE) is k∗ = n
where both parties accommodate to implement the industrial project.
Sufficiently perfect democracy puts significantly higher cost of violence to the
political parties. Facts 1 and 2 establishes that when party O’s political rent is
maximum (i.e., at k˜), both parties share equal membership strength so that each
is equally likely to win in violence (if it takes place). Recall that given any cost
of executing violence, whether the parties choose to indulge in violence or not is
not only dependent on their respective membership sizes but also on whether it is
politically rewarding for the parties to do so. With relatively small membership
sizes P never chooses to indulge in violence as in a democratic society (albeit
imperfect) both its probability of success in violence and its political return are
relatively low (resulting in its sufficiently low political rent). But since the political
return of party O from opposing the land acquisition is also sufficiently low for such
lower support for industrialisation in the locality, it is not worth for O to initiate
violence even if its probability of success in violence is sufficiently high. Following
the categorisation of industrial membership sizes all such membership sizes then
fall in the subset K−−. Otherwise, with majority of the landowners’ support
party P ’s probability of success in violence is relatively high (if it takes place)
and acquisition of land then becomes politically rewarding for the party. Since the
marginal rents of the parties are rising with their respective membership strengths,
for sufficiently high k party P ’s political rent from violence outweighs its cost to
the party (it is reasonable to assume that c is less than the maximum political
rent achievable by party P as otherwise it is equivalent to perfect democracy) so
that P can retaliate if the opposition initiates violence. But since such relatively
high industrial support sufficiently weakens party O’s chances to win in violence
and thereby reduces its political rent, political violence becomes unaffordable for
the party. Any such k then falls in the subset K++. Hence there is no such
membership sizes for which party O indulges in violence here. In absence of forced
sale in the model as P never chooses the path of violence unless the opposition
initiates it, on the equilibrium path of the conflict sub-game no party takes up
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arms and accommodate with each other to implement the project peacefully.
Anticipating the outcome of the conflict sub-game the villagers now decide to
join a party. Equilibrium in the voting sub-game is achieved when no member
from either party has an incentive to deviate from party membership. In absence
of violence any landowner who joins P in agreement to sell receives a net payoff
equals the price of land p while a deviation to O to retain his plot would fetch
him a payoff of 0. Hence no individual landowner has an inventive to deviate from
P ’s membership. Moreover, for a given p it is always individually profitable for
a landowner to sell his plot even when no one else in the village do. But these
payoffs are reversed for any member landowner who joinsO and as with the project
being implemented in the village there is always an incentive for each of them to
deviate from O’s membership. Hence the size of industrial party membership rises
continuously unless all landowners agree to sell their plots and the unique SPE
is achieved with k∗ = n. Note that in presence of very low degree of democratic
imperfections, the outcome of the game is equivalent to that of perfect democracy
where the event of full conversion is certain and peaceful. 
Sufficiently high democratic imperfections eases the execution of political vio-
lence for the parties as this imperfections shrink their cost of pursuing violence, c.
For such lower c party O can choose to initiate violence to which P can also retali-
ate with F as and when it is affordable for them to do so. However the outcome of
this conflict sub-game depends on the relative membership strengths of the parties
as well as on their respective political returns. This scenario is captured in the
following Proposition:
Proposition 9. If democratic imperfections are sufficiently large such that the
maximum political rent achievable by party O exceeds the cost of violence (i.e.,
c < RO(k˜)), then in every sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE) there is no violence.
While k∗ = n always constitutes a SPE, there can be multiplicity of equilibria. In
particular there can be exactly one other SPE where no party takes up arms and
makes the event of peaceful industrialisation certain, with k∗ = k¯−−. This occurs
if and only if |K−−| ≥ 1 and,
131
(a) either |K−| ≥ 1;
(b) or |K−| = 0 and d¯ > k+p
n−k+ .
Proposition 9 considers that c falls below the maximum political rent achievable
by party O. From Facts 1 and 2 this corresponds to the membership size k˜ (that
equals to kˆ) with which both parties are equally likely to win in violence (if takes
place). Following Proposition 8 for significantly small industrial support in the
locality (such that P is highly unlikely to win in violence) it is not rational for
the opposition to initiate violence as its political return from violence, b(·), is then
insignificant. This makes violence unworthy for the opposition party. Of course
for such significantly low k party P never chooses to indulge in violence owing to
its notably low political return and thereby rent from violence. Hence, for such
industrial membership sizes no party takes up arms and the project is implemented
peacefully. These membership sizes fall in the subset {K−−}. Since losing in
political conflict yields negative political return to the respective parties, no party
indulges in violence unless they gain sufficient support from the landowners that
then suffices their cost of executing political violence in the locality. Hence when
majority of landowners are against the sale of land the political rent for O is
relatively higher than the industrial party owing to O’s higher probability to win
in the conflict. Thus there may exist some sufficiently small k for which it is
rational for party P to not involve in a violent contest with the opposition. In
such casesO initiates violence as it then wins the uncontested violence and discards
the project from taking place. All such membership sizes (if exist) then fall in the
subset {K−}. But P ’s probability to win in violence rises with its membership size.
If the membership strengths for both parties are relatively close, then it becomes
politically rewarding for both the parties to cater their respective ideologies and
sufficiently imperfect democracy (that brings down c) then makes it easier for
the parties to pursue their ideologies by using legal or extra-legal means, even
violence. Thus for such membership sizes both parties choose to fight and all such
k then belong to the subset {K+}. However, if k is significantly large so that
the probability of O’s win in violence is close to nil which makes its rent to fall
significantly such that it does not suffices the cost of initiating violence, then it is
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rational for O to abstain from violence. Since there is no forced sale in the model
for all such significantly large k both parties accommodate with each other on the
equilibrium path and the project is implemented peacefully. All such industrial
membership sizes then fall in the subset {K++}.
Anticipating the possible outcomes of the conflict sub-game the villagers now
decide their membership through voting. Following Proposition 8 if no party takes
up arms then each landowner who joins P in support of sale gets a payoff of p
while each of the rest of landowners who joins O gets 0. Note that these payoffs
are unaltered for significantly small and large size of industrial memberships that
fall in subsets {K−−} and {K++} respectively. Hence in these two subsets each
rational landowner from O has an incentive to deviate and join P but the deviation
on the reverse direction is never rational. Hence k continues to rise unless it reaches
the upper bounds of the respective subsets, k¯−− and k¯++ respectively. I am now
to check whether k¯−− and k¯++ are SPE. For k¯−− to be a SPE it must be true
that there is no incentive for an individual landowner to deviate from his decision
of retaining his plot which then strengthen party O to initiate violence. Knowing
this if any landowner now chooses to deviate and sell his plot then industrial party
membership rises to the lower bound of the following subset that is either {K−} (if
it is non-empty) or {K+} (if {K−} is empty). Since for any membership size that
belongs to {K−} there is violent opposition that scraps the project, a member in O
rationally chooses to be in the opposition and save the cost d for being in the losing
party. Hence an equilibrium of the voting sub-game is k∗ = k¯−− where the event
of industrialisation is certain and peaceful with relatively small number of plots
being sold for the project. Since O always wins for any membership size within
{K−}, none of the rational landowners ever has an incentive to support party
P here and there is no equilibrium membership strength that belongs in subset
{K−}. Suppose, k increases sufficiently such that the size of P ’s membership
is now k+ ∈ {K+}. Since both parties can now indulge in political violence
a landowner that supports the sale of land now fetches an expected payoff of
pi(k+)p + [1 − k+](−d) while he gets 0 for keeping his plot. If the unit price of
the plot is relatively small such that it cannot compensate their individual cost
violence that crosses an upper limit of k
+p
n−k+ then any rational landowner chooses
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to keep his plot and k∗ = k¯−− remains an SPE. Note that if unit price of land
is high enough to compensate this cost then it is worth selling one’s plot and the
landowner chooses to join P . Obviously, in that case k¯−− is not an equilibrium of
the voting sub-game as k rises to the following subset {K+}.
Consider that the landowner’s individual cost from violence is sufficiently low
(or the per unit price of land, p, is sufficiently high to cross the upper limit of
(n−k+)d
k+
) such that k falls in the subset {K+}. It thus remains a question whether
there is any industrial membership size for which violence exist as a SPE. A rational
individual will remain in O if and only if his expected payoff from being in the
opposition party is strictly greater than the expected utility from being in P .
But for sufficiently high p there is always an incentive for any landowner to join
P and sell his plot rather than opposing industrialisation. Thus the industrial
membership size continues to rise and even if it reaches the upper bound of subset
{K+} it is individually rational even for the marginal seller to deviate from O to
support industrialisation as higher membership strength increases the chances of
industrialisation in the locality. Hence k rises to reach subset {K++} and there is
no equilibrium k in {K+}. Hence violence does not exists as a SPE. As mentioned
earlier once the size of P ’s membership reaches {K++} it continues to rise as it
is now individually rational for all the landowners to sell their land and thus here
the only possible equilibrium is k¯++ = n.
Hence if the subsets are non-trivially non-empty then there are two SPE : one
is a low-level equilibrium with k∗ = k¯−− and the other is k∗ = n. In both cases
the event of peaceful industrialisation is certain. Note that if {K−} is empty and
d is sufficiently low such that k∗ = k¯−− is not an equilibrium then following the
above analysis there exists a unique SPE with k∗ = n. In this case full conversion
of land is certain and peaceful. Hence even in presence of political imperfections
violence does not take place in the process of land acquisition if local political
representations involve in late mobilisation of resources for violence.
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0.12.5 Politics with early mobilisation of resources for post-
voting violence
Subsection 0.12.4 analysed the scenario where political parties involve in late mo-
bilisation of resources and thus their strategic decision follows the landowners’
voting decision. It showed that if local polity cannot indulge in an early mobilisa-
tion of resources and accepts to abide by the voting outcome then violence do not
take place on the equilibrium path even in presence of institutional imperfections.
In this section I therefore turn to analyse the scenario where parties can mobilise
resources earlier and take their strategic decision ahead of the voting outcome so
that landowners’ decision now follows the decision taken by the parties. From
section 0.12.3 I know that if perfect democracy sustains then given the unit price
of land the event of industrialisation remains certain and peaceful with k∗ = n. I
retain perfect democracy as a normalised benchmark in this section as well and
ask that given a choice does parties ever adopt late mobilisation over an early
mobilisation of resources? To see this I first analyse to what extent democratic
outcome is dampened when parties indulge in early mobilisation of resources and
decide their strategies ahead of the voters decision? Does this political imper-
fection dampen the process of peaceful industrialisation? Is violence an obvious
outcome when political parties involve an early mobilisation of resources? I then
compare these results with the scenario analysed in section 0.12.4 when parties
do not have the ability to mobilise resources early. All the results are then sum-
marised in Propositions, followed by respective proofs. The characteristics of the
original model from section 0.5 remains unaltered except the timing of the game
as in the current framework decisions follows as is mentioned below.
Timeline with parties’ early mobilisation of resources:
• Exogenous price announcement :
– Stage 0 : Unit price of land p is announced exogenously by an authority
who may not be directly involved in the land acquisition process;
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• Political conflict phase:
– Stage 1 : party O decides between A and F ;
– Stage 2 : Observing O’s choice, party P decides between A and F ;
• Voting phase:
– Stage 3.1 : Once the parties choose their strategies, landowners indepen-
dently and simultaneously determine party memberships where mem-
bership is irreversible and common knowledge;
– Stage 3.2 : Two groups are then formed - landowners who are willing
to sell their plots join party P , others who are not willing to sell join
party O;
• Outcome on local industrialisation:
– Stage 4 : Political contest takes place and the outcome is determined
and if the project is implemented the unit price of land p is delivered to
each of the member landowners in P , otherwise the project is scrapped
and no land sale takes place. The game ends here.
In the conflict sub-game each party can either choose to accommodate (strategy
A) or fight (strategy F ) that derives the decision of whether the project is to be
implemented or stalled. However, the optimal strategy choice of the parties is
driven by their respective anticipated membership strength to be achieved from
the voting sub-game. Following section 0.5, if both parties accommodate then the
project is implemented peacefully and a member landowner supporting P receives
the unit price p by selling his plot while a member in O receives a normalised
payoff of 0 from retaining his plot. Since selling a plot gives any landowner a
higher payoff than keeping that, it is always rational for any landowner to support
P . Hence if both parties accommodate then in the sub-game perfect equilibrium
all the landowners unanimously join the industrial party to support the conversion
of land and k∗ = n holds. If P is the only party that chooses F then it wins the
uncontested violence and implements the proposed project. Since supporting P
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Stage 4 : Political 
contest takes place- 
if A wins,  the game 
ends and the project 
is scrapped; if P 
wins, then the 
project passes 
through in the 
locality and is 
implemented with k 
plots of land. All 
landowners who 
agreed to sell their 
plots and joined P, 
are  now paid the 
per unit price p, the 
game ends. 
Outcome on local 
Industrialisation
 Stage 0: The 
unit price of 
land p is  
exogenously 
determined 
Voting Phase
Stage3.1: Landowners 
independently and 
simultaneously 
determine party  
memberships where 
membership is 
irreversible and 
common knowledge.  
Stage 3.2: Group 
formation - 
landowners who are 
willing to sell  
their plots join party 
P, otherwise they 
join party O  
Stage 1: Party O makes a choice between A and F
Political Conflict Phase
Stage 2: Party P  chooses A, the 
project is to be implemented 
with price p be paid to k 
landowners who will join P, the 
game ends. 
A F
Stage 2: Party P  chooses between 
A and F - there is either violent 
opposition or political violence
 Party P  chooses  A and there is 
violent opposition
 Party P  chooses  F and there is 
political violence
Political conflict between O and P 
Figure 6: Timeline of the game Gpi,c when parties can practice early mobilisation of resources
then fetches a landowner a payoff of p while supporting O fetches a net payoff of
−d, it is always rational for a landowner to support the industrial party. Hence
in SPE all the landowners unanimously join the industrial party and k∗ = n
holds again. However, if O is the only party that fights then this uncontested
violence discards the project and a supporting landowner receives a payoff of 0
from retaining his plot. But a landowner supporting P then receives a net payoff
of −d for being in the losing party. Hence it is always rational for any landowner
to join the opposition and in the SPE all the landowners unanimously join O
resulting k∗ = 0. Finally, if both the parties indulge in political violence then the
expected payoff of a member landowner in P is pi(k)p+(1−pi(k))(−d) while that of
a member landowner inO is (1−pi(k−1))0+pi(k−1)(−d). Since the outcome of the
conflict sub-game is then stochastic, in a continuum of voters’ space an indifferent
landowner’s expected payoff from joining either party is equal. Given the technical
characteristics of pi(·), if an indifferent landowner supports industrialisation then
the equilibrium size of industrial membership for which both parties choose to play
F , is denoted by kF where kF =
d(1+n)
p+2d
. Note that kF < n for any given p > 0 and
it is rising in d. Moreover, since kF is falling in p this counter-intuitively implies
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that kF > n2 .
Both the parties can anticipate the voting outcome to decide their optimal
strategies. Hence following the above analysis if both of them choose to accom-
modate then in the voting phase the payoff of parties P and O are b(n) and
−b(n) respectively where the project is implemented with unanimous support of
the landowners. If P is the only one who fights then it receives a net payoff of
b(n) − c and O receives −b(n). However, if O is the only one who fights then it
receives a net payoff of b(0) = −c and P receives b(0) = 0. Finally, if both of the
parties fight, then the expected payoff of party P is b(kF)(2pi(kF) − 1) − c while
that of party O is b(kF)(1 − 2pi(kF)) − c. Note that given c > 0, the industrial
party never chooses to indulge in political violence unless the opposition initiates
it.
Denote the political rents from violence (net of costs) of party P and O in
this case by P (k) and O(k) respectively. In any sub-game perfect equilibrium, for
violence to take place it is necessary that the political rent from violence is strictly
greater than its cost to each party. Thus for party O to initiate violence it must
be true that b(kF)(1− 2pi(kF))− c > −b(n) and for P to retaliate it must be true
that b(kF)(2pi(kF)− 1)− c > b(0). These yield
P (k) = b(kF)(2pi(kF)− 1) > c,
and
O(k) = b(kF)(1− 2pi(kF)) + b(n) > c.
Given the linearity of pi(·) and b(·) in section 2, P (k) initially decreases with
the industrial membership, optimises when the membership size reaches n
4
and
increases thereafter. The marginal rent from violence for party P is increasing in its
own membership strength so that, P (k+2)−P (k+1) > P (k+1)−P (k) for all k =
0, . . . , n−2. On a contrary, O(k) initially increases with the industrial membership,
optimises when the membership size reaches n
4
and decreases thereafter. The
marginal rent from violence for O is decreasing in industrial party’s membership
strength (rising in its own membership strength) so that, O(k + 2)− O(k + 1) <
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O(k + 1) − O(k) for all k = 0, . . . , n − 2. Note that in presence of local political
representations in the village, if no landowner is willing to sell their plots then
P (0) = 0 and O(0) = n. And if all villagers unanimously agree to sell their plots
then P (n) = n and O(n) = 0.This brings us to the following facts:
Fact 3. Assumptions on pi(·) and b(·) ensures that there exists a unique n
2
< k¯ < n
such that P (k¯) = O(k¯) where k¯ = n
4
+ n
√
20
8
.
Fact 4. P (k¯) < RP(kˆ), where kˆ = n2 .
Recall from Facts 1 and 2 in section 0.12.4 that when parties cannot mobilise
resources early then the political rents from violence for both the parties are iden-
tical at kˆ = n
2
and RP(kˆ) = n2 = RO(kˆ). It is now to analyse the scenario when
local polity has power to indulge in early mobilisation of resources and whether
it is always optimal for the parties to mobilise resources for post-vote violence
early when they can choose to mobilise resources later. In a sufficiently perfect
democratic society it turns out that the local polity rationally choses early mobili-
sation over a late mobilisation of resources for post-voting violence. The following
Proposition deals with it.
Proposition 10. If democracy is sufficiently perfect such that c > RO(kˆ) and kF <
k¯, then party O prefers the early mobilisation of resources over late mobilisation
in the process to acquire land for industrialisation and the unique sub-game perfect
equilibrium (SPE) is k∗ = 0 where violent political opposition stops the project
from taking place.
The condition on c here is identical to the one captured in proposition 8.
Recall that when parties cannot indulge in early mobilisation of resources then the
maximum political rent from violence achievable by party O is n
2
when both parties
share equal membership strength, kˆ. Proposition 8 shows that if democracy is
sufficiently perfect such that c exceeds n
2
then the unique SPE is achieved when all
the villagers unanimously join the industrial party and full conversion of land for
industrial use is conducted peacefully. Hence if the local political parties cannot
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have an early mobilisation of resources then in a sufficiently perfect democratic
environment party O’s welfare is −n.
If the parties can indulge in early mobilisation of resources then from Fact 3
both parties’ political rents from violence are equalised at k¯. Now, in presence of
sufficiently perfect democracy such that the cost of violence c exceeds n
2
if party P
anticipates that its membership strength in violence will be relatively small such
that kF will fall below k¯ (that essentially means only minority of landowners are
supporting the sale of land), then it never indulges in political violence owing to
its low probability to win in the conflict and sufficiently low political return b(·)
for such kF . Hence party P never chooses to fight as it is not rational for the
party to do so. But with anticipated majoritarian support if party O initiates
political violence then this uncontested violence discards the industrial project in
the locality. Hence the welfare it receives in this case is −c since all the villagers
then unanimously join party O to avoid getting the individual disutility d for being
in the losing industrial party and thus in this case the SPE is k∗ = 0. Given this O
rationally chooses to initiate violence as otherwise in absence of violent opposition
the project is implemented in the locality which reduces the political return of
party O.
If the opposition party is given the option to choose between the two approaches
then it will choose to have an early mobilisation of resources if and only if the wel-
fare from early mobilisation of resources is higher than that from late mobilisation
of resources for post-voting violence. Since it is reasonable to assume that the
cost of violence never exceeds the maximum rent achievable by any party and it
is binding when c is less than the maximum political rent achievable by party P
(which is n), party O optimally chooses an early mobilisation of resources.
Proposition 11. If democracy is sufficiently perfect such that c > RO(kˆ) and
kF > k¯, then
(a) if c > P (kF) then party O prefers to undertake an early mobilisation of
resources over late mobilisation of resources in the process to acquire land for
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industrialisation. The unique sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE) is k∗ = 0
where violent political opposition stops the project from taking place;
(b) if P (k¯) < c < P (kF) then party O is indifferent between undertaking early or
late mobilisation of resources. The unique SPE is k∗ = n where both parties
accommodate with each other to implement the project and make the event
of peaceful industrialisation certain.
Similar to Proposition 10, Proposition 11 also considers the scenario of suffi-
ciently perfect democracy that makes political violence sufficiently costly for the
parties. Hence following Proposition 10 if parties do not undertake early mobil-
isation of resources then the unique SPE is achieved when k∗ = n and the event
of peaceful industrialisation is certain. Here the welfare achievable by party O is
−n.
I now consider the scenario when political parties can undertake early mobil-
isation of resources. Given this if the cost of violence exceeds the threshold of n
2
and parties anticipate that the size of industrial membership will be large enough
to exceed k¯ then for any such membership sizes the political rent of party O is
relatively low owing to its lower probability to win in political violence (if takes
place). But whether the opposition chooses to initiate violence or not depends on
the strategic decision of the industrial party. If the anticipated industrial mem-
bership size in violence is such that the political rent of party P cannot suffice for
its cost from violence then P does not retaliate with F even when O initiates it.
By history if there is a chance where the opposition can choose to initiate political
violence then on the equilibrium path it never chooses to accommodate with the
industrial party. Thus if kF is relatively small then it is optimal for party O to
initiate violence as an uncontested violence then stops the sale of land and fetches
the opposition a higher welfare of −c than it could receive from accommodating
with the industrial party, that is −n. The situation then fetches the same out-
come as proposition 10 where party O prefers to undertake early mobilisation of
resources. This is captured in the first part of proposition 11.
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However, if the anticipated industrial membership size is significantly high
such that it secures party P ’s win in violence (if it takes place) then the political
rent in violence achievable by party P suffices for its cost from violence. Thus P
always retaliates with F if O initiates it. But in a sufficiently perfect democratic
scenario, it is optimal for party O to not indulge in violence when significantly
low membership strength decreases its probability to win in violence and thereby
making political violence unworthy for the party. Hence, O’s optimal choice is to
play A and thus in the equilibrium of the conflict sub-game there is no violence.
All the landowners then unanimously join party P as selling land gives them a
higher payoff of p than retaining the plots and get 0. Thus in the SPE we have
k∗ = n and party O’s welfare is −n. Since full conversion of land to industry
is achieved irrespective of whether parties undertake early or late mobilisation
of resources and welfare of receivable by party O is −n in both scenarios, party
O is indifferent between undertaking early or late mobilisation of resources for
post-voting violence.
Proposition 12. If democratic imperfections are significantly large such that c <
P (k¯) and kF ∈ (kP , kO) then party O prefers an early mobilisation over a late
mobilisation of resources. In the sub-game perfect equilibrium both parties indulge
in violence with k∗ = d(n+1)
p+2d
where the probability of industrialisation is more than
1
2
.
If democratic imperfections are significantly large such that the cost of violence
to the parties falls short of P (k¯), then the circumstance is very similar to the one
captured in Proposition 9 as in this case c falls short of n
2
as well. Following
the analysis of Proposition 9 when parties cannot undertake early mobilisation of
resources then in equilibrium the conversion of land is always peaceful as parties
choose to accommodate with each other to implement the project. While there is
always a SPE for which land is fully converted to industrial use and the welfare
of the opposition party is −n. But there is a possibility of one other low-level
equilibrium where relatively less number of plots are being sold for industrialisation
and the welfare of party O is −n
2
+
√
n2−2cn
2
. Hence the maximum welfare achievable
by party O when it cannot undertake early mobilisation of resources is −n
2
+
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√
n2−2cn
2
.
Consider now that the parties can undertake early mobilisation of resources.
Then for significantly large political imperfection such that c is lower than P (k¯)
SPE is achieved when both the parties choose to indulge in violence and the im-
perfection dampen the possibility of full conversion of land. There exists an upper
limit of the anticipated industrial membership strength denoted by kO, for which
O’s cost of violence is just equal to its political rent such that it can afford to ini-
tiate political violence. There also exists a lower limit of the anticipated industrial
membership strength denoted by kP , for which P can just afford to retaliate with
F when the opposition initiates it. When the parties anticipate that in presence of
political violence the industrial membership strength falls within these two limits
then party P optimally chooses to retaliate with F when the opposition initiates
political violence. From Section 0.12.5 we know that in presence of political vi-
olence the equilibrium membership strength of P is kF = d(n+1)p+2d for which the
industrial party is more probable to win in violence. Since the incremental politi-
cal rent of the opposition is falling for any such industrial membership sizes that
exceeds kP , the maximum welfare from violence for party O is −2c. But if the
opposition chooses to accommodate with the industrial party then in absence of
any forced sale industrialisation takes place in the locality and with full conversion
of land party O’s welfare is then −n. Knowing this party O optimally chooses to
initiate violence to minimise its loss of welfare.
Note that when democratic imperfections are sufficiently large then given a
choice party O prefers to undertake early mobilisation of resources than late mo-
bilisation of resources since an early mobilisation gives party O a chance to win the
conflict and thereby to discard the project in the locality. Otherwise the project is
always implemented in the locality and the opposition has to accommodate with
the industrial party.
Corollary 8. If democratic imperfections are significantly large such that c < P (k¯)
and
(a) kF < kP then the opposition party prefers to undertake early mobilisation of
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resources for post-voting violence. In the SPE violent opposition stops the
project from taking place and k∗ = 0;
(b) kF > kO then the opposition party prefers to undertake late mobilisation of
resources. In SPE both the parties choose to accommodate with each other
and the project gets implemented peacefully with k∗ ∈ {k¯−−, n}.
Corollary 8 also considers significantly large democratic imperfections as con-
sidered in Proposition 12 that shows c is essentially less than n
2
. Following the
proof of Proposition 12 if the opposition party cannot undertake early mobilisa-
tion of resources then in SPE the process of industrialisation remains peaceful and
the maximum welfare achievable by party O is −n
2
+
√
n2−2cn
2
.
Suppose parties can undertake early mobilisation of resources. Following the
proof of Proposition 12 if P anticipates that in presence of violence its membership
strength will be less than kP (for which P can just afford to indulge in violence)
then owing to its sufficiently low membership strength P optimally chooses to not
indulge in political violence even when the opposition initiates it. But this essen-
tially implies that the membership strength of the opposition party is sufficiently
high and thus it is easier for O to initiate political violence. As the uncontested
violence discards the project in the locality all the landowners then unanimously
join O to retain their land and thereby secure a higher individual payoff of 0 than
to face an individual loss of welfare of −d from joining the losing party (following
Section 0.12.5). Thus if O chooses to initiate violence then in the SPE violent op-
position stops industrialisation with unanimous support from the landowners. The
welfare gain for the opposition is then −c. Otherwise if party O accommodates
with party P then on the equilibrium path the project is implemented peacefully
and following Section 0.12.5 all landowners then unanimously support P for which
O’s welfare is −n. Given this party O optimally chooses to initiate political vio-
lence and secures a higher welfare of −c. Since by undertaking early mobilisation
of resources, in equilibrium the party can stop the project from taking place in
the locality while late mobilisation of resources always results in implementation
of the project, given a choice party O prefers to undertake early mobilisation of
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resources. This is captured in the first part of the corollary.
Suppose party O anticipates that undertaking early mobilisation of resources
fetches an industrial membership size that now exceeds kO (for which O can just
afford to indulge in violence). Following the proof of Proposition 12 for such
significantly high industrial membership party P always chooses to retaliate with
F if the opposition initiates political violence. But for such high industrial support
in the locality if the opposition initiates violence then its probability to win in the
conflict is significantly low such that O’s political rent does not suffice for the cost
for conducting violence. Hence party O optimally chooses to stay away political
violence. Since there is no forced sale in this model, in equilibrium both parties
accommodate with each other and the project is implemented peacefully in the
locality. Following Section 0.12.5 in absence of any violence the sub-game perfect
equilibrium is achieved when all the landowners unanimously join the industrial
party to secure a higher individual payoff of p from retaining their plots of land.
Hence the welfare of party O is −n if it undertakes early mobilisation of resources.
Note that given a choice between early and late mobilisation of resources for post-
voting violence, party O prefers a late mobilisation of resources as in presence
of multiple equilibria the maximum welfare achievable by party O is then −n
2
+√
n2−2cn
2
> −n. While there is always an equilibrium when full conversion of land
takes place and O is indifferent between the two approaches, late mobilisation of
resources gives O the chance of reducing the size of industrialisation in the locality.
This is captured in the last statement of Corollary 8.
Corollary 9. If democratic imperfections are of intermediate level such that P (k¯) <
c < RP(kˆ) and
(a) if kF < k¯ such that P (k) < P (k¯) < c then given a choice party O prefers
early over late mobilisation of resources for post-voting violence and in the
SPE violent opposition stops industrialisation with k∗ = 0;
(b) if kF > k¯ such that P (k¯) < P (k) < c then also party O prefers early mobili-
sation of resources over late mobilisation of resources and in the SPE violent
opposition stops industrialisation with k∗ = 0. But for significantly high kF
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such that P (k¯) < c < P (kF) the opposition party prefers late mobilisation
of resources and in SPE both the parties accommodate with each other to
implement the project with k∗ ∈ {k¯−−, n}.
This intermediate level of democratic imperfections essentially implies that c
is less than n
2
(following the proof of Proposition 9). Thus following Proposition 9
if the opposition party cannot undertake early mobilisation of resources then in
SPE the process of industrialisation remains peaceful and the maximum welfare
achievable by party O is −n
2
+
√
n2−2cn
2
.
Suppose the parties now can undertake early mobilisation of resources and P
anticipates that the industrial membership size in presence of violence will fall
below the threshold level of k¯ for which both the parties are equally likely to
win in the political contest. For such low membership strength party P cannot
indulge in violence as its political rent form violence does not suffice its cost from
indulging in violence. Knowing this if the opposition chooses to initiate political
violence as then it wins the uncontested violence with an unambiguous support
from the landowners (following Section 0.12.5) and the welfare gain of party O is
−c. Since accommodating with party P otherwise results in full conversion of land
and thereby reduces the opposition’s welfare to −n, party O optimally chooses to
initiate political violence. Hence in SPE violent opposition stops the project in
the locality. Given a choice the opposition chooses to undertake early over late
mobilisation of resources, as early mobilisation leads to peaceful conversion of land.
This is captured in the first part of Corollary 9.
Now consider the case where the anticipated size of industrial membership is
relatively high so that it crosses the threshold level of k¯. If the size of industrial
membership is such that the industrial party’s political rent from violence cannot
cover the associated cost then it is optimal for the party to not indulge in violence
even when O initiates it. Knowing this the opposition optimally chooses to initiate
violence and in equilibrium the violent opposition stops the project from taking
place in the locality. The outcome is then identical with that of the first part
where the opposition again chooses to undertake early mobilisation over late mo-
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bilisation of resources. However, if the anticipated industrial membership strength
is significantly large such that P ’s political rent from violence fully cover the cost
c then it is optimal for P to fight back (if needed so). Since such significantly
high industrial membership strength reduces the probability of the opposition to
win the political contest and thereby reduces O’s political rent significantly, it is
optimal for O to not initiate violence. Thus in equilibrium both parties accom-
modate to implement the project and all the landowners unanimously join party
P . Thus the welfare gain of party O is −n if it undertakes early mobilisation of
resources. Although probability of peaceful industrialisation is certain if O chooses
late mobilisation of resources, presence of multiple equilibria suggests that there
can be a SPE where political rent achievable by the opposition increases as small
number of landowners support the venture. Hence given a choice party O prefers
late mobilisation than early mobilisation of resources.
0.12.6 Conclusion
I develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study how institutional infir-
mities, in particular inefficiency of the legal-institutions towards the enforcement
of proper law and order and inefficiency of the political-institutions to uphold
the democratic decisions that is constitutionally provided to the citizens through
voting power. I characterise conditions under which these imperfections generate
inefficiency in the land acquisition process where efficiency is achieved when there
is full conversion of land without any political violence, that imposes threat to
the landowners thereby distorts their rights to cast free and fair voting decision.
Further I demonstrate that imperfections in political-institutions can result in low-
level equilibrium trap thereby economic inefficiency, even when the inadequacy of
the compensation packages are being resolved by legislation.
I further show that inefficiency and political violence can occur even when
landowners’ property rights are constitutionally provided. This is because those are
institutionally distorted especially in presence of legal-institutional inefficiencies,
which makes it easier for the local polity to indulge in post-voting violence. Such
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imperfections not only can dampen the possibility of full conversion but also can
completely discard the industrial project from being taken place in the locality.
I further show that the possibility of political violence arises only when the local
political opposition is relatively more aggressive, such that it undertakes early
mobilisation of resources. But interestingly, given that forced sale is prohibited
by law, if given a choice the local opposition does not always prefer to undertake
early mobilisation of resources even knowing that being indifferent or preferring
a late mobilisation of resources can lead to acquisition of farmland. Of course
these decisions depend on the local presence of the parties. In our framework
while such decisions are dependent on the relative group sizes of the parties and
group formation is by voting for either parties, landowners indirectly yet crucially
determines political violence.
Let us now discuss some aspects of the land acquisition process that the chapter
has abstracted away from till now. It has assumed that the reservation utility from
land is identical for all landowners. In reality, although one would not expect too
much of a variation (since geographic vicinity largely determines the quality of
land and thus plot value), there may be instances where this is violated. In that
event one interesting issue is whether the landowners with high yield plots opposes
industrialisation or supports it and whether the demographic distribution of high
yield plots affects the group formation and thereby political violence. Another
important aspect is the uncertainty that poor landowners face when they sell their
plots and look beyond traditional means of livelihood. One can incorporate this
aspect in our framework by assuming that the compensation has to be high enough
to keep the landowners from supporting violence. All our results thereby will go
through qualitatively.
In the concluding remarks let us reconsider the effects of violent conflicts, politi-
cisation and aggression associated with land acquisitions in recent era. In many
occasions where land owners have successfully made their decision to sell their
lands in attempt to have a lifestyle that would have been unachievable with their
traditional means, the prominence of good rehabilitation and resettlement package
have most certainly played a crucial role. On a contrary violence in the process of
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acquiring land have resulted in loss of communal harmony, livelihoods and even
lives of many who would have otherwise could reap the benefits of such develop-
ment agendas. Given such humanitarian tragedies, while improved compensations
and clarifying property rights cannot ensure a peaceful solution, this theoreti-
cal construct is a first attempt at understanding agitation, group formation and
violence as a result of legal and political-institutional infirmities. Keeping the
complexities of such issues in mind, I thus refrain from providing any simplified
policy suggestions.
The thesis so far has focused on providing a ‘political economy based’ micro
foundation of the land acquisition process that help understand the problems of
holdout and violence seen in all over LDCs in their industrial progress. However,
the causes and consequences of the problems associated with land acquisition are
multi-dimensional and often overlapping. Given this it is necessary to take a
broader look at the problem by considering all the factors that have direct im-
plications on the causes and consequences on the matter and find a possible link
that goes deeper than enactments of compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement
schemes. The following chapter thus takes a broader survey of existing economic
literature on such land acquisitions and studies multiple conflicting scenarios to
reach the crux of the matter. It will show that deeper institutional parameters
like bureaucratic corruption, ease of opposition, government machineries in mobil-
ising resources for violence, stemming from institutional imperfections and lack of
good governance, that the thesis studied in the previous chapters, plays crucially
in unfolding conflicting outcomes.
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0.13 Chapter 4: A Critical Survey On Conflict
Over Large Scale Land Acquisition
0.13.1 Introduction
Conflict is an outcome of inconsistency between multiple interests and beliefs that
individuals or entities hold among themselves. Non-violent conflict is construc-
tive for societal change and development in democracies as it entails interaction
of opinions. Nevertheless, it works best when the governing bodies and institu-
tions can efficiently manage such inconsistencies. Otherwise it shatters the trust
of conflicting individuals that lays ground for protests and agitations, even vi-
olence. Economies that consist of weak institutions, fragile political and social
structures are more vulnerable to the negative spiral of conflict and violence. Con-
sequently they attract literary works towards mitigating the risks of conflicts, with
recommendations on aspects of ‘good governance’ to ensure inclusive and sustain-
able development in these economies. In a democratic society, elements of good
governance include participation of citizens in decision making processes where
decisions must be consensus oriented. It is crucial to ensure accountability of
private and government institutions to the stakeholders and to the public, respon-
siveness of governing institutions to serve the stakeholders, transparency in terms
of the decision making tools, and their implementation process must be aligned
with the rule of law. It also demands assurance over equity and inclusiveness to
ensure social sustainability and the effective and efficient use of resources that
adheres to the economic and environmental sustainability. Conflict arises when
these components, either individually or jointly with others, fail to comply with
the expectations from ‘good governance’. We captured this in the last three chap-
ters in light of deeper institutional parameters that result in inefficiencies in land
acquisition for industrial progress. However, sources of such conflicts in LDCs are
diversified in nature, its phenomena is being rapidly evolving and have drawn “in-
creased international attention due to the changing nature of armed conflict and
as a result of a variety of longer-term, global trends” (UN-HABITAT, 2012). Since
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enactments on compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement policies have not yet
resorted efficiency, it is crucial to take a broader look of the problem. In this
attempt, this chapter aims to provide a critical survey of the emerging economic
literature on such land ordeals, analyses and classifies the crucial factors to help
understand possible link between them that goes at the core of the issue.
Disputes over acquisition of land has long been debated worldwide but the
recent two decades have been more prominent, as the demand for land is rising
to meet the aspiring goal for industrialisation and urbanisation. While the nexus
between industrialisation, urbanisation and economic development is established
with common consensus, with rising population and fragmentation of land it pro-
pels the demand for large-scale land conversion - from agriculture to industrial use
- uprooting landowners from their traditional livelihood, in which conflict seems
unavoidable (as explained in the Introduction), even in authoritative societies.
Recall from Chapter 1 that in China, between 1996-2005, nearly 20 million farm-
ers were evicted from their farmlands when more than 21 per cent of these lands
are being converted to non-agricultural use. Government report admits that this
rapid pace of ‘development’ triggered grievances over resentful conversion of farm-
land, corruption and arbitrary evictions, so much so that even authoritarian China
experienced 74,000 riots in the year 2004 alone (see Goswami, 2007). But grab-
bing private land has been well evidenced under democratic governments. Reports
from FAO, World Bank, Human Rights Watch and GRAIN summarises that dur-
ing 2008-2010 at least 30 million hectares of fertile agricultural land in Africa were
already sold or leased out for commercial production, and a further of 83.2 million
hectares of farmland were awaiting to be converted over 1200 land deals in the year
2012.68 The reports suggest that companies and wealthy individual land-acquirers
not only bypass the thorough due diligence process for such conversions, they often
carry illegal practices for eviction of de-facto owners by deploying private security
68Studies found that in most of these cases the acquisition process was forceful and without
proper resettlement and rehabilitation arrangements. For more discussion on this see e.g., <
https : //www.grain.org/article/entries/5336 − foreign − pension − funds − and − land −
grabbing− in−brazil > and < https : //www.grain.org/article/entries/4929−hungry−for−
land− small − farmers− feed− the− world− with− less− than− a− quarter − of − all −
farmland >
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forces, fencing off public lands and obtaining property titles to connivance local
notaries and government officials. The resistance by local landowners are least
effective, as the local authorities such as police, politicians and even local judicial
members often found to support the land-acquirer, either directly or indirectly,
instead of protecting the poor peasants.69
The scenario is very similar in a number of countries from Sub-Saharan Africa,
Latin America, central and Southeast Asia where large scale land acquisitions fol-
low from the sharp increase in land based investments - domestic transnational
capital or in competition with them and FDI, that have made headlines in me-
dia reports worldwide. While the skewed land distribution, overlapping property
rights, the expropriation and redistribution policies, improper adherence to the
rule of law, bureaucratic corruption and corrupted land administration are per-
ceived to be the major contributing factors, the lack of consolidated data on such
components makes it harder for policymakers to form effective policy suggestions.
Moreover these factors are not independent by virtue and sourced from the in-
terplay between the infirmities in legal and political institutions. There is little
doubt that changing use-value of land requires the adherence to an efficient process
that includes timely consultation, legitimate impact estimations and local direct
purchases. Otherwise, these large-scale profitable land deals raise questions on
economic, social and environmental sustainability and in its worst form can result
in dozens or even hundreds of demises. There is one strand of literature that analy-
ses populated economies that inherited large discrepancies in ownership rights and
land distribution policies such as Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Zimbabwe and
South Africa (Moore, 1966, Wickham-Crowley, 1991, and Kriger, 1992). The other
relatively recent strand of literature identifies the economic and political impor-
tance of such conflicts, analyse and pertain them to more sensitive issues including
that of gender inequality and environment sustainability. These issues are com-
plementary to the provisional legal proximity and are evident even in countries
including Rwanda, Burundi, Ghana and Uganda, the African economies where
69These contexts are studied theoretically in the earlier chapters. In this chapter we consider
a broader spectrum of the problem, bypass detailing its individual features and corresponding
literature that has already been discussed earlier to avoid being repetitive.
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population density is relatively scant and land access follow relatively egalitarian
approach (see Deininger and Castagnini, 2006, Kairaba, 2002, and Firmin-Sellers,
2000).
As mentioned earlier, reasons for conflicts arising at the event of land transfers
are many. Further, the way cases are being unfolded are unique in nature. This
increases the complexities of analysing such land acquisition conflicts in specific
frameworks, thereby resulting in large but relatively segregated and case (at large
by country) specific studies across literature. Economic literature in this area is
relatively new yet rapidly growing, often pointing out the inefficiencies of the com-
pensation mechanism. No doubt, compensation is one of the most crucial issues,
but determining right compensation is much more complex and goes far beyond
the determination of a price for land. Let alone the poor land administration sys-
tem, there are also irrational preferences resulting even in ‘pricelessness’ of land.
There are instances where the conflict is over price and thereby possibilities of re-
consideration over price through direct negotiations or through court proceedings
exist, even if this can delay the proposed project. However, there are instances
where land seems priceless owing to the land-losers outright denial to depart from
their land and conflict is then over land-use change. This is an important issue
and is detailed in Section 0.14.
The next critical issue is over land entitlement in such scenarios and as the
strands of economic and political literature suggests, it is owing to the legal weak-
nesses resulting in irregular land surveys, improper and ambiguous identification
of the de-facto and de-jute property rights as well as prolonged and inappropriate
land entitlement programs (Lindsay, 2012, Li, 1996 and Feder and Feeny, 1991).
Given the poor land markets in LDCs, the legal requirements for involving state-
level bureaucracy in cases of land sale (for Indian context see Chakravorty, 2013),
augments bureaucratic corruption and increments in transaction costs. Further,
weak property rights, along with the weak enforcement and adherence to law also
create avenues for political interference in the process. Note that while state/local
governments are largely accountable for land-use decisions, presence of political
competition can significantly impact the success for land-use changes, where a
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local government can be heavily influenced and accord with the land developer’s
interests.70 Legal infirmities in LDCs that makes it even easier for the local par-
ties to use their power with various legal and extra-legal means both ex-ante and
ex-post elections, it can result in humanitarian tragedies (as in cases mentioned
in earlier chapters).71 There are very few economic theory on land acquisition
that focuses on democratic imperfections in LDCs resulting due to institutional
fragilities.
Next is the issues over environmental sustainability in land conversions progress
that also play a significant part in success or failure of such economically promising
projects. Evidences suggest that legally mandated environmental assessments pro-
grams are often being suppressed to grant licence to proposed projects. Conflict
arises due to the health and environmental hazards following the land-use change.
While legal measures towards environmental sustainability are integrally imparted
in almost any land acquisition programs, it is lack of institutional support to adhere
to the rigorous impact assessments. One such example is the Meta Strips agitation
of the late 1990s in Verna Plateau region of Goa in India, at attempts to develop
an Rs. 250 crore plant for processing scrap materials into valuable metals to be ex-
ported to Europe. The project got approval from the state government in 1996 in a
record time of six days without any high power co-ordination committee meeting as
was legally required for clearances. In turn the mandatory Environmental Impact
Assessment was shortened and mystified regarding the potential hazards includ-
ing the discharge of intolerable levels of toxic and carcinogenic metal fumes and
groundwater pollution. The protests went violent with national highway blockage,
police repressions, midnight arrests of activists, bloodsheds and death. Eventually
the company was ordered to holdup the project until they get expert committee
confirmation on environmental hazards and take measures appropriately (for more
70This is mentioned in Chapter 1 and also seen in Spanish context by Sole-Olle and Viladecans-
Marsal, 2012.
71This is in sharp contrast with the developed nations where relatively improved judicial
systems decrease a stakeholder’s ability to bribe regulators and increases the ability of local
population to contribute in project development decisions and development leads to regulatory
stringency in the process of land conversion (see Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 2009 and Glaeser et
al., 2005).
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on this see Sampat, 2015). Protests arising due to environmental issues are most
prominent against the renewable energy plantation development programs such as
evident in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region or against the production of crude palm
oil as seen in Indonesia and Malaysia. Such examples and related literature are
discussed further in section 0.16.
Social sustainability is inevitably another crucial issue raised here. But a
project’s social viability has always been severely under-valued when compared
with its economic and financial viability, even if the project’s present and future
success cannot bypass its impact on that society. While local communal tensions
over the access of land are not rare in LDCs, the land rush of recent decades
have promulgated these tensions as land deals often induce communities in more
contesting situation. This can be devastating when local elites or wealthy farm-
ers try to hoard prime land (with greater infrastructural facilities, geographical
advantages and/or high fertility soil) with expectation to make profit from sales
in future, leaving the already improvised small farmers and tenants to toil over
inferior land. The socio-economic impacts of acquiring agricultural land are most
vulnerable to conflicts as in such cases poor land-losers are forced to exchange their
lands with relatively less productive lands (with poor infrastructure, lack of com-
plementary resources such as river or canals nearby and lack of natural habitats
essential for cattle growing or food supplies).72 The spiking food and commodity
prices, following from global food crisis of 2007-2008, often held responsible for the
recent global land rush. This is being subjected to a huge attention from interna-
tional organisations, NGOs and media, as the economically capable but land-poor
72This is evident in many rural sectors of LDCs. For example, in Cambodia this includes the
acquisition of 3000 hectare of farmland in Koh Kong province in 2006 for sugar plantation, the
acquisition of 7,972 hectares and 6,592 hectares in 2010 respectively for Dau Thieng (Cambodia)
Rubber Development Co. Ltd. and Dau Thieng (Kratie province) Rubber Development Co.
Ltd. Likewise there were institutional imperfections, like lack of preparations for appropriate
land transfers such as land entitlements, notice for acquisitions, obtaining collective opinion and
lack of social impact assessments. Moreover the acquisitions were forceful with police and military
enforcement resulting in socio-economic dismal including armed violence, minimal compensation,
mass displacement and loss of livelihood, as well as specific impacts on women (see < https :
//ejatlas.org/conflict/land−grabbing−and−forced−evictions−by−koh−kongs−sugar−
industry − cambodia > and < ic.fsc.org/download.vrg − complaints − panel − evaluation −
report− public− version.2462.htm >).
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countries aim to occupy vast area of relatively cheap foreign land (in economically
poor countries), not only for large scale agriculture but also for commercial pro-
ductions to substitute for their expensive imported supplies (See Zoomers, 2010
and Cotula et al., 2009). While this increases the FDI flows in the host nations and
encourages flow of transnational and competing capital in that economy, it costs
in terms of loss of income and livelihood. A study by Davis, D’Odorico, and Rulli
(2014) summarises the total loss of income and affected population in 28 LDCs
that are most targeted by large-scale land acquisitions (see Table 1) where more
than a quarter of land deals are for industry and infrastructure development. This
has become a major concern for the recent emerging body of economic literature
as such globalised structure of development questions the social sustainability of
mega projects. This is further detailed in section 0.15.
Acquisition of fertile agricultural land is being repetitively questioned the
‘morality’ of distributive policies. But counter argument is being raised for the in-
ability of the government in allocating non-fertile or non-agricultural land fearing
the deterrence of any poverty alleviation programs. Note that while the negative
impacts such as loss of income, employment and displacement by rural land-losers
are critical issues to consider, one cannot deny that each land deal comes with a
unique set of benefits to the concerned locality, as well as having distinctive impacts
on and responses by the affected people (Borras and Franco, 2013). Industry and
infrastructure development as the means for supporting the rapid pace of moderni-
sation with presumed trickle down effect is thereby one of the primary instruments
used by governments to meet the development components of an economy. How-
ever, while arguments against the trickling down phenomena pose questions on the
equity and efficiency of such agenda and the (mis)use of government machinery
becomes a regular practice, they uncertain the sustainability of these programs
and carry potential for violent conflicts at least at local levels. The contextual and
rapidly evolving nature of land dynamics makes it even more complex to system-
atise the root causes of land conflicts arising out of such acquisitions. Therefore
to move forward towards an efficient solution, it is required to put a step back
and enlighten the components of such land ordeals in order to establish a possible
causality amongst them and this survey is an attempt towards that. The survey
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Total lost income 
($)
Total people 
affected
% of 
popopopulation
Angola 79,337,812 15,383 0.08
Argentina 345,949,205 22,342 0.06
Benin 16,783,119 10,614 0.12
Brazil 454,969,840 41,386 0.02
Cameroon 203,675,121 90,845 0.46
Colombia 403,308,909 44,722 0.10
Congo 13,127,064 4,136 0.10
DRC 105,572,483 319,605 0.48
Ethiopia 809,980,299 785,701 0.95
Gabon 1,440,146,140 110,167 7.32
Ghana 332,672,327 206,456 0.85
Guatemala 68,573,647 14,817 0.10
Indonesia 7,736,024,665 1,847,609 0.77
Liberia 225,161,293 478,476 11.98
Madagascar 158,298,340 165,997 0.80
Malaysia 8,956,266,573 608,958 2.14
Morocco 926,336,692 201,836 0.63
Mozambique 2,443,013,473 2,710,813 11.59
Nigeria 331,781,421 153,439 0.10
Papua New Guinea 3,758,184,784 1,564,440 22.81
Peru 119,124,632 13,524 0.05
Philippines 804,018,409 203,256 0.22
Russia 27,585,683 1,423 <0.01
Sierra Leone 501,467,190 610,031 10.40
South Sudan & Sudan 3,561,260,372 1,731,108 3.97
Tanzania 305,055,452 215,955 0.48
Uganda 19,237,881 15,379 0.05
Uruguay 115,090,195 8,483 0.25
Total 34,262,003,020 12,196,904 –
Table 1: Summary of countries that are most targeted by large-scale land acquisitions. Around
36% of these land deals involve plantations for non-food items including industry, energy and
infrastructure development. Source: Davis, D’Odorico and Rulli (2014).
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therefore identifies the two following critical aspects of land acquisition programs:
Purpose: Large scale land acquisitions are not restricted to the sole purpose of
building industries or developing urban real estates but also to stimulate agribusi-
ness. The investors include economically empowered national and international
agents, from the multinational corporations, banks or equity fund holders to the
regional and national governments, local industrialists who are interested in pur-
chasing, licensing or leasing in (generally for 30 to 99 years) vast area of land (see
GRAIN, 2008). What is the purpose of acquiring such vast area of land? This
includes massive cultivation of commercial agricultural produce, renewable energy
productions, infrastructure developments and to use for industrial purposes. These
endeavours are indeed profitable for the local or regional governing bodies as these
compile large spillover effects that provide opportunity for economic development
of the concerned territory, thereby bringing in political mileage to the ruling party.
Moreover, under the new PPP model of development (as mentioned in Introduc-
tion in section 0.3) such programs have become profit-making schemes for both
investors and government. Thus there are huge incentives for the government to
facilitate such investment schemes even at a cost of invading into farmland or
destroying natural resources that are either already in use by traditional farmers
with little or no outside option, or risking the ecosystem with far-reaching en-
vironmental impacts that more generally remain unpredictable at the beginning.
But then the question remains whether such developments are needed ‘urgently’
or not. While emergency land acquisitions are legally amended in land acquisition
laws of virtually all countries and to be implemented only when abandonment can
entail welfare loss, it is frequently practiced to facilitate the flow of profit-making
investments. While the presence of legal-institutional infirmities makes it easier
for the political parties to mis-use government machineries, unclear provisions of
such clauses attract controversies in a number of occasions. Eventually countries
have undertaken amendments in their land acquisition laws to improve efficiency
but almost none discarded the ‘emergency’ clause.
Process : Since land attributes history and security to its owners the compensation
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paid to the dispossessed73 are more often criticised for its inadequacy which lays
a fertile ground for political and social fallout risking the political sustainability
of such programs. But how should the compensation be determined? How the
rehabilitation and redistributive policies ensure equity? How to take consent from
the landowners to sell their property? Process for determining price, redistributive
packages raises conflicts owing to the dependence on faulty land records, market
valuations processes and poor land administrations. The process for eviction often
relies on applications of power and forces leaving no room for consultation. A
report by Nolte, Chamberlain and Giger (2016), as presented in figure 7 shows
that in LDCs as high as 66% of the land deals are finalised without consulting the
affected population.
Figure 7: Report of community consultation in the process of acquiring land based on Land
Matrix, 2016 data. Source: Nolte, Chamberlain and Giger, 2016.
While informed consent can be practiced with votes from affected land-losers,
its efficiency can only be restored with uninterrupted and independent voting sys-
73Based on tangibility of the asset.
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tems. 74 Procedural inaccuracies, owing to the institutional inefficiencies (espe-
cially legal and political) are prominent in countries that opted for rapid indus-
trialisation such as India and China (for example see Ding, 2003 ). There are
ample evidences where the determination of the compensation package offered
or paid to the dispossessed farmers are being considered as arbitrary, unjustified
and ad hoc. The lack of transparency in the finalisation of land deals topped
with lack of consultation with the concerned parties (as mentioned earlier) are
commonly attributed to the land conflict. But recall that price is not an issue
when landowners refusal stems from their non-acceptance over land-use change,
preference irrationality and lack of transferrable skills. What are the procedural
remedies to tackle such situations?
Finally, in terms of locational preferences, while land-grabbing is evident from
across the globe, countries in sub-Saharan Africa this is predominantly by the
foreign countries for both agricultural and non-agricultural purposes (Maggi and
Veit, 2013). In contrast land acquisitions for infrastructure development, industrial
purposes and/or real-estate expansion is more prominent in emerging economies
such as India and China. The reasons for the changing land-use across the world
may vary but what is common in all these is the treatment of land as being a ‘com-
modity’, whose exchange price is determined by considering the tangible aspects
and disregarding the intangibles such as security, history, culture and livelihood of
the project-affected people. As land becomes scarcer with increased heterogeneous
entrants, there is spiral up pressure by the claimants for good governance that not
only suffice to limit “dissipation” but at a large extent can also alleviate potential
for violent conflicts (Alston et al., 2012). But it is more often than not that the
economic rents for the emergence of efficient rights fail to suffice for its political
rent thereby leaving the door of conflict wide open. Thus, the issues of land or
any natural resources can never be the sole reason for conflict and in line with
the report by UN-HABITAT (2012) they commonly occur and turn into violence
when “linked to wider processes of political exclusion, social discrimination, eco-
nomic marginalisation, and a perception that peaceful action is no longer a viable
strategy for change”.
74This possibility is examined in earlier chapters
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Clearly, a case or country specific study is not sufficient to ensure sustainability
of any land-augmented development and suggest suitable policy for its adherence.
It is important to look into the root causes of land conflicts, not only by taking
into account either the economic, environmental or social aspects of it but also
by establishing interlinks amongst them. What is certainly a complex task, this
article scratches the surface by categorising the responsible factors of this multi-
dimensional issue and attempts to find the links among them. The rest of the
chapter takes the following structure: Subsection 0.14 focuses on the compensa-
tion issues, Subsection 0.15 focuses on social impacts of large scale acquisitions,
Subsection 0.16 focuses on the environmental consideration and Subsection 0.17
focuses on the institutional failures to uphold efficiency. While each section is
developed in light of evidences from around the world in recent decades, it identi-
fies that interplay between administrative inefficiency, bureaucratic corruption and
politicisation (that are endemic to LDCs) that eases the extra-legal influences on
land acquisition issues is at the core of distorting developmental aspects of aspiring
projects. Section 0.18 includes the conclusive statements.
0.14 Compensation for acquiring land
In cases where large scale acquisitions of land by government and corporates has
drawn resistance, the most prominent reason for grievance turns out to be the
inadequacy of compensation and the involuntary displacement without suitable
rehabilitation. This implicate concerns on both equity and efficiency grounds.
In absence of any social welfare measures when the dispossessed and unemployed
landowners are inadequately compensated and left on the “mercy of market forces”,
it not only threatens the political sustainability of such programs but also dete-
riorates their economic efficiency (Ghatak and Mookherjee, 2014, Bardhan 2011).
There is a rapidly growing body of economic literature concerning the compensa-
tion package paid to the displaced landowners that can ensure efficiency, specially
when industrialisation is an unavoidable agenda for the long-run solution of so-
cial and economic backwardness. However the existing literature is more inclined
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towards the failure of procedural mechanisms of such packages and their subse-
quent effects, as compared to the design of compensation itself. One can argue
that in presence of a dire need for industrialisation, amidst of the informal and
overlapping land entitlements, fragmentations and high transaction costs, it is
rational to accept a standardised ‘market price’ of land as the basis for compensa-
tion. But the question remains to determine this price in absence of land markets.
Roy Chowdhury (2013) studies that resistance due to preference irrationalities can
cause insufficiency even when the price of land is multiple times of the market
rate. It is thus necessary to look at the parameters of the compensation packages
that not only include the valuation procedure, time gap of contract settlement and
actual payment, sunk investments in the concerned piece of land, quality and pur-
pose of the land, the ownership status of the affected people (such as the tenants
whose livelihood is dependent on a piece of land which he doesn’t own) but also
the preference, access and choice of the financial services for the fungibility of the
exchanged asset. Clearly the task is more complicated than determining a ‘price’
for land, even severe in less developed economies where land markets are thin and
administrative inefficiency and corruption are serious concerns.
The legitimacy of compensation mechanisms often becomes subject to conflicts.
On one hand the legal constitution equips state governments with ‘eminent do-
main’ laws to acquire necessarily required lands with fair compensation75, on the
other, it provides democratic rights to owners that inevitably necessitates their
perceptions and protesting voices to be considered in decisions. Hence striking a
balance between the conflicting interests is crucial and institutional efficiency is re-
quired for such growth agendas to be consensus oriented and according to the rule
of law. Ideally compensation is adequate when it ensures that the claimants are
neither impoverished nor enriched irrespective of whether it is paid monetarily or
in the form of alternative land and/or job (Keith et al., 2008). But interpretations
of adequacy varies across the nations. By principles adequacy can be achieved in
three ways: (i) By “value to the owner” principle, as used for example in Aus-
75we will return to the discussion on this law in section 0.17
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tralia76 and Japan,77 that not only considers the market value of the land but
also the other losses that a claimant faces. (ii) By “just compensation” principle,
as used for example in UK78, Philippines 79, India80 and Brazil.81 This ensures
a financial compensation that enables a private landowner to purchase a similar
land (both in terms of physical geography and quality). (iii) By “reasonable com-
pensation” principle, as used for example in China82 and British Columbia83, that
considers only direct losses when market price of land remains the yardstick for
compensation. Although the principles for resettlement of dispossessed owners
may vary in both quantity and quality grounds and have respective pros and cons,
market value of land remains an underlined basis for its determination, thereby
necessitates the requirement of efficient valuation process.84 However, in line with
Lindsay (2012), this legal approaches are best suited the developed nations that
attributes to relatively well-defined and standardised land rights, well-functioning
land markets and credible land records. Owing to the administrative inefficiency,
that resulting in rare occurrence of such attributes, implementation of the law is
rather complex in developing nations where compensation issues can be broadly
divided into two overlapping problems: first, is the identification of the receiver of
compensation and the administration procedure of distributing them, and second,
is the design of compensation - quantitative and qualitative - with consideration
of all losses due to large-scale acquisitions. We continue with the analysis of the
second issue here while the first is analysed in sub-section 0.17.
An one-off compensation can trigger two serious consequences: first, a time
lag between the agreement and the actual payment can significantly swing the
76Land Acquisition Act 1969.
77Land Expropriation Act Japan, see< http : //www.hosyoukikou.jp/zisyukenkyu/CONTENTS/2013−
12forCambodia.pdf >.
78Land Expropriation In Europe, see < http : //www.mreza − mira.net/wp −
content/uploads/Expropriation− in− Europe− Jan− 2013.pdf >
79Republic Act No. 1400: Philippine Laws, Statutes And Codes.
80The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in a Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Act, 2013
81Constitution of Brazil, Article 153.
82Land Administration Law, 1988, Peoples Republic of China.
83British Columbia Expropriation Act, RSBC 1996.
84For more on this see Mahalingam and Vyas, 2011.
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compensation value even with a sufficiently small variance in the projected rate
of inflation. Second is, being a replacement for continuous flow of income can be
devastating especially when alternative investment options like alternative lands or
financial securities are scarce. It should thus be considered whether compensations
can be linked with future use value of land that secures a share to the land seller
for his future benefits85, and if so to what extent. While there are practices of
providing industrial employment for at least one member from the dispossessed
families as a part of the compensation program, there exists potential for having
alternative auxiliary businesses surrounding the proposed industry as part of the
resettlement program. But these industrial jobs are fewer in number and subject to
employability concerns.86 Apart from the fact that such programs can be grievous
in absence of any legal time limit being imposed on the industrialists to set up
their factories, there should be a mandated reverse sell of the acquired plots in
case of failure to adherence to it. Clearly both legal and bureaucratic efficiency is
required for effectiveness of such compensation programs.
Coase Theorem restores the efficiency of land transactions through negotiation
between the concerned parties, but in practice, land deals in the LDCs are often
being finalised with government mediation.87 It may then seems a viable ques-
tion that why should land transformation involve government mediation replacing
direct dealing of investor-buyer and the concerned landowners? We discuss the
phenomenon in continuation with the earlier chapters. Economic literature seems
to advocate such government involvement in LDCs (See Levien, 2011, Sarkar, 2007;
Banerjee et al., 2007) primarily due to the high transaction cost of private bargain-
ing (as mentioned earlier) that makes land purchase both difficult and undesirable
for the investor. Secondly, to minimise a buyer incentive to reap benefits from the
already existing intra-group conflicts by settling multiple group-specific (secret)
85For example, options of allotting company shares to the dispossessed landowner as pro-
posed by JSW steel company to landowners in Salboni, in West Bengal India. See < https :
//www.ukessays.com/essays/history/study − of − salboni − land − acquisition − history −
essay.php >
86This issue is further discussed in sub-section 0.15.
87Evidences suggest that land deals that are settled without government mediation or expe-
rience peaceful transformations, are less attractive to media and thus remains largely unknown.
We will return to this in sub-section 0.17.
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deals with the landowners. Thirdly, geographical contiguity, technological comple-
mentarity among plots, preference irrationalities, sentimental values towards land
induce sellers strategically bargain and hold-up land to extract greater surplus (for
example see Cai, 2000, 2003, Menezes and Pitchford, 2004, Miceli and Segerson,
2007 and Roy Chowdhury and Sengupta, 2012). In line with Banerjee et al., 2007,
government’s mediation seems unavoidable not only for economies that cannot
afford to lose the pace of industrialisation but also for the strong financial and
infrastructural support required for successful project implementation. Moreover,
information asymmetry on bilateral trade problems as considered in Chatterjee
and Samuelson (1983) and Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) (amongst others)
also causes inefficiency. Seemingly these issues can be bypassed with a legislated
price of land as compensation, although it is hardly considered to be mitigating
the crux of the issue. The following section put some detail on such dilemma in
light of conflicts that took place in the last two decades.
0.14.1 Conflict: income instability
In presence of unequal and inequitable land and asset distribution, weak institu-
tions and market, when land reforms are not the prime-most objective, conflicts
arising over land-use changes are significant. There are a number of studies in eco-
nomic literature when in such environment resistance at acquiring land resulted
in unemployment, displacements and income instability. This include the studies
by Deininger and Castagnini (2006) that focuses on Africa, Cao et al. (2008) and
Chakravorty (2013) that focus on Asia, in particular on China and India respec-
tively, Alston, Libecap, and Mueller (2000, 2010) and Barros et. al (2012) that
focus on Latin America, particularly on Brazil. These cases align with at least one
common factor: the inadequacy of the compensation. In addition to that there
is trust deficit, following from irregularity of compensation amount, unfulfilled
promises regarding rehabilitation and resettlement arrangements. For example in
Indian context, there are scenarios when compensation has been due for more that
three decades and the beneficiaries involve absentee landlords and intermediaries
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but poor peasants.88
To progress further on this, let us reflect on some detail of two such cases.
First consider the conflict that arises between the farmers and the industrial de-
velopment authority Jaypee Infratech Limited (JIL) in the northern Indian state
Uttar Pradesh that resulted in a series of agitations during 2009-2012 concern-
ing the compensation paid to landowners for building a 165.4 km long Yamuna
Expressway and business zone, worth more than USD 25 billion. This instigated
controversies across the country and turned into bloody violence during 2011 caus-
ing delay in this development aspiring project.89 The matter took six long years to
reach an agreement when the state government during 2014 order an enhancement
of compensation by 64.7 per cent to the affected farmers at which all deals have
then settled.90 Further, the issue was highly politicised as the opposition, Indian
National Congress party made this one of its upcoming Assembly Election agenda
but lost against the incumbent BSP party in the state assembly election of 2012.91
The second major controversy poses contrast with the above scenario and ought
to mention in this section, is the case of Singur in the eastern Indian state West
Bengal. It (in continuation with the information provided in earlier chapters)
started when the incumbent government, communist party of India (Marxist) in
2006 used the Land Acquisitions Act, 1894, to help a leading private firm Tata
Motors to acquire 997 acres of prime agricultural land for building an automobile
factory. The process met with resistance from not only the land owners who were
against this sale (irrespective of the compensation amount) but also those who
88See < http : //inclusion.skoch.in/story/332/land− acquisition− for − infrastructure−
−industry − 632.htmlsthash.d7J037BO.dpuf >
89See < http : //www.bbc.co.uk/news/world− south− asia− 13330343 >
90This decision on additional payment was taken on two grounds: one being the enforcement
of new land acquisition law (2013) that amends a payment of four times the market price of
land to rural farmers which the protesting villagers from Bhatta Parsaul demanded. Other being
the fact that the new act was implementable to the projects commencing after the first day of
2014, that makes ground for the authority to disagree with such increase in initial compensation
(which was the market price of land according to the previous land acquisition act 1894). See
< http : //timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/noida/Y EIDA − settles − farmers − issues −
realtors− hails− from− the− development/articleshow/45239109.cms >
91see < http : //archive.indianexpress.com/news/from − bhatta − parsaul − to − dalit −
homes− rahu.../921057/ >
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claimed to have inadequate compensation even after accepting the initial offer,92
where the inadequacy is largely driven by the fact that the land being taken were
qualitatively different but a proposed flat price for all plots failed to incorporate
this in the compensation package (Ghatak et al., 2013). The issue raises further
controversy and turned into massive violence when the state government practiced
forceful eviction using bureaucracy and the police. The opposition was organised
by forming a Committee to Save Farmland with various interest groups including
the opposition party Trinamul Congress (TMC), several legal and human right
activists and draws huge national and international media coverage. The protests
that led to strikes, highway blockage, bloodsheds and suicides, finally resulted in
complete abandonment of the project from West Bengal and moved to a western
state Gujarat (see, e.g., Sarkar, 2007, and Ghatak and Banerji, 2009). The oppo-
sition party TMC who made this as one of its upcoming state assembly election
agenda, won over CPM’s more than three decades of incumbency.
The above two examples strike an important point: a scale increment of the
market price based compensations seem to settle down land deals in some cases as
indicated in the example of Yamuna Expressway, but the same practice for other
cases like Singur doesn’t work. Despite the price offered were sufficiently higher
than the ‘market price’ with the inclusion of solatium, tree and structure values,
values for damage of outstanding crops and annuity, it could not settle the deal in
West Bengal but settled without any trouble in Gujarat where the price was nearly
6 times higher (Ghatak et al. 2013 and Chakravorty, 2013).93 If one thinks that the
resistance was from the majority of the landowners while only a few agreed with
the initial price offer, the picture was exactly the opposite94. Clearly this Singur
issue was more complex and one cannot guarantee that if the compensation was
more than what was being offered, the story would have been different. Further it
poses the question whether for some owners land is rather ‘priceless’.
92http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/land-lost-singur-farmer-said-no-to-compensation-
commits- suicide/31930/1
93Note that the market price for land varies between states and due to location-based factors
but the price offered in Gujarat was even higher compared to the international standards (For
more detail see Chakravorty, 2013).
94see < http : //www.economist.com/node/12010079 >
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Theoretically possibility of a sale of land arises when a willing buyer’s offer of
the present discounted value of land matches or exceeds the reservation price of
a willing seller. But in reality this reservation price almost invariably crosses the
present value of land. Firstly, because it not only includes the objective compo-
nents such as productivity or income generated from land, but also the subjective
(and contextual) components such as value of land as being an asset, insurance, sta-
tus good for landowners. Secondly, with the fact that the piece of land is typically
their only source of income, many of which, as highlighted by Kombe (2010) are
scarcely appreciated by the valuers. Further in line with Chakravorty (2013) the
value of land, although possesses both ecological (directly proportionate with the
productivity components) and locational (directly proportionate with the urban
vicinity) components, tend to outweigh ecology-based prices when location-based
price becomes high enough. Only in such settings market price near-equalises the
reservation price. Irrespective of this, as industrial development is complementary
to the infrastructural development (at least at the local level) and the fact that
urban areas are not mono-centric anymore, market price remains a constitutional
benchmark for compensation in many LDCs around the world. Further, a discrete
variation of market prices (even without additional non-monetary resettlement
packages) have been proven successful in multiple occasions,95 strengthening the
retention of ’market price’ as a basis for compensation in virtually all constituen-
cies.
However, setting market value of land as the basis for compensation can be
useful only when the valuation procedure includes detailing of the current charac-
teristics of affected properties instead of abiding by the unreliable and misleading
official records (typically holds for LDCs). Then only it can reveal the actual
transaction prices and refurbished land grades. Thus an effective land survey, ad-
dressing not only the objective characteristics of compensations (like locational
factors, financial considerations, occupational skills), but also the subjective char-
acteristics (like preference for diversified non-cash compensations, financial secu-
rities, time preference) can provide crucial information to determine offers. Such
surveys in combination with price offers for a randomised sample of landowners
95For examples in Indian context see, e.g., Chakravorty (2013).
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can estimate the acceptability quotient, thereby determine the final compensa-
tion package minimising the likelihood for resistance (see Ghatak et. al., 2013).
Alternatively there are auction-based methods (see for example Zhan, 2008 and
McAfee et al., 2002), and direct bargaining (see Chapter 1 and related literature).
Properly designed auctions tools that minimise incentives for owners overstating
their true valuation, yet ensuring voluntary participation from majority of the
landowners can effectively replace the ad-hoc scale variation of offers. Properly
designed bargaining protocols can minimise the hold up problems, but efficiency
of this is dependent on institutional perfections (see Chapter 1 and its litera-
ture review section). Otherwise, compensation possesses risks of being either too
low with an induced bias towards excessive industrialisation or too high to lower
the pace of industrialisation, thereby growth. Over-compensation can arguably
favours economic efficiency as reducing under-compensation induces productivity-
enhancing investments on land by both farmers and government. This not only
reduces over-industrialisation but also ensures more equitable sharing of benefits
from such growth programs (Ghatak and Mookherjee, 2014 and Miceli, 1991).
However exactly how these compensations are ought to be set, whether and when
non-cash options accompanied by rehabilitation, training programs etc. are jus-
tifiable96 to improve efficiency remains unresolved by a large extent. There are
a growing body of economic literature that entreat contiguity concerns (Ghatak
and Ghosh, 2011, Singh, 2012 and Kominers and Weyl, 2011) and usefulness of
contingent contracts (see Collins and Isaac, 2012) to restore efficiency but without
institutional efficiency none of these can achieve success.
0.15 Social Impact and Consent
As industrialisation is a process of changing the socio-economic structure by shift-
ing focus from being agro-dependent to ponder on manufacturing commercial pro-
duce with technological upgrade, acquisition of land for this bound to impact the
96For discussion on these see Bardhan, 2011, and the symposium in Economic and Political
Weekly, 2011.
169
lives of the converting society. As stated in sub-section 0.13.1 such social impacts
has always been underrated. Land, in general have three categories: agricultural
land comprising of forest, irrigated and unirrigated land; cultivable waste land
comprising of paddock, grazing land and groves; and non-cultivable land compris-
ing of building sites, roads, railways, rivers, ravines and hillocks. Naturally and
evidentially when ‘agricultural’ land is being acquired for conversion, the socio-
economic impacts are the deepest and thus attracts large body of literature. In a
democratic environment where ’good governance’ is demanded by its modernising
society, evidences indicate that collective opinion97 and assessment of societal im-
pacts are necessary components for the success of land conversion, as otherwise it
could have significant contribution to conflict (and often to violence). This sec-
tion highlights the potential social impacts and failure of adherence to collective
opinion as a major sources of land acquisition conflict, thereby showcasing the
importance of social impact assessments (SIA) to reach efficiency and effectiveness
of development programs.
Ideally the components of SIA98 studies include social analyses, socio-economic
assessments, communal and social impact assessments to evaluate or estimate the
consequences of specific project or policy actions on human environment in the
context of pertinent national, state or provincial environmental policy legislations
(see Burdge and Vanclay, 1996). SIA or more specifically socio-economic impact
assessment (SEIA)99 is to be conducted prior to the commencement of a proposed
industrial project focusing on the people who are to be affected directly (often
short-term and particular to the industry in concern) and indirectly (long-term
general consequences of industrialisation) by the industrial development. It is to
make them aware of the project, assess their perception on it with consideration
97Alternatively known as “social consent”, implicating towards a free, prior and informed
consent of the affecting communities, agreeing to sale their resources and permitting business in
their community.
98Introduced in 1970s in the US as a part of US National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
legislation.
99Impacts on the project-affected people include possible social and cultural consequences
starting from the changes in their day to day activities, occupations, communal pursuits to the
alterations of communal norms, beliefs that “guide and rationalise” their individual and societal
perceptions (Burdge and Vanclay, 1996).
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of problems they faced in similar past projects (Ramanathan and Geetha, 1998).
While the importance of SIA as a tool for grievance management is accepted
worldwide and legally mandated (although with varying degrees) in most of the
countries undertaking such conversion process such as US, UK, New Zealand,
India, Malaysia and African nations, the implementation of these assessments
are persistently disputed especially in LDCs. Although the most crucial factor
stands against acquisitions is perceived to be the compensation amount, social
and communal disruptions are proven to be of no lees importance in resulting
violent conflicts between participating agents.
The most important factor impacting the social sustainability of such acqui-
sitions is employment and employability of the traditional agriculturalists and
agricultural labourers who have minimal outside option owing to severe skill short-
age.100 Development economics advocates for industries that can create employ-
ment opportunities to absorb local labourers, including skill generation programs
to increase the employability of host communities, contributing to improve their
socio-economic conditions. Although potentially this increases stability of local
business operations and success of industries, a study by Idemudia (2010) indi-
cated that employment generation as a tool for preventing conflicts is not an effec-
tive option. This is because the lack of available local skills makes such programs
expensive for the industries who then pass on a large share of it to the government
that lacks the required fund to sustain such programs. In order to prevent conflicts
and to ensure sustainability of development, a global initiative has been taken un-
der the banner of corporate social responsibility (CSR). It provides a framework
for the industries to contribute in improving the socio-economic, ethical and envi-
ronmental conditions without hurting the religious, historical and cultural factors
of the host communities. Nevertheless, effective implementation of CSR is crucial
for the most lucrative growing markets of the rapidly expanding economies where
100This is a social issue as lack of it results in migration of locals with local jobs being offered to
expatriates with suitable technical skills that induces social inequality (see Burdge and Vanclay,
1996, and Idemudia, 2010). Burdge and Vanclay (1996) studies that, each time when a “wave
of new settlers arrives” they typically either aspire for further development of income generating
activities or stalls the process to obstruct the folk of new settlers, each having significant social
impact.
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social and environmental crises are usually most acute. Economic literature seems
a little scarce in producing and examining the efficiency and effectiveness of CSR
performance. In line with Visser (2008) it is firstly because a large component of
CSR performance is location rather than country or region specific and thus an ex-
tensive coverage is required for measuring and improving the effectiveness of CSR,
and secondly, because of the fact that it is politically contested instead of being
ideationally neutral. Moreover, while ‘good conduct’ and ‘transparency’ are essen-
tial aspects for superior performance of CSR, the legal responsibility (in particular
with concerned human and property rights) always comes at the end. In the devel-
oping nations this fails to provide legal infrastructure to support an independent,
resource efficient and administratively effective CSR program (Visser, 2008). The
gap between legal provision and implementation of such programs are even more
complex in developing economies such as India, China, Malaysia, Indonesia and
South Africa, and are subject to a large body of development literature. However,
while the failure of peaceful coherence is stemming from bad governance, there are
arguments in literature that despite the interest of corporations and government
bodies’ in promoting social stability (from both ethical and business perspectives)
and lending hands to encourage community involvement and development, it is
sometimes the local demographic inability that constraints the government, in-
ducing resistance to such projects. The following section put some detail on such
dilemma in light of related conflicts from recent era.
0.15.1 Conflict and social tension
For further analysis, it is important to note two crucial points. First, that indi-
vidual or communal grievances are more important than a large-scale outbreak
of the society (or nation). Primarily this is because communities differ in terms
of culture, history, perception and occupation differing the root causes of their
grievances. And secondly, communal grievances significantly impacting the busi-
ness operations are more common in practice. As a result, the literature have
focused on this issue in light of segregated incidents (country, state or province
specific), but the common drivers being the failure of CSR and resettlement pro-
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grams that promised to provide employment, inequality in treatments and insuffi-
cient social services. The second point is that while compulsory (alternatively used
as ‘urgent’) land acquisition is legally meant to serve for public purpose, its defi-
nition and inference often blamed to be unjustified, complicating the issue further
(see Ghatak and Ghosh, 2011). Moreover, evidences indicate that whenever the
process of acquiring land is not bounded by clear, institutionalised and inclusive
protocols adding transparency and predictability for the project affected people
(PAP), it potentially induces communal grievances, “escalate and assume political
dimensions” undermining the socio-economic sustainability, peace and stability of
such programs (Kombe, 2010). Also note that corporate/state-community con-
flicts arises from attempts of acquiring customary and ancestral lands of the local
communities, or child and forced labor are used in projects, such as in Indonesia
and Malaysia (Rainforest Action Network, 2014).
To progress further in this section let us consider the following examples. Note
that economic literature agrees that already existing social tensions aggravates the
degree of conflict when the land under acquisition are being shared communally
for living. This is exemplified in African countries when the land under acquisi-
tion comprises vast area of community/government land, that is being utilised by
several communities (with social division) for generations possessing customary
rights over these land. Events of and acquisition does not impact them equally.
Our first set of example comes from Kenya. A report by Maggi and Veit (2013)
suggests that in Kenya many among the 35 per cent of population living in arid
or semi-arid land and practicing pastoralism are relatively more vulnerable when
it comes to claim land and related rights than the sedentary groups (e.g., small-
scale farmers) holding individual plots, in control of the usage and operations of
their plots, even without any formal entitlement. This division comes from the
social division where pastoralism is considered as backdated, “antithetical to the
western model of property rights”, slows down economic development due to its
mobile and communal nature. This topped with government mismanagement of
resources, resulting in poverty stricken, undernourished and food insecure society
in Kenya. Maggi and Veit (2013) further reports that during 2003-2005 when US
based Dominion Farms signed MoU with the Lake Basin Development Author-
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ity (LBDA) and the county councils to have acquired more than 9000 hectares
land for development of rice plantations in the Yala Swamp Wetlands, the local
residents initially welcomed the venture with the hope of having job opportuni-
ties, infrastructure and communal development including health, education and
financial services that the farm promised to get licence.101
The second example is from Pakistan when the Water and Power Develop-
ment Authority (WAPDA) attempts to acquire 9000 acres of land for the Diamer
Basha Dam Project on the River Indus. The foundation stone was laid in 2011
for the worlds highest Roller Compacted Concrete Dam, estimated to cost over
US$8.5 billion, with the capacity to provide 4500 MW of electricity to the national
grid. With China being the major source of financing this promising Hydropower
project, series of protests arises primarily due to lack of consent from the local vil-
lagers and land-losers and delayed the process. With the inadequate assessments of
impacts on socio-economic and environmental factors, the affected people claimed
that while the energy produced will not benefit the mass population, including
farmers and riverine communities and will damage the heritage of culture and ex-
change of the Indus Valley regions, portion of the Silk Road. Moreover, World
Banks rejection to finance this project due to its location on a territory claimed
by both India and Pakistan, further ignited the protests as it might impact the
politically contested Northern Areas and could contribute to further unrest in the
region. Protests include sit-ins, appeal to the Asian Development Bank to cut
financing the project, road blockades, marches, police firings and deaths.102
These studies suggest that assessments reports are produced merely to get
project approval, involve inefficient feasibility studies and disregard many poten-
101Around 700,000 local people whose domestic and occupational living was depended on this
wetland has been assured to have mass provision of direct and indirect local employment with
preference given to former land users; bringing in outside expertise for training, technical support,
equipment management, farming and healthcare services; preparing local stuffs to take over farm
consultancy and management services; finance community development services such as income
generating activities, schools, churches, clean water and sanitation, etc.
102see < https : //ejatlas.org/conflict/diamer − bhasha − dam − pakistan >, <
http : //www.firstpost.com/india/after − world − bank − adb − refuses − to − fund −
pakistans − dam − project − on − indus − river − in − pok − 3076512.html > and < http :
//www.dawn.com/news/1300579 >
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tial hazards, that brings in social conflict (almost immediately after its commence-
ment) and unsuccess to the project. Social sustainability requires financial alloca-
tion for ongoing monitoring activities, location preference of land-losers, prevention
of health disorders, management of resource conflicts. Note that the private in-
terests of the few individuals representing the entire community can outweighed
communal benefit/harm that perpetuated the social division and thereby ignited
the conflict. A more intense social conflict is also studied by Maggi and Veit, (2013)
in Kenya’s Tana Delta Region103 where socially divided multiple communities have
been “accessed, utilised, and even settled” for generations in the vast area of public
land. Conflict arises when Bedford Biofuels Tana Delta Ltd. attempts to have ac-
quired 64,000 hectares of this land to develop a jatropha plantation. Despite being
prospective for the socio-economic development for Kenya, the project was stalled
due to lack of consultation and consent from the de-facto and customary land
owners. The study reported that while the oil MNC attempted to negotiate leases
with the local ranches (even with the associated huge transaction cost), there was
diversified interest of the stakeholders and non-ranch settlers who claimed to have
superior right over land, followed by filing of lawsuits that further delayed acqui-
sition. The project was eventually scrapped although having legal approval from
environmental ground (by NEMA), whose authenticity was also being questioned
in the process. Absence of free, prior and informed consent from the stakeholders
that often results from social class divisions, non-recognition of customary prop-
erty rights and complex tenure systems have been significantly contributed to such
conflicts around the world such as Papua New Guinea, India, Brazil, US and Aus-
tralia (see Rainforest Action Network, 2014, Bhaduri and Patkar, 2009, Alston et
al., 2012).
An efficient SIA study is not only a matter of time and money but also associ-
ated with the interest of the concerning parties like investors, government and the
stakeholders themselves. The task is complex in presence of conflict of interests
and effective implementation of SIA/SEIA/CSR requires strong institutional sup-
port (for detail on this see, e.g., Cernea, 2000 and Vanclay, 2003). Cernea (2000)
studies resettlement mechanisms in a risks-and-reconstruction-oriented framework.
103With over 70 per cent poverty rate.
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It shows that a socially responsible resettlement program, that is guided by an ’eq-
uity compass’ benefits both local and national economy. Further, it is of foremost
importance to gather land data which in most of the LDC contexts are inadequate,
improperly collected or being ignored. This is largely due to the lack of knowl-
edgeable and trained surveyors/consultants regarding scientific methodologies of
obtaining and interpreting information (see UN-HABITAT, 2012, and Burdge and
Vanclay, 1996). But providing such facilities beforehand is neither a priority of
the administrators nor the investors, due to the high associated cost and risks of
loosing the opportunity to reap the benefits of these economically and politically
aspiring projects. Interestingly, even in the countries where undertaking SIAs are
among the statutory requirements, there is hardly any obligation for taking the
results pivotally in decision making process (see Burdge and Vanclay, 1996). Con-
sequently, reports and mitigation measures often remain unread or unheeded, even
falsified. For example, the case of land acquisition by oil-MNC Kuala Lumpur Ke-
pong in Papua New Guinea’s Collingwood Bay (see Rainforest Action Network,
2014).
The second most important aspect is the implementation of SIA/CSR mea-
sures and the provision of services for communal development. In this regard,
employability of local people remains questionable, firstly owing to industry’s cap-
ital intensive nature (for example oil plantations or car manufacturing industries)
and secondly due to the lack of local technical skills. The leasing contract of-
ten involve the provision of schools and training centres as a potential long term
solution for this issue. But lack of acceptability and understandability of these
provisions often restrict the locals to actively participate in these programs. Thus
schools go unattended by local students, university graduates avoid gaining ’tech-
nical’ skills despite being provided by CSR programs (see for example Idemudia,
2010). Moreover, whilst competition for the communal development proposals fur-
ther stimulates “intra and inter-community violence”, corporate-community/NGO
(mostly local) partnership schemes also fail to act as an effective measure. Com-
munal development programs also involve hospital or health care services but for
the same reasons fail to occupy with resident doctors or nurses inducing division
between corporate and communities.
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The third aspect comes from an extension of land acquisition arguments, rais-
ing question on the choice of land given to the industries. A common perception
is that state should allocate industries to the previously occupied and currently
closed industrial locations. This can have two primary benefits: firstly, it gives
a solution to the acquisition of lands that are presently in agricultural use or be-
ing used by customary land owners or indigenous people, thereby reducing the
conflicts over property rights and employability of the locals. And secondly, ac-
quisition of abandoned land minimises the pressure on agricultural land, thereby
reducing the food crisis due to the land use change. Otherwise it can continually
raise food prices, severely impacting the poverty-stricken societies questioning on
equity and sustainability grounds (for example see report by OECD, 2007). A
counter argument to the first is that the choice of land is not always in a state’s
hands especially when it is in desperate need for industrialisation and is in com-
petition with other states for fetching investments (see Banerjee et al., 2007 and
Sarkar, 2007 for Indian context). Moreover, taking an abandoned factory site may
put an additional pressure on the industrialist to employ the local workers who
lost their jobs for the closing down of previous factory. These, coupled with the
rising population pressure induces the decision of occupying vast area of land that
more often happens to be in agricultural use. Regarding the mitigation of food
crisis, a part of literature argues in fact on the viability of this food crisis issue.
For example Sarkar (2007) points this as “baseless” as the relative land require-
ment for industrialisation is too small as compared with the land being used in
agriculture. It argues that while the long-term solution for “poverty and back-
wardness” is industrialisation and states have a choice to freely import foods from
neighbouring states, industries should be welcomed as it would in turn increase
agricultural productivity by raising the average landholding of the rural popu-
lation and by stimulating the use of modern technology. However, distribution
of property rights, consolidation of landholders’ opinion, their identification, con-
sent and participation is accepted almost unanimously in the economic literature
for efficient implementation of industrial projects which is possible with effective
performance of social assessments.
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0.16 Environmental Impacts
The environmental impacts of alternative land-uses have long been debated but
when it comes to the search for factors responsible for ongoing global conflicts
arising out of large-scale land acquisitions, environmental issues seem to take a
backstage. Predominantly it is due to the fact that the land-rush is a relatively
recent trend and as large proportion of land acquisition proposals remains at their
primary stage of implementation (if not forsaken any earlier), there is a signif-
icant shortfall of information that can confirm environmental impacts of these
proposed projects. The other being lack of availability of strong environmental
measurements and compliance systems to assess environmental sustainability of
such programs. While in most developing nations government-enforced environ-
mental monitoring systems do not exist or weakly enforced by law, owing to the
dearth of resource and technical support to carry on required audits, it is trouble-
some for the non-government entities to conduct effective inspections due to lack
of cooperation from regional government bodies and investors. But potential en-
vironmental impacts of such land-use changes have been evidentially contributed
to conflicts, if not, as a sole contributor. It is also not rare that local government
practices leniency on the environmental regulations to keep an uninterrupted in-
flow of capital. In turn it bears the costs and consequences in terms of extensive
environmental degradation and inevitably passes them on to the communities, at
least locally. In cases when environmental assessment reports are available, unless
the proposed projects are being materialised, it undermines the “most egregious”
environmental impacts (Maggi and Veit, 2013). This section aims to survey the
literature and highlight the potential environmental impacts that play crucially to
unfold conflicting land acquisitions.
Large-scale land-use changes more often than not endanger the already scarce
natural resources and species as it puts a threat of transforming and polluting
the surrounding air and water resources, destroying forests, wetlands and savan-
nahs which impact the natural habitat. Eventually it can have detrimental effects,
risking the environmental sustainability of such programs unless precautionary
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measures are taken. The affected and fragile ecosystem may percolate down to
not only serious environmental consequences, impacting the crop yield and fish
life cycle but also a chain effect on the local communities whose livelihoods are
dependent on farmland cultivation and fisheries. While such impacts are hard
to measure at the time when a proposed project is due to implement or at the
very beginning of its operation, its extent is also unimaginable. However, risking
environments is not always deliberate as the availability of vast area of land that
is either unused for human survival or deprived of natural resources, are sharply
declining. The UNECA’s Economic Report (2009) suggests that Africa is the most
rational destination for investors owing to its abundance of land, cheap labour re-
sources, copious water reserves, vast natural and mineral resources. It is then fol-
lowed by other LDCs like Brazil, Indonesia, Cambodia, Kazakhstan and Malaysia
that are relatively rich in natural resources and cheap human resources, especially
for outright purchase, concession or long-term leasing in land by the economically
wealthy but land-poor foreign countries and investors (GRAIN, 2008).
Conflicts regarding environmental issues are most prominently associated with
land developments for renewable energy plantation programs. Because, modern
societies are increasingly concerning the environmental implications of fossil fuels
on global climate that makes them strive for renewable energy resources, thereby
fuelling the increasing demand for large scale land to stabilise the source of en-
ergy. Globalisation facilitates investments on foreign land, a cheaper option than
importing the biofuels from producer country to meet national demand for renew-
able energy. A recent rise in fossil fuel prices perpetuated the ever rising demand
for renewable energy that contributed in the incidents of land acquisition world-
wide (FAO, 2008). Although the developed nations like European Union (EU)
and United States of America (USA) topped the list of renewable energy markets
and related investments, the emerging economies like India and China also con-
stitute strong markets and gearing up such investments. This as well explains the
demand for farmland conversions. Since food crops including wheat corn, rice,
maize, sugar cane and soybeans can be converted into biofuels, higher prices of
oil increases the profitability of converting farm commodities into automotive fuel.
Thus the countries with ample arable land are becoming primary targets for the
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oil investors to produce the required feedstock for biofuel. In 2010, Africa alone
contributed for 13 per cent of global oil production, with major supply from the
sub-Saharan Africa, contributing 7.25 per cent (Baumuller et al., 2011). Brazil
not standing too far, forecasted to be one of the world’s largest biodiesel suppliers
by 2020 owing to its agricultural capacity. Other countries such as Argentina,
Laos, Malaysia, Indonesia, Madagascar, Mali and Tanzania are also emerging as
the potential target for renewable energy producers. The initial excitement over
the potential growth factors from such investment flows and clean source of en-
ergy soon turns into concerns, owing to their severe environmental impacts, that
resulted in series of empirical literature (see for example Maggi and Veit, 2013,
Baumuller et al., 2011 and Cotula et al., 2009). This eventually forces countries
in the EU to have adopted sustainability standards such as Renewable Energy Di-
rective (RED) to safeguard their consumption, production and trade of renewable
energy, irrespective of whether those are produced domestically or being imported
(see Obidzinski et al. 2012).
0.16.1 Conflict and unrest
Our first example in this section comes from Sub-saharan Africa (SSA), supplier
of a major share of global oil and gas, with nearly 500 oil companies in operation.
Their exporters include the EU (the world’s largest among developed nations),
Spain, Germany, France, the UK, Portugal, the Netherlands and Italy as well as
the emerging economies like China (the world’s second largest), India, Malaysia,
South Korea and the Gulf states (Baumuller et al., 2011). According to Baumuller
et al. (2011) in 2010 alone SSA has been accounted for 314 million barrels of oil
worth US$65 billion to the EU, with Nigeria and Angola being the major suppli-
ers of production. While the economic importance of oil and gas industry is huge
for SSA, effects of oil spills and gas flaring pose high direct risks not only to the
environment by contributing dangerously to greenhouse gas emissions, impairing
fishing and farming livelihoods and biodiversity, but also impacting health and
well-being of local communities. Niger Delta, in particular is affected by the in-
dustry as large part of production happens onshore resulting in an estimated gas
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flaring of 20-76 per cent as compared with a worldwide average of only 4.8 per
cent (UNDP, 2006). It follows the sufferings from pollution-associated health dis-
orders such as gastrointestinal and respiratory ailments, skin diseases and cancers,
severely impairing coastal and inland ecosystem.104 The severely affected local
communities often indulge into violent protests against the oil producers and/or
the state government that values profitability of these massive projects over the
immensity of human and material destruction and the demographic dislocation.
There are many incidents from Niger Delta of such environmental conflicts that
result in violence and bloodshed of local people. The first reported major clash was
between the multinational oil company Shell and local host community of Iko in
July, 1987 when around thirty youths from the village of Iko attacked the Utapete
oil flow station, drove away the workers and occupied it for three days disrupting
the flow of crude oil from the ten oil wells located in their village (Okwechime,
2013). Shell’s operations resulted in closure of creeks used for fisheries and was
causing health hazards due to the gas flares. The locals demanded for compensa-
tion in terms of jobs and general improvement of the local environment conditions.
This led to police intervention resulting in massive violence, mass destruction of
village houses and displacement of hundreds of villagers without any assistance
from government or any other oil companies nearby. However the grievances con-
tinued and embarks again into protest with an expansion of Shell’s operations in
August 1995 leading to police intervention, bloodshed and burning down of village
houses (Okwechime, 2013). A number of similar bloody massacre was reported in
literature such as the clash of the host community of Egi with the French-owned
oil company ELF in 1993, the clash of Umuechem community against the oil giant
Shell in 1990 etc. (see Okwechime, 2013).105
The second is the most discussed Ogoni-Shell conflict that initially started with
104It is important to note that the impact of such decisions on the ecosystem is not binding
to the vicinity of the acquired land, but rather vast. As the displaced farmers, being forced
out of their traditional livelihoods move to the frontiers and transform natural forest land for
cultivation and animal grazing which in turn affects the natural habitat of forest.
105Most of the protests were initially non-violent with repetitive petitions to state government,
against the oil companies’ consistent negligence over environmental degradation, ecosystem, com-
munity health and well-being. These turned into brutality after being invaded by military oper-
ations, resulting from prioritising inflow if investments over communal well-being.
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a non-violent resistance campaign, supported by an umbrella organisation of the
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in 1993 and climaxed in
1995 with the murder of author and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa along with eight other
fellow members. This followed by the gruesome murder of four honoured Ogoni
Chiefs in May 1994. Series of studies including Okwechime (2013) and Idemudia
(2010)106 reported many such protests in Nigeria that brought this West African
country and the operating oil companies into international disrepute. A detail
survey on local communities by Idemudia (2010) found that around 90 per cent
of the conflicts arises against the operation of MNCs that resulted in gas flaring
damaging the zinc roofing local houses that then require frequent repairing, acid-
ification of rain water that makes it undrinkable and stunts crop yields, pollution
from carbon emissions. Further, oil spills pollutes the water affecting the natural
habitats and fish life cycle where agriculture and fisheries are the main livelihoods
in Niger delta. To prevent and manage such situations a framework of CSR has
been incorporated in the host community by the oil-MNCs that involves environ-
mental impact assessment (EIA) study and proliferation of communal support in
terms of schools, hospitals, job training centres etc. However, despite of the pro-
vision of such highly cost incentive programs,107 its success has never reached the
expected level as these private companies are more inclined towards making profit,
and pass on the responsibility of managing these programs to the poor government.
Reportedly more than half of the cost of CSR programs are being passed on to the
state government by the MNCs. The government then passes it on to the local
communities by giving leniency in the environmental regulations such as fixing a
significantly low penalty for violating the environmental regulations. But lack of
funding and difficult research environment for conducting epidemiological studies
makes it harder for the researchers to fully reveal situations in the Delta. This
is also misleading for both private companies and government to rely on existing
data to take any appropriate measure even when it is intended. Thus even though
some of micro-CSR issues address few aspects of host community’s grievances, it
106One can refer to the studies mentioned in these reports. Those are not mentioned separately
here.
107For example, to manage the increased community violence between 1989 to 1998 Shell raises
spending on corporate-community relations from $330,000 to $43 million (Idemudia, 2010).
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remains at a surface level as the root causes remain unsolved. Hence, the resultant
incidents of corporate-community violence are not solely due to action or inaction
of private industries, instead it is due to the failure of good governance that the
strategic decision of industries have accentuated.
It is important to note that violent conflicts are not always driven by private
industrialists, they can also result from high aspirations of economically poor gov-
ernments. This third set of examples thus are from Indonesia and Malaysia, whose
tropical environments naturally blessed them with rich soil suitable for producing
several food and forestry commodities, but their governments intended to grow
upon the economically promising palm-oil. Owing to the high economic prospects
of palm oil, both the governments are likely to ponder on becoming the key world
suppliers of crude palm oil (CPO). So much so that in Indonesia there is 75 per
cent rise in palm oil plantation between 2006 to 2010 accounted for nearly 46 per
cent of the world’s CPO (Obidzinski et al., 2012) while jointly with Malaysia they
account for 86 per cent of the world’s palm oil exports. A large part of this goes
to China and India, the fastest growing economies of the world today (Coxhead
and Jayasuriya, 2010).108 Consequently, these oil plantations resulted in defor-
estation, threatening the rainforests and carbon reserves resulting in green house
gas (GHG) emissions, changes in land cover and endangering the biodiversity, af-
fecting local as well as the global environment. A large body of literature dealing
with environment and sustainability are devoted to analyse such issues. Coxhead
and Jayasuriya (2010) studied that deforestation also makes land vulnerable to
flash floods, endangering the livelihood of local communities that are dependent
on forestry and fishery, timber-extraction activities and impacts the health and
well-being of the residents in plant locality by polluting the surrounding air and
water. Consequently there are communal protests against these oil companies in-
terrupting their production and operations. Reportedly, in Indonesia in 2010 alone
there were more than 630 land disputes between palm oil companies and local com-
munities. UNDP (2012) reports conflicts in Papua New Guinea’s Collingwood Bay
108China topped the list of palm oil importers in the world followed by EU and India in second
and third position respectively. Between 1990 to 2005 Chinese and Indian imports have grown
steeply from 1,291,000 MT to 4,500,000 MT and 209,000 MT to 3,800,000 MT respectively
(Coxhead and Jayasuriya, 2010).
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area, during 1995-2002 when 262,000 hectares of tropical forest, forming the wa-
tershed of five major rivers were brought into stake. The local Maisin community
in support of Conservation Melanesia, a local environmental NGO fights against
private industries and ruled out their operation through court order of return-
ing the land title to the community. They also impose self-operated innovative
and effective environment conservation programs in order to have “environmen-
tally sound, economically viable, culturally appropriate, and socially equitable”
sustainable development. This active communal attempt to save local environ-
ment and entail sustainable development has attracted national, international and
media support that poses an example of communal strength in preserving local
well-being109. This communal initiative poses a good example for many others
in similar situation thus research on finding the detail of such stories are worth
working on.
Similar scenarios of violent conflict is not new. An example comes from India,
when in 1989 Goa Industrial Development Corporation (GIDC) acquired 123,200
square metres of land in Bhutkhamb plateau for the chemical giants DuPont, the
Thapars group of India and Mitsui of Japan to produce Nylon 6,6. The $190m
plantation was initially declared as pollution free and was hugely promoted by
Politicians and officials as one of the most promising SEZ in the state history. But
the industrys production of Nylon with two hazardous chemicals adipic acid and
Hexamythelene Diamine, was causing concerns for environmentalists that resulted
in several agitations and protests against its operations. It turned violent when in
1995 police open fired at protestors and killed one. In retaliation protestor beat up
the police, stripping and chasing them into the woods, burnt cash and properties of
the companys local office. The intensity of conflicts gradually forced the company
109Conservation Melanesia and local Maisins successfully formed a local community-based or-
ganisation, the Maisin Integrated Conservation and Development (MICAD) association, that
guided the locals through business workshops for project identification, prioritisation, develop-
ment, and evaluation. It has not only been successful in alternating their primary source of
income utilising their traditional occupation (of making tapa cloth), rather than solely relying
on large-scale cultivation or timber harvesting, but also been successful in marketing it to urban
and international consumers. Consequently this helps in funding their means for protesting and
protecting their local livelihood from being expropriated by any industrial investors (UNDP,
2012).
184
to relocate to a neighbouring state, Tamil Nadu.110
The evidences discussed above shows that environmental issues are closely
linked with societal gains, state machineries and legal issues that fails to mandate
and implement the required EIA studies. However the causality relation between
these are not very clear. For example, while deforestation resulting from industrial-
isation negatively impacts the socio-economic well being of the PAP, the displaced
communities may prefer to move to the frontiers to resettle even when resettle-
ment arrangements are provided as part of CSR programs. This in turn adversely
impacts the local biodiversity with this changing land use. The ecological effect
of deforestation, desertification, land-cover and land-use change are similar across
the nations although its extent is highly nuanced. Thus studies on environmental
impacts have been specific to the country or location proposed for plantation. In
order to mitigate issues most of the countries (both developed and developing) such
as EU, Australia, New Zealand, Sri Lanka, India, China, South Korea, Nepal and
Malaysia have enacted Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) studies.111 While
it is supposed to be conducted prior to the commencement of a project to forecast
its plausible positive and negative impacts on environment, there are loopholes
in the adherence of the study especially in LDCs, due to lack of administrative
efficiency, lack of political and financial support and ease of breaching. Although
the notion of environmental impacts are commonly perceived and subjected to an
emerging body of development literature, there is argument over the consensus of
climatic disorders with violent resource conflicts as the link has not been success-
fully established by factual evidence or quantitative research (OECD, 2013). The-
oretically scarcity of resources questioning environmental security has potential for
civil conflict, insurgencies and ethnic clashes. But in practice, such incidents are
more often combined with other socio-economic and political parameters, resulting
in small-scale violent conflicts in arid and semi-arid areas rather than full-blown
110See < http : //www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/content/9062/a − shredded −
project/ >, < http : //www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/KalpanaSharma/The−Other−
Half −Will − anything − change/article16123571.ece > and Sampat (2015).
111EIA was introduced late 1960s and with the increasing global awareness on the climatic issues
countries are becoming more frequent in mandating and producing the reports and introducing
punishments for negligence.
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violence with involvement of the state government. For example, drought may be a
direct impact of climate change or series of rainfall shortage that may have caused
indirectly due to deforestation resultant from industrialisation but violent conflict
primarily arising out of it is often hard to establish. As reported by FAO (2008),
large-scale mono-cropping practices, cultivation of genetically modified materials
or feedstocks are highly water intensive and thus expansion of such economically
promising industries imposes greater competition for this already scarce resource
that ‘may’ negatively impact agricultural biodiversity but that, to a very large
extent, depends on the geographical and methodological implementation of such
projects.
0.17 Institutional failure: policy disputes and
implementation failure
Institutional success and failure is essentially a combined performance of legal,
political and social entities. As evident from the discussion so far, conflicts arise
from their interplays. In this section, we elaborate our views by subdividing the
elements of institutions that directly plays in conflicts arising out of large-scale land
acquisition programs for industrial progress. This include constitutional provision
of Eminent Domain and Public Purpose laws, legal provisions for property rights,
takings on Environmental Protections and Social Consent laws, role played by
media and the role of outside Interference and politicisation.
0.17.1 Legal disputes
Eminent Domain and Public Purpose Laws : Land acquisition for industrialisa-
tion is commonly facilitated by the law of eminent domain112 which empowers
112Alternatively termed as expropriation, takings and compulsory purchase, compulsory acqui-
sition in different legal frameworks.
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government to acquire land for “public purposes” and “public uses” in exchange
of adequate compensation. While this is virtually enacted in all constitutional
frameworks (as discussed in section 0.14), it is the improper definition of these
principles along with the inefficient establishment of legal systems that persis-
tently raises controversy in the economic and land policy debates (see Lindsay,
2012, Ghatak and Ghosh, 2011 and Miceli, 2011 and Munch, 1976). The definitive
use of these laws for projects that are in “public purpose” or in “public interest”
is a controversial issue raising concerns for policy makers. Blume et al. (1984)
suggests that when land acquisition follows eminent domain laws (thus acquisi-
tion is not independent of land use), even a full compensation may be inefficient,
since there exist moral hazard problems. Thus it is crucial to define when land
acquisition must follow eminent domain laws. Although there is a variety of its
definition across national laws, including both itemised list of purposes and open
ended definitions, neither of them seem to have achieved efficiency. Because while
itemised list of purposes imposes a degree of certainty and limits discretion, its
potential of being too rigid and inflexible can cause problems, especially when such
a purpose remains unanticipated when the law was made (see Keith et al., 2008 for
more on this). National laws in most of the countries including US, UK, regions
of sub-Saharan Africa and India allows the government to exercise this ‘extraor-
dinary’ power (in varying degrees) not only for government projects but also in
cases of private investments and public-private partnerships that potentially in-
crease economic growth.113 This leaves room for further debate on which project
can truly serve the ‘public’ and in their interest. On one hand, by law it is left on
the discretion of the local government. On the other hand it is inviting challenges
from the resentful political or non-political bodies that more often found catering
their own incentives towards implementation of large-scale projects.
Property Rights : The principle of equivalence insists that both de facto and
de jure owners are entitled for equitable compensation. But in absence of any
recognisable legal right or claim to the land, occupants and poor squatters who
should be entitled to monetary or any alternative forms of compensation and re-
settlement assistance, become informal victim of the necessity (for discussion on
113A detail on this can be found in Lindsay (2012) and the associated references.
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this see Alston et al., 2012, Keith et al., 2008 and Alston et al., 2000). Sharing the
compensation with non-owners whose livelihood is equally impacted as that of an
owner by the eviction process, is much broader than the scope of economics or the
law as it subject to both ethical and political aspects. Limiting compensation to
the owners and including non-owners in a broader social insurance programme as
suggested by Banerjee et al. (2007) seems a just scheme but as pointed out in their
study, may not be affordable by economies burdened with overpopulation and less
wealthy government. An alternative can be short-term transition assistance pro-
grammes which seems a viable option but subject to fall in the vicious cycle of ad-
ministrative inefficiency and corruption (typical in developing economies) besides
giving privilege to “newly poor over the long-term poor”. Theoretically ownership
rights entails possession of ex ante and ex post bargaining power but absence of
complete contracting programs gives rise to informational rents and exploit poor
land-users (for detail see Mookherjee, 1997). Moreover, political institutions that
often lend hand to fix the issues of property rights impeding the acquisition process
are often influenced by their political mileage from these sensitivities.114
Environmental Protections and Social Consent Laws : A number of measures
have been undertaken in attempt to minimise the negative effects of industries
on society and environment. Some of the more pertinent ones include the World
Bank’s Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership (GGFR) that provides a plat-
form for oil producers and importers to increase the use of natural gas associated
with oil production, thereby reducing flaring and venting.115 The United Nations
Global Compact framework (UNGC), the OECD Guidelines for Multinational En-
terprises are among those international guidelines that set out standards and prin-
ciples for responsible business conduct adhering to not only to environment, in-
formation disclosure and human rights but also in combating bribery.116 But this
114For the cases of West Bengal, India see < http : //archive.indianexpress.com/news/india−
nirman/25736/ >
115Launched in August 2002, the GGFR is a public-private partnership designed to bring
together representatives from all the stakeholders including Government (including An-
gola/Songangol, Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Nigeria/NNPC in Africa),
oil importers (including the EU, the US, Norway and others) and major oil companies.
116For detail on measures and guidelines to prevent such conflicts one can also refer to Ochieng,
2011.
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voluntary measures should be seen as complementary to local and (inter-)national
regimes and legal instruments. These are subject to the enforcement of monitoring
instruments to mandate the demonstration of progress and adherence.117
Regarding the protection of socio-economic factors most national constituen-
cies incorporate Socio Economic Impact Assessment (SEIA) as part of their land
acquisition law (as discussed in section 0.15). However its complementarity with
national regimes and legal instruments is required to fulfil its purpose. For exam-
ple, in its attempt to minimise inefficiency, in 2013 a bill named Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill has been enacted in India. This bill has been
set in place along with the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (arguably
the most crucial pro-rural and pro-poor legislation of the post-liberalised era),
and the Right to Education Act, although may subject to various improvements
but provides a ‘legislative template for framing new legislation on land’ (Jenkins,
2012).
0.17.2 Role of Media
Media as an institution plays a role in imparting information that becomes public
knowledge, feeding into decision making. Thus sensitive issues such as acquisition
of land in LDCs requires responsibility and accountability of the media, rather than
having it sensationalised to make it ‘newsworthy’. The role of media in increasing
government responsiveness and accountability has been massive (for example see
Besley and Prat, 2006 and Basley and Burgess, 2000), while the political orienta-
tion of interest groups and their role in manipulating media information by using
sparse yet powerful resources such as Landless Peasants Movements, Save Farm-
land Committee, Committee Against Forced Displacement, etc. has been critical
in many instances (for discussion on this in Brazilian context see Barros et al.,
2012 and Alston et al., 2012). It is not impossible that media hype is feeding
the recent land rush. As more reports come out, they increase the interest of the
117For detail on this a reader can refer the discussions in the reports from OECD (2013),
UNRISD (2009), USAID(2011) and Baumuller et al. 2011
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key players to strike a profitable deal from seeking to acquire large areas of land.
Therefore there is an increasing importance of media reports with careful and de-
tached analysis of factors influencing land investments in developing economies.
Issues of image and reputational risks are important aspects. Thus investors who
are dealing with bureaucratic corruption that results in violation of environmental
laws and human rights should be subjected to unbiased attention. In a scenario
of controversial acquisition it is often found that facts pertaining commerce and
the government are over-presented than the deeper reasons for grievance of the
landowners, potentially distorting opinions.118 Moreover, when media attention
is biased towards troublesome acquisitions and scale coefficients of the projects,
this results in relative absence of information on cases concluded without ‘trouble’
(resistance, violence, extended negotiation, and so on). But in reality it is nei-
ther the size of land nor the scale of project that ensures conflict in the process
(Chakroborty, 2013). Media reports on ‘peaceful’ land transfers can impart infor-
mation on more accepted norms of successful deals thereby increase efficiency of
development programs.
0.17.3 Outside Interference and Politicisation
The impact of government involvement in acquiring land for massive state projects
are two-fold: On one hand it keeps the interest of an investor in states where it is
needed the most, serving an effort of having equitable distribution of such develop-
ment phenomena. But on the other hand it almost inevitably encourages political
interference in the matter especially when conflict of interests persists in the crux of
the matter. Government intervention over private purchase of land can be justified
on many grounds. One, fragmented land holdings in LDCs make private negotia-
tions costly and intensifies strategic delays in the process as a result of landowners
monopoly power, strategic bargaining, non-cooperative bargaining protocols and
associated transaction costs that put buyers at bargaining disadvantages vis-a-vis
118Readers can refer the role of media in Singur, India case in < https :
//www.ukessays.com/essays/history/the − tata − nano − singur − controversy − history −
essay.php >
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sellers (see Miceli and Segerson, 2007, 2011, Menezes and Pitchford, 2004, Pos-
ner, 2003 (p. 55), Cooter, 2000 (p. 289) and Munch, 1976 (p. 474)). Chapter
1 discusses how in presence of institutional infirmities a buyer can strategically
involve the government in the process. Second, as discussed earlier, the pres-
ence of inappropriate property rights, communal land disputes and corrupt land
administration can creates potential ground for wealthy private buyer to exploit
poor landowners and make profitable land deals. And third, the PPP model of
development whereby industrial and infrastructure projects has been transformed
into profit making ventures for the state governments, as explained earlier. While
these mandate government mediation to restore efficiency, fabricated utilisation of
eminent domain laws and misuse of government machineries grease forced sale of
land.
As the land markets are reforming in LDCs, the information asymmetries fa-
cilitating the historical abusive acquisitions are fading away with the emerging
active and aggressive civil society as well as political parties, using disruptive land
acquisition issues to garner votes. It therefore invokes a deeper question of what
makes land acquisition disputes worthy of political attention? This is in continua-
tion with the discussion in earlier chapters. Certain key factors provide incentive
for political involvement: First, active participation of various interest groups119
who provide all necessary information, support the project affected people and
coordinate an initial resistance. Second, active participation of media ensuring
greater political mileage from involvement. Third, greater fragmentation of land,
increasing not only the number of victims but also contributing to the need for ac-
quiring multiple pieces of land for development, entailing higher transaction costs.
As these create potential ‘flash-points’ and emerge as wedge-issues for parties in
upcoming political events, whose benefits can go far beyond the land acquisition
per-se, intervention of outside agents becomes more lucrative.120
This feature is typical of developing nations, as in the developed countries land
119Comprising of NGO’s, national and/or international (non-profit) organisations that are ide-
ologically motivated to protect poor peasants, whose striking emergence is noted during and post
mid-2010 (see Chapter 1 or Jenkins, 2012).
120This has been evident in the different cases discussed earlier.
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disputes arising out of large-scale acquisitions are resolved using legal machineries
owing to their relative efficiency of the legal-institutional framework. The study so
far suggests that imperfections in the institutional framework, especially regard-
ing the legal and political infirmities result in inefficiency in the industrialisation
process. Urgency of states for bringing in economic growth and employment, the
transition to new PPP model of development, that put too much risk on losing
inflow of investments has fuelled government involvements. But imperfections
bring in inequality in the involvement - while private investors has been facilitated
with liberalised licensing schemes, affected communities are facing suppression of
voices, using state machineries. The inefficiency of the legal institutions resulting
in unclear and overlapping property rights (as mentioned earlier in this section)
combined with the fact that land transactions must involve a state-level bureau-
cracy (as discussed in Chakravorty, 2013), make room for bureaucratic corruption,
thereby increasing transaction costs. In such a scenario when rule of law is weakly
enforced it is easier for the outside agents to interfere in the resentful land acqui-
sition process and use legal or extra-legal means to fulfil their own agendas. Of
course, the decision of political parties for giving support or to oppose the land
acquisition process is largely dependent on their respective political status and
associated gains.
There is a large body of literature that establishes an undeniable correlation
between bureaucratic corruption and economic development. As mentioned in
Chapter 1, there are two strands of scholarly articles holding rather contradic-
tory views: one, that sees corruption as an obstacle to economic development
or ‘sands’ the process by critically contributing in generating poverty traps (see
for example Blackburn et al., 2006, Mauro, 1995 and Murphy et al.,1993). The
other sees that corruption as an ‘greasing’ element, facilitating beneficial trades
and improving efficiency of bureaucratic procedures (see for example Levy, 2007,
Egger and Winner, 2005, Beck and Maher, 1986 and Leff, 1964). In terms of
empirical literature, anecdotal evidences support the later argument in context
of less developed economies (for more on this see Aidt, 2009). While economic
literature connecting the inefficiencies of democratic institutions with the extent
of corruption is weak, it is agreed that such inefficiencies play a crucial role to
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foster political transitions, thereby increase the chances of economic development
(see for example Svensson, 2005, Paldam, 2002, Ades and Tella, 1997 and Bard-
han, 1997).121 Economic theory in context of land acquisition programs that trace
the role of politicisation on restoring efficiency in such programs is rather scarce.
Roy Chowdhury (2013) shows that politicisation cannot improve efficiency if it
is landowner-induced, when landowners’ have present-biased preferences. In the
first two chapters of the thesis we show that inefficiency in land acquisition results
precisely because of the interplay between legal and political infirmities, that an
industrial buyer can strategically utilised. We show that inefficiency can take place
even without strategic bargaining, geographical contiguity or preference irrational-
ities and a reduction in bureaucratic corruption may in fact increase inefficiency if
these imperfections are significant and small improvements in institutions can hurt
economic surplus. Further, the study shows that sellers are worse off when insti-
tutions fail to control excessive opposition. The third chapter shows that political
intervention does not always result in inefficiency. It shows that when consent for
selling land is practiced through landowners’ voting, inefficiency occurs if institu-
tional inefficiencies make parties indulge in an early mobilisation of resources for
post-voting violence.
0.18 Conclusion
Management of land is becoming the most critical challenge for the developing
economies today. On one hand there is ever rising aspiration for industry and
infrastructure development that demands for land-use changes, coupled with the
new PPP model of development that are mounting competition over this dimin-
ishing resource. On the other hand there is lack of outside option for the ones
who loses their traditional livelihood and lifestyle. In presence of institutional
infirmities resulting in bureaucratic corruption, infringement of rule of law and
distorted political motivations, exploitation of this high value resource is more
likely. Imperfections like bureaucratic corruption and extra-legal influence of var-
121Chapter 1 put more details by unifying these views.
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ious stakeholders, including political parties and civic-society organisations, can
reinforce one another and distort property rights in LDCs. In such environment
when corrective measures for land acquisition acts, compensations and rehabilita-
tions fails to restore efficiency on a large scale, it is necessary to look beyond such
schemes. In light with anecdotal evidences from LDCs, the thesis is thus a first
cut attempt to provide an institution-based explanation of the land acquisition
problems.
This thesis ends with a solemn reminder regarding the violence, suppression
and coercion associated with land acquisition. Many land owners have lost their
lives and livelihood, while many are still engaged in battles against a powerful
nexus of buyers and various parties with vested interests. At the same time, many
land owners have successfully sold their lands and have a lifestyle that would not
have been achievable by them otherwise. Given the complexity of the issue, and
the humanitarian tragedies involved, we point out that our theoretical construct is
a first cut aimed at understanding the trade-offs involved between economic and
political considerations, and, consequently, we refrain from providing any facile
policy recommendations.
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0.19 Appendix A
0.19.1 Proofs of Results from Chapter 1
Proof of Proposition 1: The buyer’s objective in stage 2 is then to maximize Π(k)
by choosing k. The first order derivative of the buyer’s profit function in (6) gives
Π′(k) =
λ− v − rI + 4k(rI − rP )
2
, (27)
where note that Π′(0) = λ−v−rI
2
> 0, and Π′(1) = λ−v−rI+4(rI−rP )
2
. The FOC in
case of an interior equilibrium is given by
k∗(rP ) =
(λ− rI − v)
4(rP − rI) .
Further, the second order derivative of the profit function gives
Π′′(k) = 2(rI − rP ),
so that Π′′(k) < 0 if and only if rI < rP . Let k˜(rP ) denote the choice of k that
maximizes Π(k). For rP < rI , Π(k) is increasing and convex. Thus k˜(rP ) = 1.
Whereas for rP > rI , Π(k) is concave. Thus k˜(rP ) = min{k∗(rP ), 1}. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Fix some c ≥ 0 chosen by A. The lottery contest success
function pi(k) = k means that the party F’s problem is
max
rP
Z(rP ) ≡ γk˜(rP ) + (1− γ)k˜(rP )2(rp − c). (28)
Thus, Z(rP ) = γ + (1− γ)(rP − c) in case rP induces no holdout (i.e. k˜(rP ) = 1),
and Z(rP ) =
λ−v−rI
16
[ 4γ
(rP−rI) +
(1−γ)(λ−rI−v)(rP−c)
(rP−rI)2 ] otherwise. Thus, for any rP that
induces hold out, we have that
dZ
drP
=
(λ− r − vI)
16(rP − rI)3 [(1− γ)(λ− rI − v)(2c− rI − rP )− γ(rP − rI)]. (29)
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For ease of exposition I define Y ≡ [(1− γ)(λ− rI − v)(2c− rI − rP )− γ(rP − rI)].
Let rˆP solves Y (rP ) = 0, so that
rˆP =
(1− γ)(2c− rI)(λ− v − rI) + γrI
(1− γ)(λ− v − rI) + γ .
Let
c¯ := Y |
rP=rI+
λ−v−rI
4
,k=1
=
(
7
8
)
rI +
1
8
(
γ
1− γ + (λ− v)
)
. (30)
Note that rI < c¯. Also note that for any rP ≤ rI + λ−v−rI4 , from Proposition 1, the
equilibrium does not involve any holdout and party F’s utility is γ+(1−γ)(rP−c),
so that it is increasing in rP . Thus it is sufficient to consider rP ≥ rI + λ−v−rI4 .
To prove the first part of the proposition, suppose c is small, i.e. c ≤ rI .
Consider rP such that rP ≥ rI + (λ− v − rI)/4. I argue that Z(rP ) is decreasing
for all rP > rI whenever the outcome involves holdout. Given that Y is decreasing
in rP , it is sufficient to establish this for rP close to but greater than rI . Since
Y |rP=rI = 2(1− γ)(λ− rI − v)(c− rI) ≤ 0,
it follows that Z(rP ) is decreasing for all rP greater than, but sufficiently close to
rI . Thus optimally party F sets r
∗
P = rI +
λ−rI−v
4
. From Proposition 1 it then
follows that k∗ = 1 and there is no holdout. So suppose c is large, i.e. c > rI and
4(1− γ) (2(c− rI)− λ−v−rI4 )− γ ≤ 0 that implies c ≤ c¯. Note that
Y |
rP=rI+
λ−v−rI
4
=
λ− v − rI
4
(
4(1− γ)(2(c− rI)− λ− v − rI
4
)− γ
)
≤ 0.
Consequently, in this case Z(rP ) is also decreasing in rP for all rP ≥ rI + λ−v−rI4 .
Thus the outcome involves r∗P = rI +
λ−v−rI
4
, and for same reasons there is no
holdout.
To prove the second part of the proposition, consider the case where c > rI
and 4(1 − γ) (2(c− rI)− λ−v−rI4 ) − γ > 0. This implies c > c¯ by the fact that
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rI < c¯. Recall that
Y |
rP=rI+
λ−v−rI
4
=
λ− v − rI
4
(
4(1− γ)(2(c− rI)− λ− v − rI
4
)− γ
)
.
Consequently, in this case Z(rP ) is increasing in rP for rP = rI +
λ−v−rI
4
. Thus
r∗P > rI +
λ−v−rI
4
. In particular, r∗P = rˆP . Note that, here the profit of the buyer
remains positive for all values of r∗P = rˆP . To see this consider the buyer’s profit
function when r∗P = rˆP given by
Π(k∗(r∗P )) =
λ− rI − v
8(rP − rI)
(
λ− rI − v
4(rP − rI)(rI − rP ) + (λ− rI − v)
)
.
Note that λ−rI−v
8(rP−rI) is positive for any rP > rI and
(
λ−rI−v
4(rP−rI)(rI − rP ) + (λ− rI − v)
)
>
0 as well since λ > rI+v. Finally, note that as r
∗
P > rI+
λ−v−rI
4
, from Proposition 1,
k∗ < 1 so that the outcome involves holdout. 
Proof of Proposition 3 : Let
L :=
(
δ
2α(1− δ)
)(
(λ− rI − v) + v
1− γ
)
,
X :=
(
(λ− rI − v) + γ
1− γ
)2
,
From Proposition 2 we know that in the region c ≤ rI there is no holdout.
Since α > 0 it must be that c∗|c≤rI = 0 in that region. Similarly in the region
rI < c ≤ c¯ we have c∗|rI<c≤c¯ = 0. This is because from Proposition 1 we know
that for any c ≤ c¯ we have no hold out in which case A will save this cost. In both
the above cases A’s payoff equals 0.
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Now consider the case when c > c¯. Here r∗P = rˆP and the consequent k
∗(rP ) is
k∗|c¯<c<G = (1− γ)(λ− rI − v) + γ
8(1− γ)(c− rI) .
Hence in this region, A’s payoff in c is
D = δ
(
1− (1− γ)(λ− rI − v) + γ
8(1− γ)(c− rI)
)
− (1− δ)αc.
Now
dD
dc
=
δ((1− γ)(λ− rI − v) + v)
8(1− γ)(c− rI)2 − (1− δ)α,
and
d2D
dc2
=
δ((1− γ)(λ− rI − v) + v)
4(γ − 1)(c− rI)3 < 0
since c > rI in the case under study. Consider first the free solution from the FOC:
dD
dc
= 0. This yields two roots, namely
c = rI ±
√
δ(λ− rI − v)
8α(1− δ) .
Since I am in the zone c > rI , it follows that the free solution must be
cf = rI +
√
δ(λ− rI − v)
8α(1− δ) . (31)
Next note cf > c¯ if and only if
(
γ
1− γ + (λ− v − rI)
)2
<
δ(1− γ)(λ− rI − v) + v
α(1− γ)(1− δ) ,
198
that yields(
γ
1− γ + (λ− v − rI)
)2
<
(
δ
α(1− δ)
)(
(λ− rI − v) + v
1− γ
)
. (32)
Following the notations, Eq. (32) is equivalent to having X < 2L. Thus
c∗ = cf = rI +
√
δ(1−γ)(λ−rI−v)
8α(1−γ)(1−δ) if and only if X < 2L (that is equivalent to α < α¯),
provided the payoff to A is positive as otherwise it will never set a positive c. Now,
A’s payoff from cf is positive if and only if
δ
(
1− λ− rI − v
4(rP − rI) + αrI
)
> αrI +
√
α(1− δ)δ(λ− rI − v)
8
. (33)
It is straightforward to verify that there exists a 0 < δ˜ < 1 such that the above
inequality holds if and only if δ > δ˜. Thus for all such values of δ we have c∗ = cf
while for all δ < δ˜ we have c∗ = 0.
Given Eq. (32) if cf ≤ c¯ then it must be true that(
γ
1− γ + (λ− v − rI)
)2
≥
(
δ
α(1− δ)
)(
(λ− rI − v) + v
1− γ
)
.
But this gives X ≥ 2L that is equivalent to α ≥ α¯. Then the constrained optimum
c∗ = 0 as there will be no eventuality with holdout.
To prove the comparative static results, recall that
cf = rI +
δ(λ− v − rI)
8α(1− δ)
Clearly
∂cf
∂α
< 0;
∂cf
∂v
< 0;
∂cf
∂λ
> 0 and
∂cf
∂δ
> 0.
∂cf
∂rI
=
√
2δ(λ−v−rI)
α(1−δ)
8(rI + v − λ) + 1
199
Note that for given λ− v − rI > 0 we have ∂cf∂rI < 0 if and only if 32(λ− rI − v) >
δ
α(1−δ) . 
Proof of Corollary 1: Recall that
r∗P = rˆP =
(1− γ)
(
rI + 2
√
δ(λ−rI−v)
8α(1−δ)
)
(λ− v − rI) + γrI
(1− γ)(λ− v − rI) + γ
Clearly ∂rˆP
∂α
< 0.
It is straightforward to verify that
∂rˆP
∂λ
=
√
2(1− γ)((1− γ)(λ− v − rI)) + 3γ)
√
δ(λ−v−rI)
α(1−δ)
4((1− γ)(λ− rI − v) + γ)2
Note that ∂rˆP
∂λ
> 0 for any 0 < γ < 1.
∂rˆP
∂v
=
√
2(γ − 1)((1− γ)(λ− v − rI)) + 3γ)
√
δ(λ−v−rI)
α(1−δ)
4((1− γ)(λ− rI − v) + γ)2
Note that ∂rˆP
∂v
< 0 for any 0 < γ < 1.
Finally, we have
∂rˆP
∂rI
=
√
2
(
(γ − 1)((1− γ)(λ− v − rI)) + 3γ)
√
δ(λ−v−rI)
α(1−δ) + 2
√
2((1− γ)(λ− v − rI) + γ)2
)
4((1− γ)(λ− rI − v) + γ)2 .
Then, ∂rˆP
∂rI
> 0 if and only if
2
√
2((1−γ)(λ−v−rI)+γ)2)−(1−γ)((1−γ)(λ−v−rI))+3γ)
√
δ(λ− v − rI)
α(1− δ) > 0.
200
Define A := (1 − γ)(λ − v − rI) + γ) and B :=
√
δ(λ−v−rI)
α(1−δ) . Then the above
expression can be written as
rˆP rI(A,B) := 2
√
2A2 −B(1− γ)A− 2B(1− γ)γ > 0.
One can check that the function rˆP rI(A,B) is concave with two roots of A. I
denote them as ai for i = 1, 2 where ai is as follows:
ai =
B(1− γ)±
√
B2(1− γ)2 + 4.4√2B(1− γ)γ
4
√
2
Since we have λ−v− rI > 0 and 0 < γ < 1 by assumption, we always have A > 0.
Thus ∂rˆP
∂rI
> 0 whenever A > ai and
∂rˆP
∂rI
< 0 whenever A < ai. It is now routine
to check whether both the roots are positive. For given 0 < γ < 1 there is only
one root of A that is positive and it is given by a2 =
B(1−γ)+
√
B2(1−γ)2+16√2B(1−γ)γ
4
√
2
.
Hence we have ∂rˆP
∂rI
> 0 whenever λ − v − rI is significantly bigger than γ1−γ and
∂rˆP
∂rI
< 0 whenever λ− v − rI is significantly smaller than γ1−γ . 
Proof of Proposition 4: In general one obtains a qualitatively identical result as
reported in Theorem 1 except that now the expression for period 1 equilibrium
price is different. In particular, if political weakness is high (meaning α small) and
the motivation parameter δ of A is large so that there is holdout, it follows that
the equilibrium period 1 price equals
qcoercion =
λ+ v
2
− rI
2
− χ
kcoercion
, (34)
where
kcoercion =
√
2((1− γ)(λ+ 2χ− rI − v) + γ)
4(1− γ)
√
δ(λ+2χ−rI−v)
α(1−δ)
.
Thus I have shown that with coercion, first period price is unambiguously lower
(viz. qcoercion < q). We have seen that without the possibility of coercion, an
increase in legal weakness (i.e., a rise in rI) reduces period 1 price of land lin-
early (at a rate equal to −1/2). I now show that linearity of this relationship is
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unambiguously destroyed and worsening of legal weakness arrests this fall. More
interestingly this convexity of period 1 price in the degree of legal weakness gives
rise to generic instances where increase in this weakness can even increase qcoercion.
To see this, note that provided there is holdout,
∂qcoercion
∂rI
= −1/2 + χ
k2coercion
∂kcoercion
∂rI
.
Next check that
∂kcoercion
∂rI
=
√
2α(1− δ)((1− γ)(λ+ 2χ− rI − v)− γ)
√
δ(λ+2χ−rI−v)
α(1−δ)
8δ(rI + v − λ− 2χ)2(γ − 1) ,
using which it can be verified that ∂kcoercion
∂rI
< 0 if rI < λ+2χ−v− γ1−γ and ∂kcoercion∂rI >
0 if rI > λ+2χ−v− γ1−γ . Hence kcoercion is convex in rI . From (34) it then follows
that qcoercion is convex in rI as well so that as the legal institution deteriorates
further, the period 1 price under the threat of coercion falls at a decreasing rate.
To show that qcoercion can be upward sloping for high values of rI , we know that
∂qcoercion
∂rI
= 0 if and only if ∂kcoercion
∂rI
=
k2coercion
2χ
. Now, note that with rI = λ − v, its
maximum value, we have
lim
γ→1
∂kcoercion
∂rI
=
√
2α(1− δ)((1− γ)2χ− γ)
√
2δχ
α(1−δ)
8δ(−2χ)2(γ − 1) = +∞.
Since the maximum value of period 1 sales is 1, it follows that for γ high enough,
∂kcoercion
∂rI
>
k2coercion
2χ
. Hence for rI and γ high enough, we have
∂qcoercion
∂rI
> 0. 
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0.19.2 Proofs of Results from Chapter 2
Proof of Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 : Recall from Chapter 1 that k∗ = (1−γ)(λ−rI−v)+γ
8(1−γ)(cf−rI)
if there is holdout where cf = rI +
√
δ(λ−rI−v)
8α(1−δ) . Substituting cf yields
k∗ =
√
2((1− γ)(λ− rI − v) + γ)
4(1− γ)
√
δ(λ−rI−v)
α(1−δ)
. (35)
Now the comparative statics are as follows:
∂k∗
∂α
=
√
2(1− δ)((1− γ)(λ− rI − v) + γ)
√
δ(λ−rI−v)
α(1−δ)
8δ(λ− rI − v)(1− γ) .
Note that ∂k
∗
∂α
> 0 for given 0 < γ < 1 and the assumption of λ > rI + v.
∂k∗
∂γ
=
√
2
4(γ − 1)2
√
δ(λ−rI−v)
α(1−δ)
> 0.
∂k∗
∂δ
= −
√
2α((1− γ)(λ− rI − v) + γ)
√
δ(λ−rI−v)
α(1−δ)
8δ2(1− γ)(λ− v − rI) .
Note that ∂k
∗
∂δ
< 0 for given the assumption of λ > rI + v.
∂k∗
∂λ
=
√
2α(δ − 1)((1− γ)(λ− rI − v)− γ)
√
δ(λ−rI−v)
α(1−δ)
8δ(rI + v − λ)2(γ − 1) .
Note that given 0 < γ < 1 and 0 < δ < 1, ∂k
∗
∂λ
> 0 if and only if (λ−v)−rI > γ1−γ .
∂k∗
∂v
=
∂k∗
∂rI
=
√
2α(1− δ)((1− γ)(λ− rI − v)− γ)
√
δ(λ−rI−v)
α(1−δ)
8δ(rI + v − λ)2(γ − 1) .
Note that given 0 < γ < 1, 0 < δ < 1 both ∂k
∗
∂v
< 0 and ∂k
∗
∂r
< 0 if and only if
(λ − v) − rI > γ1−γ . Finally, the cross partial derivative of k∗ with respect to the
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parameters α and rI gives us the following,
∂2k∗
∂α∂rI
=
√
2(1− δ)((1− γ)(λ− rI − v)− γ)
√
δ(λ−rI−v)
α(1−δ)
16δ(rI + v − λ)2(γ − 1) .
For given 0 < γ < 1, 0 < δ < 1 and the assumption λ > v+ rI , I have
∂2k∗
∂α∂rI
> 0 if
and only if (1− γ)(λ− rI − v)− γ < 0 that gives λ− rI − v < γ(1−γ) . This proves
Theorem 2. 
Proofs of Corollary 3 and Corollary 4: Equation 35 gives the size of k∗ if there is
holdout. Now the comparative statics are as follows: ∂k
∗
∂δ
+ ∂k
∗
∂γ
> 0 iff
α((γ − 1)2(rI + v) + γ2(1− λ) + γ(2λ− 1)− 2δ2 + 2δ − λ)
√
δ(λ−rI−v)
α(1−δ)
rI + v − λ < 0
For given 0 < δ < 1 and the assumption λ > rI + v the above is true whenever
(γ − 1)2(rI + v) + γ2(1 − λ) + γ(2λ − 1) − 2δ2 + 2δ − λ > 0. This simplifies to
−(γ − 1)2(λ − v − rI) − γ(1 − γ) + 2δ(1 − δ) > 0 and boils down to 2δ(1 − δ) >
(1 − γ)2(λ − v − rI) + γ(1 − γ). Let L = λ − v − rI . This yields the following
condition
2δ(1− δ) > (1− γ)((1− γ)L+ γ). (36)
Note that 36 is never satisfied when 2δ(1− δ) < γ(1− γ). So suppose otherwise.
Then condition 36 holds if and only if L < Λ := 2δ(1−δ)−γ(1−γ)
(1−γ)2 . The rest of the
proof that yields Corollary 4 is now straightforward. 
Proof of Theorem 3 : Recall that the equilibrium payoff of the local landowners
under holdout (denoted by US below) is simply a markup over and above their
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reservation utility v. Straightforward calculations yield that
US =
√
2((1− γ)(λ− rI − v) + γ)
4(1− γ)
√
δ(λ−rI−v)
α(1−δ)
(
λ− v − rI
2
)
+ v. (37)
Given (37), it immediately follows that ∂US
∂α
> 0, so that sellers would prefer the
ease of opposition α to be large. This is intuitive since with an increase in α, there
is a decrease in holdout (as seen in Theorem 2(ii)).
A fall in bureaucratic corruption however unambiguously benefits the sellers.
In particular,
∂US
∂rI
= −
√
2(3(1− γ)(λ− rI − v) + γ)
16(1− γ)
√
δ(λ−v−rI)
α(1−δ)
< 0. (38)

Proofs of Corollary 5 and Corollary 6 : Consider the equilibrium payoff of the
local landowners (when holdout takes place) as denoted by US in equation 37.
Straightforward calculations yield that,
∂US
∂v
= 1−
√
2(3(1− γ)(λ− v − rI) + γ)
16(1− γ)
√
δ(λ−v−rI)
α(1−δ)
> 0
if and only if
∆ = 9L2 + L(6G− 4J
2α
) +G2 < 0,
where L = λ−v−rI , G = γ1−γ and J = δ1−δ . Clearly if 6G− 4J2α > 0 then ∆ cannot
be negative. Thus, I conclude that if 3αγ/(1 − γ) > δ/(1 − δ), then ∂US
∂v
< 0. So
suppose 3αγ/(1 − γ) < δ/(1 − δ). Then, as ∆ is convex in L, it follows that the
two roots of the equation ∆ = 0 determines the bounds of L for which ∆ < 0
holds. The higher root of L is
(4D
2α
− 6G) +
√
(4D
2α
− 6G)2 − 36G2
18
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which can be easily shown to be negative. Given L > 0, there is no value of L for
which ∆ < 0 holds. Hence ∂US
∂v
> 0. Also,
∂US
∂λ
=
√
2(3(1− γ)(λ− v − rI) + γ)
16(1− γ)
√
δ(λ−v−rI)
α(1−δ)
> 0
for any δ < 1, γ < 1 since λ− rI − v > 0. Next,
∂US
∂γ
=
√
2α(1− δ)
√
δ(λ−v−rI)
α(1−δ)
8δ(1− γ)2 > 0
and
∂US
∂δ
= −
√
2α((1− γ)(λ− v − rI) + γ)
√
δ(λ−rI−v)
α(1−δ)
16δ2(1− γ) < 0.
Finally, upon simplification, one obtains
∂US
∂γ
+
∂US
∂δ
=
α[(1− γ)2(rI + v) + γ2(1− λ) + γ(2λ− 1)− 2δ2 + 2δ − λ]
√
2δ(λ−rI−v)
α(1−δ)
16δ2(1− γ)2 .
Now ∂US
∂γ
+ ∂US
∂δ
> 0 if and only if condition 36 holds. This means if 2δ(1 − δ) >
γ(1− γ) and L < Λ = 2δ(1−δ)−γ(1−γ)
(1−γ)2 then
∂US
∂γ
+ ∂US
∂δ
> 0. 
Proof of Observation 4: Suppose γ = δ = 1/2. If there is holdout, as assumed,
then the following two conditions must be satisfied. The first condition comes from
the requirement that α < α¯ yielding
∆1(α, rI) :=
(3− rI)
(rI − 2)2 − α > 0,
while the second condition comes from the fact that δ = 1/2 > δ˜, yielding
∆2(α, rI) := 1/2− 1− rI
8
(√
2(1−rI )
α
(rI−1)−2rI(rI−2)
2(rI−2) − rI
) − αrI
2
−
√
α(1− rI)
32
> 0.
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Consider Figure 8 that plots these two conditions and shows that for given α > 0
there exist pairs (α, rI) that falls in the area to the right of ∆1(α, rI) = 0 for
which ∆1(α, rI) > 0 is satisfied and there exist pairs (α, rI) that falls in the area
below the curve ∆2(α, rI) = 0 for which ∆2(α, rI) > 0 is satisfied. It shows here
∆2(α, rI) > 0 is the binding constraint unless the existing institution is very good
for which ∆1(α, rI) > 0 is the binding constraint.
Now consider the expression for economic surplus given by
ES(rI) =
√
2
32(1− rI)(
α(r2I + 6rI − 8)
√
(1− rI)
α
−
√
2(2(1− rI) 32 (rI − 2)− 19r2Iα + 2rI(11α + 8)− 16)
)
.
Then, ∂ES(rI)
∂rI
> 0 if and only if
∆3(α, rI) := α(3r
2
I+2rI−4)
√
1− rI
α
−2
√
2((1−rI) 32 (3rI−4)−α(19r2I−38rI+22)) < 0.
Figure 8 plots ∆3(α, rI) = 0 so that ∆3(α, rI) < 0 holds true for α > 0. It
shows that the zone where ∂ES(rI)
∂rI
> 0 is the area to the right of ∆3(α, rI) = 0
that consists of pairs (α, rI) such that α > 0 and rI ≥ 1. But in our example the
maximum degree of corruption is normalised to 1. Thus for given 0 ≤ rI ≤ 1 and
α > 0, the area under consideration is to the left of ∆3(α, rI) = 0 that consists of
pairs (α, rI) for which
∂ES(rI)
∂rI
< 0.
The figure pinpoints two critical values of rI . One is when rI = 1 and the other
is when the lines ∆1(α, rI) = 0 and ∆2(α, rI) = 0 intersect. I label this value as
rI,1. Note that in this example rI,1 ≈ 0.08.
To elaborate, take two zones into consideration:
• if the degree of bureaucratic corruption is relatively small (viz. 0 < rI < rI,1)
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Figure 8: Effect of change in rI with balanced party preferences.
then the area that is bounded by rI,1 and ∆1(α, rI) = 0 yields
∂ES(rI)
∂rI
< 0.
• if the degree of bureaucratic corruption is relatively large (viz. rI,1 < rI < 1)
then the area below the line ∆2(α, rI) = 0 that is bounded by rI,1 yields
∂ES(rI)
∂rI
< 0.
Thus when institutional imperfections are such that there is buyer-induced
holdout in the locality, then small improvement of institutions that deteriorates
the degree of bureaucratic corruption (viz. a fall in rI) improves economic surplus,
irrespective of the existing degree of institutional imperfections.
Next consider the impact of a change in α. Then, ∂ES(α)
∂α
< 0 if and only if
∆4(α, rI) := (r
2
I + 6rI − 8)
√
1− rI
α
+ 2
√
2rI(19rI − 22) < 0
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Figure 9: Effect of change in α with balanced party preferences.
Figure 9 plots the condition ∆4(α, rI) < 0 and shows that for given 0 ≤ rI ≤ 1
and α > 0 there exist pairs (α, rI) to the left of the line ∆4(α, rI) = 0 for which
there is ∂ES(α)
∂α
< 0. The figure also pinpoints three critical values of α. One is when
α = 0 (with rI = 1), the second is when the lines ∆1(α, rI) = 0 and ∆2(α, rI) = 0
intersect that is labelled as α1 and the third one is when ∆1(α, rI) = 0 intersects
the y-axis that is labelled as α2. Note that in this example α1 ≈ 0.80, α2 ≈ 0.75
and for buyer-induced holdout to take place it must be that α < α1. Thus the
following must be true:
• if the existing institutions are relatively bad such that the ease of opposition
is relatively high (viz. 0 < α < α2) then the area that is bounded by α2 and
∆2(α, rI) = 0 yields
∂ES(rI)
∂α
< 0.
• if the existing institutions are relatively good such that the ease of opposition
is relatively low (viz. α2 < α < α1) then the area that is bounded by α2,
∆1(α, rI) = 0 and ∆2(α, rI) = 0 yields
∂ES(rI)
∂α
< 0.
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Hence when institutional imperfections are such that there is buyer-induced hold-
out in the locality, small improvement in the rule of law that decreases the ease of
opposition (viz. a rise in α) deteriorates economic surplus. 
Proof of Observation 5 : Suppose δ = 8
10
and γ = 2
10
. In this case if there is holdout
as assumed, then the following two conditions must be satisfied. As before, the
first condition comes from the requirement that α < α¯ yielding
∆′1(α, rI) :=
16(9− 4rI)
(4rI − 5)2 − α > 0,
while the second condition comes from the fact that δ = 8
10
> δ˜, yielding
∆′2(α, rI) := 4(1− rI) + 4(αrI − 4)
√
2(1− rI)
α
− 4rI + 5 < 0.
I
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Figure 10: Effect of change in rI with strong ideology and rent-seeking parties.
Consider Figure 10 that plots these two conditions and shows that given α > 0
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by assumption, condition ∆′1(α, rI) > 0 is satisfied for pairs (α, rI) that falls in
the area to the right of ∆′1(α, rI) = 0 and there exist pairs (α, rI) that falls below
∆′2(α, rI) = 0 for which ∆
′
2(α, rI) < 0 is satisfied. It shows here ∆
′
2(α, rI) = 0
is the binding constraint unless the existing institution is very good, as in that
scenario ∆′1(α, rI) = 0 is the binding constraint.
The expression for economic surplus in this example is given by
ES(rI) =
√
2
5120(1− rI)(
5α(80r2I + 336rI − 417)
√
(1− rI)
α
+ 8
√
2(332r2Iα− 5rI(67α + 64) + 320)
)
.
Then ∂ES(rI)
∂rI
> 0 if and only if
∆′3(α, rI) := 5(240r
2
I + 16rI − 255)
√
(1− rI)
α
+ 16
√
2(332r2I − 664rI + 335) < 0
Figure 10 plots the condition ∆′3(α, rI) < 0 that holds true for pairs (α, rI) that
falls in the area below ∆′3(α, rI) = 0. The figure shows that in this example for
given 0 ≤ rI ≤ 1 there are two critical values of rI to be considered. One is when
rI = 1 and the other is when the lines ∆
′
1(α, rI) = 0 and ∆
′
2(α, rI) = 0 intersect.
I label this as rkink with 0 < rkink < 1. In our example rkink ≈ 0.03.
Thus there are two zones to consider:
• If the existing institution is relatively inefficient so that bureaucratic corrup-
tion is relatively large (viz. rkink < rI < 1) then there are two possibilities:
the zone above ∆′3(α, rI) = 0 that is bounded by ∆
′
2(α, rI) = 0 and rkink I
get ∂ES(rI)
∂rI
< 0, while the zone below ∆′3(α, rI) = 0 that is bounded by rkink
I get ∂ES(rI)
∂rI
> 0;
• If the existing institution is sufficiently efficient so that bureaucratic corrup-
tion is sufficiently small (viz. 0 ≤ rI < rkink) then there are two possibilities:
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the zone above ∆′3(α, rI) = 0 that is bounded by ∆
′
1(α, rI) = 0 and rkink I
get ∂ES(rI)
∂rI
< 0, while the zone below ∆′3(α, rI) = 0 that is bounded by rkink
I get ∂ES(rI)
∂rI
> 0.
Next consider the impact of a change in α. Then, ∂ES(α)
∂α
> 0 if and only if
∆′4(α, rI) := 5(80r
2
I + 336rI − 417)
√
1− rI
α
+ 16
√
2rI(332rI − 335) > 0
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Figure 11: Effect of change in α with strong ideology and rent-seeking parties.
Figure 11 plots the condition ∆′4(α, rI) > 0 that holds true for pairs (α, rI)
that falls to the right of ∆′4(α, rI) = 0. It shows that for any non-negative rI the
zone to the left of the curve ∆′4(α, rI) = 0 that consists of pairs (α, rI) such that
0 ≤ rI ≤ 1 and α > 0 I get ∂ES(α)∂α < 0. The figure pinpoints three critical values
of α. One is when α = 0 and rI = 1. The second is when ∆
′
1(α, rI) = 0 intersects
with the y-axis that I label as α2. In this example α2 ≈ 5.75. The third one is
when ∆′1(α, rI) = 0 and ∆
′
2(α, rI) = 0 intersect that I label as α1. In this example
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α1 ≈ 5.93.
The rest of the proof then follows from Observation 4. It shows that for any
pair of (α, rI) such that 0 ≤ rI ≤ 1 and 0 < α < α1 (so that holdout takes place),
the area below ∆′2(α, rI) = 0 that is bounded by ∆
′
1(α, rI) = 0, I have
∂ES(α)
∂α
< 0
irrespective of the level of corruption. 
Proof of Observation 6 : Suppose γ = 8
10
and δ = 2
10
. In this case if there is holdout
as assumed, then the following two conditions must be satisfied. As before, the
first condition comes from the requirement that α < α¯ yielding
∆′′1(α, rI) :=
6− rI
4(rI − 5)2 − α > 0,
while the second condition comes from the fact that δ = 2
10
> δ˜, yielding
∆′′2(α, rI) := (1− rI) +
√
2(1− rI)
α
(4rIα− 1)− rI + 5 < 0.
Consider Figure 12 that plots these two conditions and shows that given α > 0
by assumption, condition ∆′′1(α, rI) > 0 is satisfied for pairs (α, rI) that falls below
∆′′1(α, rI) = 0 and there exist pairs (α, rI) that falls below ∆
′′
2(α, rI) = 0 for which
∆′′2(α, rI) < 0 is satisfied. It shows here ∆
′′
2(α, rI) = 0 is the binding constraint
unless the existing institution is very good, as in that scenario ∆′′1(α, rI) = 0 is the
binding constraint.
The expression for economic surplus in this example is given by
ES(rI) =
√
2
80(1− rI)
(
5α(5r2I − 24rI + 3)
√
1− rI
α
+ 4
√
2(19r2Iα− 5rI(11α + 2) + 10)
)
.
Then ∂ES(rI)
∂rI
> 0 if and only if
∆′′3(α, rI) := 5(15r
2
I − 44rI + 45)
√
1− rI
α
+ 8
√
2(19r2I − 38rI + 55) < 0
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Figure 12: Effect of change in rI when there is a stronger ideological support for
the project and weaker ideological opposition.
214
Figure 12 plots the condition ∆′′3(α, rI) < 0 that holds true for pairs (α, rI) that
falls to the right of ∆′′3(α, rI) = 0 such that rI > 1. But in this example the
maximum value for rI is normalised to 1. Thus for given 0 ≤ rI ≤ 1 in our
example the zone to be considered is to the left of ∆′′3(α, rI) = 0 and there is only
one critical point, when rI = 1 and α = 0.
Given that there is holdout in the locality, this part of the proof follows from
Observation 4. It shows that the zone below ∆′′2(α, rI) = 0 that is bounded by
∆′′1(α, rI) = 0 I get
∂ES(rI)
∂rI
< 0, irrespective of the level of institutional inefficien-
cies.
Next consider the impact of a change in α. Then, ∂ES(α)
∂α
> 0 if and only if
∆′′4(α, rI) := 5(5r
2
I − 24rI + 3)
√
1− rI
α
+ 8
√
2rI(19rI − 55) > 0
r
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Figure 13: Effect of change in α with stronger ideological support for the project
and weaker ideological opposition.
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Figure 13 plots the condition ∆′′4(α, rI) > 0 that holds true for pairs (α, rI) that
falls to the left of ∆′′4(α, rI) = 0. It shows that for any non-negative rI the zone to
the left of the curve ∆′′4(α, rI) = 0 that consists of pairs (α, rI) such that 0 ≤ rI ≤ 1
and α > 0 I get ∂ES(α)
∂α
> 0. The figure pinpoints two critical values of rI . The
first is when rI = 1 and α = 0, the second is when the line ∆
′′
4(α, rI) = 0 intersects
the x-axis. I label this as rI,2 with 0 < rI,2 < 1. In this example rI,2 ≈ 0.05. Thus
there are two zones to consider:
• if the existing institution is relatively inefficient so that bureaucratic corrup-
tion is relatively large (viz. rI,2 < rI < 1) then the zone to the right of
∆′′4(α, rI) = 0 that is bounded by ∆
′′
2(α, rI) = 0 I get
∂ES(rI)
∂rI
< 0;
• if the existing institution is relatively efficient so that bureaucratic corruption
is relatively small (viz. 0 ≤ rI < rI,2) then the zone to the left of ∆′′4(α, rI) =
0 that is bounded by ∆′′1(α, rI) = 0 I get
∂ES(rI)
∂rI
> 0.

Proof of Observation 7 : Suppose λ = 3, rI = v = 1, α = 1/5 and γ = 1/2. If
there is holdout, as assumed, then the following two conditions must be satisfied.
The first condition comes from the requirement that α < α¯ yielding
∆1,1(δ) :=
3δ
4(1− δ) −
1
5
> 0,
while the second condition comes from the fact that δ > δ˜, yielding
∆2,1(δ) :=
√
5
√
δ(1− δ)− 12
√
2δ + 2
√
5
√
δ(1− δ) + 2
√
2 < 0.
Note that ∆1,1(δ) > 0 is satisfied if and only if 0.21 < δ < 1 and ∆2,1(δ) < 0
is satisfied if and only if 0.36 < δ < 1. Thus in this example ∆2,1(δ) < 0 is
the binding constraint and buyer-induced holdout takes place for any δ such that
0.36 < δ < 1.
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Now ∂ES(δ)
∂δ
> 0 if and only if
∆3,1(δ) := −
√
10
√
δ
1−δ − 3(1− δ)
40δ2(1− δ) > 0.
Thus ∆3,1(δ) > 0 whenever
√
10
√
δ
1−δ − 3(1 − δ) < 0. But this holds if and only
if δ is significantly low such that 0 < δ < 0.30. But then there is no holdout.
Hence, for a relatively higher value of δ such that 0.36 < δ < 1 there is holdout
and ∂ES(δ)
∂δ
< 0. 
Proof of Observation 8 : Suppose λ = 3, rI = v = 1, α = 1/5 and δ = 8/10. If
there is holdout, as assumed, then the following two conditions must be satisfied.
The first condition comes from the requirement that α < α¯ yielding
∆1,2(γ) := γ(3− γ)− 39
20
< 0,
while the second condition comes from the fact that δ > δ˜, yielding
∆2,2(γ) :=
√
10
50(γ − 1) −
√
10
50
+
19
25
> 0.
Note that for given 0 < γ < 1, the first condition ∆1,2(γ) < 0 is satisfied if and
only if 0 < γ < 0.95 and the second condition ∆2,2(γ) > 0 is satisfied if and only
if 0 < γ < 0.91. Thus in this example ∆2,2(γ) < 0 is the binding constraint and
buyer-induced holdout takes place for any γ such that 0 < γ < 0.91.
Now ∂ES(γ)
∂γ
> 0 if and only if
∆3,2(γ) :=
√
2(γ(3
√
5−√2)− 2√5 +√2)
160(γ − 1)3 > 0.
For given 0 < γ < 1 I get ∆3,2(γ) > 0 whenever
√
2(γ(3
√
5−√2)−2√5+√2) < 0.
But this holds if and only if γ is significantly low such that 0 < γ < 0.06. Thus in
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an economy when there is holdout and 0 < γ < 0.06 I get ∂ES(δ)
∂δ
> 0. 
Proofs of Observation 9 and Observation 10 : Suppose there is buyer-induced
holdout in local land acquisition and given equation (24) I ask whether WN(k, q, qb)
decreases with the rise in extortionary activity in the institutions so that there is a
rise in corruption (i.e., with the rise in rI). To see this I differentiate the non-local
welfare function with respect to rI to obtain
∂WN
∂rI
=
α(1− 2φ)(δ − 1)((1− γ)(λ− rI − v)− γ)
√
2δ(λ−rI−v)
α(1−δ)
8δ(rI + v − λ)2(γ − 1) .
I consider a scenario when marginal productivity of the industrial project is
sufficiently small or the local unit of party F is sufficiently ideological such that
λ − rI − v < γ1−γ . Thus the term (1 − γ)(λ − rI − v) − γ < 0. Then for given
γ < 1 and δ < 1 I have ∂WN
∂rI
> 0 if and only if 1− 2φ < 0 that gives φ > 1
2
. This
proves the first part of observation 9. Otherwise for given λ− rI − v < γ1−γ I get
∂WN
∂rI
< 0 if and only if 1 − 2φ > 0 that gives φ < 1
2
. This proves the second part
of observation 9. Observation 10 is then immediate. 
Proof of Observation 11 : Differentiation of the non-local welfare function in equa-
tion (9) with respect to φ gives
∂WN
∂φ
=
√
2((1− γ)(λ− rI − v) + γ)
2(1− γ)
√
δ(λ−v−rI)
α(1−δ)
− 1.
Given δ < 1, γ < 1 and the assumption of λ > rI + v I have
∂WN
∂φ
> 0 if and
only if γ
1−γ + (λ − rI − v) >
√
2δ(λ−v−rI)
α(1−δ) . Note that there exists some 0 < δ
′ < 1
such that if δ < δ′ then the above condition holds true and ∂WN
∂φ
> 0. Otherwise if
δ > δ′ such that γ
1−γ + (λ− rI − v) <
√
2δ(λ−v−rI)
α(1−δ) then it yields
∂WN
∂φ
< 0. 
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Proof of Observation 12 : Differentiation of the non-local welfare function in equa-
tion (9) with respect to γ gives
∂WN
∂γ
=
√
2(2φ− 1)
4(γ − 1)2
√
δ(λ−v−rI)
α(1−δ)
.
Note that given the assumption of λ− v − rI > 0 we have ∂WN∂γ > 0 if and only if
2φ− 1 > 0 or φ > 1
2
. Otherwise if φ < 1
2
then we have ∂WN
∂γ
< 0.
Proof of Observation 13 : Differentiation of the non-local welfare function in equa-
tion (9) with respect to δ gives
∂WN
∂δ
=
α(1− 2φ)((1− γ)(λ− rI − v) + γ)
√
2δ(λ−rI−v)
α(1−δ)
8δ2(rI + v − λ)(γ − 1) .
Note that given γ < 1, δ < 1 and the assumption of λ > v + rI we have
∂WN
∂δ
> 0
if and only if 1− 2φ > 0 or φ < 1
2
. Otherwise if φ > 1
2
we have ∂WN
∂δ
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 5 : To see the impact of a rise in rI on the total welfare I
differentiate the total welfare function in equation to obtain
∂WT
∂rI
=
 α(1− δ)
√
2δ(λ−v−rI)
α(1−δ)
16δ(rI + v − λ)2(γ − 1)
((1− η)(1− γ)(3(λ2 + v2 + r2I ) + 6vrI − 6λ(rI + v))
−γ(1 + rI + v)− η(λ− v − rI + λ(1− γ)(1− 4φ))− 2ηγ(2φ− 1) .
Note that for γ < 1, δ < 1 we have ∂WT
∂rI
> 0 if and only if
(1−η)(1−γ)(3(λ2+v2+r2I )+6vrI−6λ(rI+v)) < γ(1+rI+v)+η(λ−v−rI+λ(1−γ)(1−4φ))
+2ηγ(2φ− 1).
Note that the term on the LHS of the above condition 3(λ2 + v2 + r2I ) + 6vrI −
219
6λ(r + v) > 0 given the assumption of λ − v − rI > 0. Moreover The LHS is
decreasing in η and γ. Suppose φ > 1
2
. Then there exist some 0 < γˆ < 1 such that
for any γ > γˆ the RHS γ(1+rI+v)+η(λ−v−rI+λ(1−γ)(1−4φ))+2ηγ(2φ−1) > 0.
Also note that for φ > 1
2
the RHS is rising in both η and γ. Hence there exist
some 0 < η′ < 1 such that ∂WT
∂rI
> 0 if and only if η > η′. Otherwise for φ > 1
2
if
γ < γˆ we have ∂WT
∂rI
< 0. 
Proof of Proposition 6 : Following Proposition 5 we have ∂WT
∂rI
> 0 if and only if
(1−η)(1−γ)(3(λ2+v2+r2I )+6vrI−6λ(rI+v)) < γ(1+rI+v)+η(λ−v−rI+λ(1−γ)(1−4φ))
+2ηγ(2φ− 1).
From Proposition 5 recall that the LHS of the above condition is falling in both
η and γ. Suppose φ < 1
2
. Given this, the RHS of the above condition is rising
in γ if and only if η < η′ for any 0 < η′ < 1. Hence there exist some 0 < γˆ < 1
such that I have ∂WT
∂rI
> 0 if and only if γ > γˆ. Otherwise if γ < γˆ then we have
∂WT
∂rI
< 0. This proves the first part of Proposition 6.
Similarly if λ−v−rI > γ1−γ then ∂WT∂rI > 0 if and only if 1√α(1−δ) <
(
η
1−η
) (
1−2φ
λ−v
)
.
This holds for given φ < 1
2
whenever η > ηˆ. Otherwise if η < ηˆ and λ−v−rI > γ1−γ
we have ∂WT
∂rI
< 0. 
Proof of Proposition 7 : We know from Corollary 5 that ∂WL
∂γ
is unambiguously
positive and from Observation 12 that ∂WN
∂γ
is positive if and only if φ > 1
2
. Hence
we get ∂WT
∂γ
> 0 whenever φ > 1
2
. We also know from Corollary 5 that ∂WL
∂δ
is
unambiguously negative and from Observation 13 that ∂WN
∂δ
is negative if and only
if φ > 1
2
. Hence we get ∂WT
∂δ
< 0 whenever φ > 1
2
. This proves the first part of
Proposition 7.
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The derivative of the total welfare function with respect to γ gives
∂WT
∂γ
=
√
2((1− η)(λ− v − rI) + 2η(2φ− 1))
8(γ − 1)2
√
δ(λ−v−r)
α(1−δ)
Given that λ > v+rI I have
∂WT
∂γ
> 0 if and only if (1−η)(λ−v−rI)+2η(2φ−1) > 0
that gives (1−η)(λ−v−rI)
η
> 2(1− 2φ). Suppose φ < 1
2
that gives 1− 2φ > 0. Given
this I have ∂WT
∂γ
> 0 if and only if η is sufficiently small such that η < ηˆ (where
0 < ηˆ < 1). Otherwise if η > ηˆ then for φ < 1
2
I have ∂WT
∂γ
< 0.
The derivative of the total welfare function with respect to δ gives
∂WT
∂δ
=
√
2α((1− γ)(λ− v − rI) + γ)((1− η)(λ− v − rI) + 2η(2φ− 1))
√
δ(λ−v−rI)
α(1−δ)
16δ2(1− γ)(rI + v − λ) .
Given that γ < 1, δ < 1 and λ > v + rI we have
∂WT
∂δ
> 0 if and only if
(1− η)(λ− v − rI) + 2η(2φ− 1) < 0 that gives (1−η)(λ−v−rI)η < 2(1− 2η). Suppose
φ < 1
2
so that 1−2η > 0. Given this we have ∂WT
∂δ
> 0 if and only if η is sufficiently
large such that η > ηˆ (where 0 < ηˆ < 1). Otherwise if η < ηˆ we have ∂WT
∂δ
< 0.
This completes the proof of Proposition 7. 
0.19.3 Proofs of Results from Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 8 : The proposition considers significantly low degree of demo-
cratic imperfections such that RO(k˜) < c. Given Facts 1 and 2 I know that RO(·)
is maximised at k˜ = n
2
and RO(k˜) = RP(k˜) = n2 . Recall that RP(·) is maximum
for k = n and I reasonably assume that c < 2n where RP(n) = 2n. Given the
properties of political rent functions for relatively small k such that 0 ≤ k < n
2
I get
RP(k) < RO(k). Since RO(k˜) < c this essentially implies that RP(k) < RO(k) < c
for any k < n
2
. Following the definitions of the subsets of the industrial mem-
bership sizes all such k ∈ {K−−}. For relatively large k such that k ≥ n
2
I get
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RO(k) ≤ RP(k). Given that RO(k˜) = RP(k˜) < c there exist a n2 ≤ k> ≤ n
such that I have RO(k) < c < RP(k) whenever k > k>. Following the defi-
nitions of the subsets of the industrial membership sizes all such k ∈ {K++}.
Otherwise for any k < k> I have RO(k) ≤ RP(k) < c and all such k ∈ {K−−}.
Hence the sequence in which the subsets appear on the equilibrium path is such
that 0, 1, . . . , n = {K−−, K++}. Note that none of these subsets are empty here
since 0, 1, . . . n
2
∈ {K−−} and n ∈ {K++}. Moreover, following the definition of
these subsets, there is no violence on the equilibrium path of the conflict sub-
game. Considering these subsets to be non-trivially non-empty, the sequence of
P ’s membership sizes can be expanded as:
{0, 1, . . . , k¯−−}, {k++, . . . , k¯++},
where |K−−| > 1 and |K++| ≥ 1.
Suppose there exists a k′ such that 0 ≤ k′ ≤ k¯−−. Since for such a membership
size no party indulges in violence, a landowner who supports P receives p from
selling his plot of land and who supports O receives v from retaining his plot.
Given v = 0 I have k′ as an equilibrium if and only if no landowner has an
incentive to deviate from their respective membership. Hence for each of k′ member
landowners in P it must be true that p > 0 and for each of n − k′ members in
O it must be true that 0 > p. Not only that the conditions are contradictory
to each other, it is also that the former is ensured by the assumption of p > v
while the latter is violating the same. Hence, it is always individually rational
for any member in party O to deviate and join P . As the condition holds for
any 0 ≤ k′ < k¯−−, the industrial membership continues to rise unless it reaches
k¯−−. Since the current subset is then followed by {K++}, if any one from O
further deviates then P ’s membership increases to k++. Since no party indulges
in violence for a membership size that falls in subset {K++}, we never have k′
as an SPE. Suppose there exists a k′′ such that k++ ≤ k′′ ≤ k¯++. For any such
membership sizes the payoffs for both party members remain unaltered irrespective
of the size of subset {K++}. Hence members in O will continue to deviate to join
the industrial party unless k reaches k¯++−1 where all members but one has joined
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P . Given p > 0 it is rational for the remaining landowner to join party P as well.
Hence k rises to k¯++ = n. As the reverse deviation is never possible here the
unique Nash Equilibrium is k∗ = n ∈ {K−− ∪K++} where all villagers eventually
join party P and the probability of full industrialisation is 1. This completes the
proof for proposition 8 and the condition on c provides a sharp lower bound on
this institutional strength in order to make democratic imperfections outcome-
equivalent to perfect democracy. 
Proof of Proposition 9 : The proposition considers significantly high degree of
democratic imperfections such that c < RO(kˆ). This essentially implies that c < n2
where kˆ = k˜ = n
2
(From Facts 1 and 2). From the technical characteristics of
pi(·) and b(·) we know that for any industrial membership size such that k < n
2
we
have RP(k) < RO(k). For given 0 < c < RO(n2 ) and sufficiently large N , there
exists some 0 < k≤ < n
2
such that for any k < k≤ we get RP(k) < RO(k) < c.
Following the categorisation of industrial membership sizes any such k belong to
the subset {K−−}. Since both of the political rent functions are increasing in
k and RP(k) is convex while RO(k) is concave with respect to k there are some
relatively large k such that k≤ < k < n
2
for which we have two possible cases:
if RP(k) < c < RO(k) then all such k belong to the subset {K−}, and/or if
c < RP(k) < RO(k) then all such k belong to the subset {K+}. Now for given pi(·)
and b(·) we have RO(k) < RP(k) for any k > n2 . Hence for given c < RP(n2 ) there
exists some n
2
< k≥ ≤ n such that we get RO(n) < c < RP(n) if and only if k > k≥.
Following the definitions of the subsets all such k belong to the subset {K++}.
Otherwise if k < k≥ then we get c < RO(n) < RP(n) and all such k belong to
{K+}. Hence these subsets appear sequentially on the equilibrium path such that
0, 1, . . . , n = {K−−, K−, K+, K++}. Note that subsets {K−−}, {K+} and {K++}
are non-empty since 0, 1 ∈ {K−−}, n
2
∈ {K+} and n ∈ {K++}. Considering
all these subsets to be non-trivially non-empty, the sizes of membership on the
equilibrium path can be expanded as:
{0, 1, . . . , k¯−−}, {k−, . . . , k¯−}, {k+, . . . , k¯+}, {k++, . . . , k¯++}.
• Suppose {K−} is non-empty. Following the analysis of proposition 8, there
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is no other possible equilibria in this subset unless P ’s membership reaches
k¯−− as it is always individually profitable for any members in O to deviate
and join the industrial party as p > 0 while the reverse deviation is never
plausible. Once k reaches k¯−− any single deviation from O will increase
the size of industrial membership to the lower bound of the following subset
{K−} as k¯−− + 1 = k−. Recall for any membership size that belongs to
{K−}, the cost of violence is such that P never retaliates with F even when
O initiates it. Since any uncontested violence wins for any k ∈ {K−} the
violent opposition puts an end to the proposed project. Thus if k reaches
k− then a member in P receives a net payoff of −d while deviation to O
gives him 0. Hence none of n− k¯−− members in O chooses to deviate from
his membership. Thus we get a SPE where the process of land acquisition
is peaceful where relatively less number of plots are sold for the project,
in particular k∗ = k¯−−. This equilibrium remains unaltered whenever K−
is non-empty and irrespective of the size of K−−. Note that there is no
equilibrium size of k that belongs to {K−} as for any arbitrary k′ ∈ {K−}
such that k− ≤ k′ ≤ k¯− an industrial party member will receive a payoff of
−d while joining party O will get him 0. Since 0¿-d for any such k′ ∈ {K−}
it is always plausible for any member in P to deviate to join O and k∗ =
k¯−− ∈ {{K−−} ∪ {K−}}.
• Suppose {K−} is empty. If any one from O now choose to deviate then k
increases to k+ ∈ {K+} as now k¯−− + 1 = k+. For k¯−− to remain a SPE it
must be true that none of the k¯−− members in P has an inventive to deviate
from the industrial party and none of the n − k¯−− members in O has an
incentive to deviate from the opposition party membership. Since p > 0 a
deviation for a member in P is never plausible here. Recall that for any
size of industrial membership that belongs to subset {K+} both the parties
choose to play F . Hence for k¯−− to remain a SPE it must simultaneously
be true that for each member in O the expected payoff from violence is less
than the payoff he receives from retaining his plot of land, i.e.,
0 > pi(k+)p+ (1− pi(k+))(−d).
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This gives
d >
k+p
n− k+ .
Hence for given p > 0 the SPE is achieved with k∗ = k¯−− ∈ {{K−−}∪{K−}}
if and only if d crosses its upper limit denoted by d¯, such that d¯ > k
+p
n−k+
122.
Consider |K+| ≥ 1. Suppose there exists a k+ ∈ {K+} such that k+ ≤ k+ ≤
k¯+. Following the above analysis for k+ to be an equilibrium it must be true that
pi(k+)p + (1 − pi(k+))(−d) > 0 which implies d < k+p
n−k+ so that no member from
P has an incentive to deviate from industrial membership (irrespective of whether
{K−} is empty or not). This essentially puts a sharp lower bound on the unit
price of land, p, such that
p >
(n− k+)d
k+
.
But it must also be true that none of the n − k+ members in O has incentive to
deviate from opposition membership and for that it must be true that
(1− pi(k+))0 + pi(k+)(−d) > pi(k+ + 1)p+ (1− pi(k+ + 1))(−d).
This provides a sharp upper bound on the price per plot of land, p, such that
p <
(n− (2k+ + 1))d
(k + 1)
.
Given p > 0 the above condition is non-empty if and only if n > 2k++1. Otherwise
k+ is not a SPE. So let n > 2k+ +1. Then for k+ to be a SPE it must be true that
n−k+
k+
< n−(2k
++1)
(k+1)
. But this is never true for given k+ < n. Hence k+ is not a SPE.
I am now to check whether there is any other SPE in the subset {K+}. To see
this suppose k+ be an arbitrary membership size for P such that k+ < k+ < k¯+.
Following the above analysis for k+ to be an equilibrium it must be true that the
expected payoff of any k+ industrial party member outweighs his expected payoff
122Note that if d¯ ≤ k+p
n−k+ then it is always individually profitable for a member in O to deviate
from its membership and then k rises to k+. Obviously in that case k¯−− is no longer a SPE even
if p > 0 holds true.
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from being in the opposition party and the expected payoff of any n−k+ opposition
party member outweighs his expected payoff from being in the industrial party.
Hence for an individual member in P it must be true that
pi(k+)p+ (1− pi(k+))(−d) > (1− pi(k+ − 1))0 + pi(k+ − 1)(−d), (39)
that gives p > d(n+1−2k
+)
k+
and for an individual member in O it must be true that
(1− pi(k+))0 + pi(k+)(−d) > pi(k+ + 1)p+ (1− pi(k+ + 1))(−d), (40)
that gives p < d(n−1−2k
+)
k++1
. Note that for given p > 0 an individual member in O
always deviates to join P whenever n < 1 + 2k+ and then k+ is never a SPE. So
let n > 1 + 2k+. Thus for conditions 39 and 40 to hold together we must have
n+ 1− 2k+
k+
<
n− 1− 2k+
k+ + 1
.
But this condition is never true. Hence k+ is never an equilibrium of the voting
sub-game since this holds in general for any industrial membership size such that
k+ < k+ < k¯+.
Suppose condition 39 holds. Then the size of industrial membership continues
to rise unless it reaches k¯+ and if any individual member in O now deviates then
P ’s membership size increase to the lower bound of the following subset {K++}
since k¯+ + 1 = k++. Proceeding through the same analysis k¯+ is an equilibrium
if and only if for any of the k¯+ members in P it is not individually profitable to
deviate from industrial membership. The condition for an individual member in
P is just identical with the one mentioned above if k+ is replaced by k¯+. This
gives a sharp lower limit on the proposed price per plot of land such that
p >
d(n+ 1− 2k¯+)
k¯+
.
But for k¯+ to be a SPE it must also be true that none of the n − k¯+ opposition
party members has an incentive to deviate and join P . Following the definition of
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{K++} it must then be true that
(1− pi(k¯+))0 + pi(k¯+)(−d) > p.
But this can never be true as p > 0. Hence there is no SPE size of membership in
the subset {K+}.123
Suppose |K++| > 1. Following the above analysis the lower bound of this sub-
set is never a Nash equilibrium of the voting sub-game as for any of the n− k++
members in O it is always individually rational to deviate to get industrial mem-
bership given p > 0. Following the proof for proposition 8 there is no other
possible equilibrium in this subset unless the industrial membership size reaches
k¯++. Given p > 0 it is always individually rational for any member landowner to
remain in P and all member landowner in O to deviate to the industrial party.
Hence equilibrium in the voting sub-game is achieved when k = k¯++. Note that
k¯++ = n and hence the SPE is k∗ = n124. This completes the proof for Proposi-
tion 9. 
Proof of Proposition 10 : Proposition 10 considers a scenario that is similar to
the one considered in Proposition 8. Recall that when parties cannot indulge in
early mobilisation of resources then following Proposition 8 there is no violence on
the equilibrium path if c > RO(kˆ) = RP(kˆ) and the unique SPE is achieved when
k∗ = n. Since in this case both the parties choose to accommodate with each other
there is no violence on the equilibrium path and the project gets implemented
peacefully in the locality. Hence from Section 0.12.5 the welfare of party O is
−b(n) = −n if it does not undertake an early mobilisation of resources.
Now I compare the above welfare of the opposition party with its welfare achiev-
able in case it undertakes early mobilisation of resources. Recall from Fact 4 that
P (k¯) < RP(kˆ). Since I have RP(kˆ) = n2 from Fact 1, the condition c > RP(kˆ) nec-
123Note that if n > 1+2k+ such that condition 40 holds then the size of industrial membership
continues to fall unless it reaches k¯−− which is an SPE. Hence there is no equilibrium in {K+}
irrespective of whether {K−} is empty or not.
124this equilibrium persists irrespective of the size of subset {K++}
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essarily implies that P (k¯) < n
2
< c. Also recall that from Fact 3 I have P (k¯) = O(k¯)
where k¯ > n
2
. Hence for given the concavity of O(·) function and the convexity of
P (·) function for any kF such that kF < k¯ we must have P (kF) < O(kF). Given
that c is sufficiently high, then we have P (kF) < P (k¯) < c and thus for such
anticipated membership strength P does not afford violence. Hence it is rational
for P to not retaliate with F even if O chooses to initiate it. For this to be true
it must be that for party P we have
c > b(kF)(2pi(kF)− 1)
and for party O we have
c < b(n) + b(0).
For these two to hold simultaneously it must be that b(kF)(2pi(kF)−1) < c < b(n).
This is true whenever c < O(k). Thus when the opposition anticipates that kF < k¯
such that P (kF) < P (k¯) < c < O(kF) < n (it is reasonable to assume that c does
not exceed the minmax{P (·), O(·)} = n) then it is optimal for party O to initiate
violence to which P does not retaliate. Hence in the equilibrium of the conflict sub-
game the uncontested violence stops the project from taking place in the locality.
As mentioned in section 0.12.4 it is then individually rational for any member in
P to deviate to support party O as by doing so he can save the cost d of being
in the losing party. Hence in the SPE all the landowners unanimously join party
O and k∗ = 0. Hence the welfare of party O from being able to undertake early
mobilisation of resources is b(0) − c = −c. Since c < n for given a choice it is
always optimal for the opposition to undertake early mobilisation of resources.
This completes the proof for Proposition 10. 
Proof of Proposition 11 : The condition on c here is identical to that considered
in Proposition 10 but now the anticipated membership size of party P in violence
is such that kF ≥ k¯. Following the proof of Proposition 10 if parties cannot
undertake early mobilisation of resources then for sufficiently high c such that
c > RP(kˆ) there is no violence on the equilibrium path and the unique SPE is
achieved when k∗ = n and the project is implemented peacefully. As mentioned
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earlier that the welfare of party O in this case is −b(n) = −n if it does not
undertake early mobilisation of resources.
Suppose the parties now undertake early mobilisation of resources. From Fact
4 here also we have P (k¯) < n
2
< c for given c > RP(kˆ) = n2 and given the technical
characteristics of P (·) for any anticipated kF such that k¯ ≤ kF we have P (k¯) ≤
P (kF). Given this there exists a k¯ ≤ k′F ≤ n such that we have P (k¯) < c < P (kF)
if and only if P ’s anticipated membership strength is significantly high such that
kF > k′F . Otherwise if kF < k
′
F we have P (k¯) < P (kF) < c.
First consider the case when P (k¯) < P (kF) < c. Given this it is optimal for P
to not indulge in political violence even whenO chooses to initiate it. Following the
proof of Proposition 10 for O to initiate violence when P does not retaliate with
F it must be that b(kF)(2pi(kF)− 1) < c < b(n). Since it is reasonable to assume
that c < n, the above holds true for k¯ ≤ kF < k′F . Given this it is optimal for the
opposition to initiate violence as in that case all the landowners will unanimously
join the winning party O and as the opposition party’s welfare is then −c > −n,
given a choice party O always prefers to undertake early mobilisation of resources
(This follows from the proof of Proposition 10). This proves the first part of
Proposition 11.
I now consider the case when P (k¯) < c < P (kF). Given this party P can
choose to retaliate with F when O initiate violence. Note that for O to initiate
political violence it must be that
c < b(kF)(1− 2pi(kF)) + b(n) (41)
and for P to retaliate with F it must then be that
c < b(kF)(2pi(kF)− 1). (42)
Note that from Fact 3 we have k¯ > n
2
that essentially implies that 1− 2pi(kF) < 0
for sufficiently large kF such that kF > k¯. Hence given c > n2 for condition 41 to
hold it must be true that c > b(kF)(2pi(kF) − 1). But this contradicts condition
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42. Thus for given c > n
2
and sufficiently large kF it is rational for party O to not
initiate political violence since for such kF party P chooses to retaliate with F .
Thus it is rational for the opposition to accommodate with party P . Since there
is no forced sale in our model party P never chooses F in the conflict sub-game.
Note that for both parties to accommodate simultaneously it must be true that
2b(kF)(1 − 2pi(kF)) < −b(n). This condition holds only if pi(kF) > 12 which is
true for significantly high membership strength for party P . Hence equilibrium
of the conflict sub-game is achieved when both parties choose A and in the SPE
k∗ = n. Hence party O’s welfare gain is −n. Hence given a choice party O is
indifferent between undertaking late and early mobilisation of resources for post-
voting violence. This proves the second statement of proposition 11. 
Proof of Proposition 12 : This proposition considers a situation where democratic
imperfections are sufficiently large such that c < P (k¯). This essentially implies
that c < RP(kˆ) = n2 (From Facts 1 and 4). If the political parties cannot undertake
early mobilisation of resources then this scenario follows the analysis of Proposition
9 that shows that if c < RP(kˆ) = RP(k˜) then in every SPE there is no violence
and the project is implemented peacefully. Considering the subsets of industrial
memberships to be non-trivially non-empty this leads to two possible equilibria,
one is a low level equilibrium with k∗ = k¯−− and the other with k∗ = n. Hence if
parties cannot undertake early mobilisation of resources then party O’s welfare is
−b(k¯−−) for k∗ = k¯−− and is −b(n) for k∗ = n.
Suppose the parties now undertake early mobilisation of resources. We know
that for given Fact 3 and the technical characteristics of P (·) and O(·) we have
P (k) < O(k) for any k < k¯. Hence for given c < P (k¯) = O(k¯) there exist
some n
2
< kP < k¯ such that P (k) < c < P (k¯) < O(k) if and only if k < kP .
Otherwise if k > kP then we have c < P (k) < P (k¯) < O(k). But we have
O(k) < P (k) for any k > k¯. Hence for given c < P (k¯) = O(k¯) there exist
some k¯ < kO < n such that O(k) < c < P (k¯) < P (k) if and only if k > kO.
Otherwise if k < kO then we have c < O(k) < P (k¯) < P (k). Given c > 0 this
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essentially implies that n
2
< kP < k¯ < kO < n
125. Recall from Section 0.12.5 that
on the equilibrium path of the conflict sub-game violence is possible if and only
if c < min{O(·), P (·)}. Hence for violence to exist as an equilibrium there must
be some anticipated industrial membership size k”F such that kP ≤ k”F ≤ kO
for which both the parties optimally choose F . Following sub-section 0.12.5 if
there is political violence then the equilibrium size of industrial membership is
k∗ = kF =
d(1+n)
p+2d
. Hence for both parties to indulge in violence it must be that
kP ≤ kF ≤ kO. This essentially implies that n2 < kF < n which always holds for
any non negative n. Hence for anticipated industrial membership kF ∈ {kP , kO}
it is always rational for party P to retaliate with F whenever O initiates it where
pi(kF) > 12 . Note that the expected welfare gain of party O from violence is
(1 − pi(kF))b(kF) − pi(kF)b(kF) − c = O(k) − (n + c) which is falling for any
anticipated k > n
4
. Hence if party O chooses to initiate violence then its expected
welfare is maximised at kP and that is −2c. Otherwise if it chooses to play A then
in absence of any forced sale in our model there is no violence on the equilibrium
path and k∗ = n for which O receives −n. Hence O chooses to play F if any only
if −2c > −n and for given c < n
2
it is always optimal for O to initiate violence.
Hence violence exists as a SPE where k∗ = d(1+n)
p+2d
.
If parties do not undertake early mobilisation of resources then party O’s wel-
fare achievable here is −n
2
+
√
n2−2cn
2
for k∗ = k¯−− = dK−−e and is −n for k∗ = n.
While the maximum welfare achievable by O when it cannot undertake early mo-
bilisation of resources for post-voting violence is −n
2
+
√
n2−2cn
2
(since k¯−− < n),
given a choice it always prefers to undertake early mobilisation of resources even
when −n
2
+
√
n2−2cn
2
> −2c holds true (for c < 3n
8
). This is because by history if
there exists a scenario where violence is affordable for the opposition (to initiate
with F ) then on the equilibrium path O never chooses to play A. This completes
the proof for Proposition 12. 
Proof of Corollary 8 : From Proposition 12 we know that c < P (k¯) essentially
implies that c < n
2
and also that if the political parties cannot undertake early
125Note that P (·) > 0 for any anticipated industrial membership strength that exceeds n2 .
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mobilisation of resources then in every SPE there is no violence and the project
is implemented peacefully for given c < n
2
. Considering the subsets of industrial
membership to be non-trivially non-empty this fetches two SPE, one with k∗ = k¯−−
and the other with k∗ = n. Since k¯−− < n the maximum welfare achievable by
party O if it cannot undertake early mobilisation of resources is −n
2
+
√
n2−2cn
2
.
Consider now that the parties can undertake early mobilisation of resources for
post-voting violence. As shown in the proof of proposition 12 if c < P (k¯) and kP ≤
kF ≤ kO then in the SPE both parties optimally chooses violence and k∗ = d(1+n)p+2d .
Suppose in presence of violence the anticipated size of industrial membership is
such that kF < kP . Following the proof of Proposition 12 this essentially implies
that for any such kF we have P (kF) < c < O(kF) < n. Therefore, owing to P ’s
sufficiently small probability to win in violence it is optimal for the industrial party
to not retaliate with F as its political rent then cannot cover the cost from violence.
But for such membership strength O can initiate violence as it is affordable for the
party to do so. Thus in the equilibrium of the conflict sub-game violent opposition
stops the project from taking place in the locality and following Section 0.12.5 in
equilibrium of the voting sub-game all the landowners unanimously join party O
as retaining their plot of land then give them a higher individual payoff of 0 than to
support the losing party to get −d. Hence in the SPE violent opposition stops the
project from taking place with k∗ = 0. The welfare of the opposition party is thus
−c if it can undertake early mobilisation of resources. Note that for given a choice
between early and late mobilisation of resources party O prefers to undertake early
mobilisation of resources as otherwise O’s welfare is always −n < −c for k∗ = n
(if it undertakes late mobilisation of resources). However the presence of multiple
equilibria suggests that O’s welfare is −n
2
+
√
n2−2cn
2
> −c for k∗ = k¯−− but in
that case the project is implemented in the locality. Since by undertaking early
mobilisation of resources, in equilibrium the party can always stop the project from
taking place in the locality it prefers to undertake early mobilisation of resources.
This proves the first statement of the corollary.
Suppose in presence of violence the anticipated size of industrial membership
is such that kF > kO. Following Proposition 12 this essentially implies that for
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any such kF we have O(kF) < c < P (kF). Hence party P can now afford to
retaliate with F if the opposition initiates violence. But such significantly high kF
decreases party O’s probability to win in violence (if it initiates violence) such that
its political rent cannot suffice for its cost from violence. Hence it is optimal for
party O to not initiate political violence. In absence of any forced sale in our model
then there is no violence on the equilibrium path of the conflict sub-game. From
Section 0.12.5 we know that in absence of violence all the landowners unanimously
join P to receive a higher individual payoff of p than to receive 0 by joining the
losing party. Hence in the SPE both parties choose to play A and the project is
implemented with k∗ = n and following proposition 12 party O’s welfare is −n.
Note that when O does not undertake early mobilisation of resources, then its
maximum welfare achievable is −n
2
+
√
n2−2cn
2
> −n. Hence given a choice party
O prefers late mobilisation of resources to get the chance of reducing the size of
industrialisation in the locality. This completes the proof for Corollary 8. 
Proof of Corollary 9 : The condition on the degree of democratic imperfections here
follows from Proposition 9. Hence following the proof of proposition 9 here also I
have c < n
2
and if the parties cannot undertake early mobilisation of resources then
the maximum welfare achievable by party O is −n
2
+
√
n2−2cn
2
when k∗ = dK−−e
(considering all the subsets of k to be non-trivially non-empty).
Consider now that the parties can undertake early mobilisation of resources
and suppose that in presence of political violence the anticipated size of indus-
trial membership is such that kF < k¯. Then I have P (kF) < P (k¯) since P (·) is
increasing k and this essentially implies that P (kF) < P (k¯) < c < n2 . Thus for
such low kF party P never chooses to retaliate with F even if O chooses to indulge
in political violence, owing to P ’s sufficiently low probability to win in violence.
Following the proof of Proposition 12 for given the concavity of O(·) we then get
P (kF) < P (k¯) < c < O(kF) as the membership strength of party O is sufficiently
high now. Hence optimally party O chooses to initiate violence for which in equi-
librium of the voting sub-game we get k∗ = 0 (follows from Section 0.12.5). Thus
the welfare gain for party O is −c. Following proof of the first part of Corollary 8,
233
if given a choice party O prefers to undertake early mobilisation of resources since
by early mobilisation it can stop the project from taking place. This proves the
first part of Corollary 9.
Suppose parties undertake early mobilisation of resources and anticipate that
in presence of violence kF > k¯ so that P (kF) > P (k¯). Following the proof of
Proposition 11 then there exists a k¯ ≤ k′F ≤ n such that we have P (k¯) <
c < P (kF) if and only if P ’s anticipated membership strength is significantly
high such that kF > k′F . As for such significantly high membership strength P
optimally chooses to play F if O initiates it then party O optimally chooses to
accommodate with P owing to P ’s significantly high probability to win in violence.
Thus in equilibrium both the parties then optimally choose to accommodate to
implement the project and since k∗ = n here the welfare of party O is −n if it
undertakes early mobilisation of resources. Note that since in presence of multiple
equilibria the maximum welfare achievable byO from late mobilisation of resources
is −n
2
+
√
n2−2cn
2
> −n, given a choice party O prefers late mobilisation of resources
to get the chance of reducing the size of industrialisation in the locality. Otherwise
if kF < k′F we have P (k¯) < P (kF) < c for which P optimally chooses to refrain
from violence, O initiates it and in equilibrium violent opposition stops the project
from taking place in the locality and then the result is identical with the first part.
This completes the proof for Corollary 9. 
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Table 1: The status of land acquisition as per Sanjoy Chakrabroty’s book and as updated land acquisition status for erstwhile ‘Contested’ cases. 
States Location (Participant(s); Project)
Year (as per 
Sanjoy 
Chakraborty’
s book)
Land acquisition 
status (as per 
Sanjay 
Chakraborty’s 
book)
Year (updated 
by authors)
Land acquisition 
status (updated 
by authors; 
previously 
‘Contested’ status 
has been 
updated)
Land acquisition status narrative 
(updated by authors) Source for updated status by authors
Andhra 
Pradesh
Hyderabad, Quila Mohammed 
Nagar (AP Tourism Development 
Corporation, Golf Course)
2006 Contested 2013 Successful Farmers offered alternative land and an increased compensation
New Socialist Initiative (NSI) on 17.04.2013 - 
http://nsi-delhi.blogspot.com.au/2013/04/ofpublic- purpose-beauty-and-
other.html 
Hyderabad, Ranga Reddy District, 
Gopannapalli village (State 
Government, IT Complex)
2006 Contested 2015 Contested
Land primarily owned by Tribals. The 
purpose of acquisition is not clearly 
stated
http://www.hmda.gov.in/LandBankData/RR_District_Mandal_Lands.pdf
Komarada, Vizianagaram district 
(Private thermal power plant) 2010 Contested 2016 In Process
Ministry of Environment re-instated and 
extended the validity of environmental 
clearance till 2020 to start production 
operations
http://environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/Form-1A/EC/
06122015OBC3I57D13-2009.PDF
Mahbubnagar district, Polepally 
(State Government, SEZ) 2009 Contested 2014 Successful
Acquisition was forceful targeting mostly 
backward classes to avoid strong 
resistance, discriminated compensation 
scheme
Rawat et al., 2011, retrieved from http://
www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/WEB_SDF_India_final_layout.pdf 
Also see https://ejatlas.org/conflict/polepallyspecial-economic-zone-
telangana-india
Rajaiahpet village, 
Vishakhapatnam (Anrak 
Aluminium, Port for aluminium 
plant)
2010 Contested 2010 Successful
Landowners offered only price for land 
but no compensation for displacement 
as homestead land plots have been 
strategically avoided
Oskarsson, P. 2009 Retrieved from http://www.academia.edu/3781587/
Zoning_Andhra_Pradesh_Land_for_SEZs_via_a_land_for_the_poor_pro
gram
Machilipatnam (Railway 
administration, Navayuga 
Engineering Company Ltd; Port)
2010 Contested 2015 Contested More compensation sought http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/andhrapradesh/machilipatnam-port-rs-700-crorerequired-for-land-acquisition/article6876312.ece
Chandigarh Manimajra (UT Government, Technology Park) 2007 Contested 2012 Contested
Initially acquired but the Supreme Court 
quashed the land acquisition as it 
violated the Law
The Tribune, October 12, 2012, retrieved from http://
www.tribuneindia.com/2012/20121012/main2.htm
ChhattisgarhRaigarh (Navin Jindal Group, Power plant) 2008 Successful 2008 Successful
 1
Bastar (Tata Steel, Steel plant) 2011 Contested 2013 Successful
Information asymmetry in terms of legal 
provisions, landowners were not 
consulted
Global research, April, 2013. Retrieved from  
http://www.globalresearch.ca/thebastar-land-grab-the-expropriation-of-
farmers-inindia/5332410
Janjgir-Champa district (NTPC, 
KSK Energy; Thermal power 
plant)
2011 Contested 2016 Successful
Compensation increased from the initial 
offer of Rs 1.2-2.3 lakh per acre to Rs. 
17 lakh per acre, force involved
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/KSK_Mahanadi_Power_Project
Naya Raipur (State Government; 
New Town, Capital) 2008 Contested 2014 In Progress
Landowners are happy with the 
increased compensation and annuity
Economic Times, 2014. Retrieved from http://
articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014 -06-22/news/
50772399_1_new-city-naya-raipurdevelopment-authority-acres
Goa Dabolim (DLF Limited; Real Estate) 2010 Successful 2010 Successful
Navelim (State Government; 
Sewage treatment plant) 2011 Contested 2015 In Progress
Initially acquired but the proposal to 
revert the agricultural land to the 
farmers is in final stage and pending 
cabinet approval.
The Navhind Times, May, 2015. Retrieved from http://
www.navhindtimes.in/salcete-farmers-toget-back-acquired-farmland/
Navelim (NHAI; Highway 
widening) 2010 Contested 2010 In Progress
Landowners willingly gave No objection 
Certificates (NoCs) as the highway 
project was demanded by locals
The Navhind Times, November, 2015. Retrieved form http://
www.navhindtimes.in/navelimjakniband-road-widening-to-start-by-dec-
saysavertano/
Panaji (Central and State 
Governments; New airport) 2010 Contested 2016 Contested
Part of the required land is taken 
forcefully.
http://www.heraldgoa.in/Edit/Editorial/Thepeople-of-Goa-are-paying-more-
than-the-Mopadeveloper-is/98328.html and http://
articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2016-03-15/news/
71543136_1_airport-project-sandipkambli-mopa
Gujarat Mundra (Adani Group; Port and SEZ) 2008 Successful 2008 Successful
Rural, south (Power Grid 
Corporation of India Limited; 
Power lines)
2010 Contested 2010 Contested
The Government issued order for 
acquisition of land under `public 
purpose’ in 21 projects issued during 
2013 and 2014
Gazette Notifications, GoI, 2015. Retrieved form http://
www.governancenow.com/files/GOILAQnotifics-tabulatedsummary-
prelimfindingsdissemdoc-Jul15.pdf
Bhavnagar district, Mahuva 
(Nirma, State Government; 
Cement plant, limestone mining)
2010 Contested 2010 Contested Stalled until the land allotted is proven to be a wasteland
http://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/ngt-orderclears-way-for-nirma-
cement-plant-at-cost-ofwetland-48311 and https://ejatlas.org/conflict/
mahuva-movementagainst-proposed-nirma-cement-plant-india
Haryana Manesar (State Government; Industrial zoning) 2011 Contested 2014 Failure
The State Government decided to look 
for less fertile lands nearby
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chandigarh/State-drops-3664-acre-
Manesar-Bawal-logistichub/articleshow/45622902.cms
 2
Yamunanagar 2009 Contested 2014 Successful Farmers are offered employment http://www.cityairnews.com/content/hooda-givesaway-appointment-letters-dependents-59-landoustees-dcrtpp-yamyna-nagar
Himachal 
Pradesh
Una district (State Government; 
Airport and aircraft SEZ) 2009 Contested 2009 Contested Project likely to be abandoned Tribune, December 2009
Jharkhand Chandil (Moser Baer; Power plant) 2008 Successful 2008 Successful
Potka (Bhusan steel; Steel plant) 2011 Contested 2016 Contested
Project on hold due to lack of 
administrative clearances and land 
acquisition issues
http://www.constructionic.com/HomePage/Projects?
ReturnUrl=%2FProjects%2FOverview%2F114400%3Futm_source%3Dw
orldconstructionnetwork%26utm_medium%3DReferral%26utm_campaign
%3DBPSL%2B%25E2%2580%2593%2BPotka%2BIntegrated%2BSteel
%2BPlant%253A%2BCaptive%2BPower%2BPlant%2B900%2BMW%2B
%25E2%2580%2593%2BJharkhand&utm_source=worldconstructionnetw
ork&utm_medium=Referral&utm_campaign=BPSL%20–
%20Potka%20Integrated%20Steel%20Plant%3A%20Captive%20Power
%20Plant%20900%20MW%20–%20Jharkhand#
Torpa (LN Mittal Group; Steel 
plant) 2008 Failure 2008 Failure
Saraikela (Tata Steel; Steel plant) 2011 Contested 2014 Contested Pending by order from DC for deposition of land valuehttp://jh rkhandindustry.gov.in/MOM1872014.pdf
Purbi Singbhum (PWD and NHAI; 
Highway widening) 2010 Contested 2016 Heading towards success
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1160125/jsp/jharkhand/
story_65674.jsp#.V4my_TfGKrc and http://www.ercindia.org/files/
eiadocuments/eiareports/11.06.2013_EIA_nh6.pdf
Karnataka Bangalore-Mysore corridor (State Government; Highway) 2010 Contested 2014 Successful
Landowners are offered multi-fold 
increases in compensation
http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/bangalore/bmic-project-land-losers-
cancheer/article6725468.ece
Belgum district, Hukkeri taluk 
(Zuari Fertlizers and Chemicals 
Ltd, Karnataka Indutrial Areas 
Development Board; 
Petrochemical plant)
2010 Contested 2014 Contested
Government ordered to change the 
location from Mastihole Village to 
Kanagala Village in Belagavi District, 
land allotment reduced from 100 acre to 
50 acre
Government order No. CI 265 SPI 2014, Bengaluru, Dated: 
10.12.2014,PR. 164, SC. 10. Retrieved from http://www.gazette.kar.nic.in/
30-4-2015/Part-1-(Page-441-464).pdf
Mangalore (ONGC and Karnataka 
Industrial Areas Development 
Board; SEZ)
2009 Contested 2011 Contested 1,997 acres of the required land has been de-notified.
DNA India, July, 2011. Retrieved from http://www.dnaindia.com/
bangalore/reportmangalore-sez-land-goes-posco-land-secure-1565237
 3
Maharashta Lower Penganga valley (State Government; Irrigation) 2009 Contested 2016 Contested
Feasibility of the project has been 
questioned
https://sandrp.wordpress.com/2015/07/15/lowerpenganga-project-two-
decades-after-inceptionthe-struggle-continues/
Mauda, Nagpur (NTPC; Power 
plant) 2010 Contested 2011 Successful
Farmers have been provided with 
enough compensation
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/nagpur/NTPC-plant-powers-
Mouda-farmers-toprosperity/articleshow/10823439.cms
Nagpur (State Government; 
Multimodal International Airport 
Hub at Nagpur)
2008 Contested 2009 In Progress Some parts completed in 2009 http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/logistics/boeing-amazon-explore-investing-inmultimodal-cargo-hub-atnagpur/article6805643.ece
Nanded (Maharashtra Industrial 
Develoment Corporation; 
Industrial Estate)
2011 Contested 2015 Successful Higher compensation provided http://indianexpress.com/article/cities/mumbai/land-acquisition-government-offers-farmersmaximum-compensation/
Pune-Ahmednagar Highway 
(State Government and Videocon; 
IT SEZ)
2009 Contested 2009 Failure Project cancelled due to increased resistance
http://www.hindustantimes.com/mumbai/statescraps-videocon-sez-
project-near-pune/storye0Y8Tz0yxJbQRItTUPghmM.html 
and 
http://epaper.timesofindia.com/Default/Layout/Includes/ETNEW/
ArtWin.asp?
From=Archive&Source=Page&Skin=ETNEW&BaseHref=ETM%2F2010%
2F01%2F01&GZ=T&ViewMode=HTML&EntityId=Ar00301&AppName=1
Jaitapur, Ratnagiri district (State 
Government; Nuclear power 
plant)
2010 Contested 2015 Contested Consistent protests due to livelihood and environmental concerns
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/ratnagirivillagers-fight-on-against-
jaitapur-nuclear-powerproject/story-GQCXJgpYKbOkaZnvbYyJVL.html
Odisha Gopalpur (Tata Steel; Steel plant) 2008 Failure 2008 Failure
Paradip (Essar Group; Steel 
plant) 2011 Successful 2011 Successful
Paradip (Posco; Steel plant) 2011 Contested 2015 Contested Problems with land acquisition by the State government
http://post.jagran.com/odisha-optimistic-to-seeposco-plant-near-
paradip-1437208448 
and 
http://indianexpress.com/article/business/business-others/posco-starts-
pull-out-from-orissa/
Kasaphal (LN Mittal Group; Steel 
plant) 2008 Failure 2008 Failure
Kalinganagar (Tata Steel; Steel 
plant) 2011 Contested 2015 Successful Higher amount of compensation paid
http://www.businessstandard.com/article/companies/tata-steel-tapshot-
metal-from-kalinganagar-project-116031700685_1.html
 4
Rajasthan Barmer (Sajjan Jindal Group; Power plant) 2008 Successful 2008 Successful
Bagru (Mahindra Group; SEZ) 2008 Successful 2008 Successful
Tamil Nadu Irungattukottai (Hyundai Motors; Car plant) 2008 Successful 2008 Successful
Maraimalainagar (Mahindra 
group; SEZ) 2008 Successful 2008 Successful
Tuticorin (Tata Steel; Titanium 
dioxide project) 2008 Failure 2008 Failure
Peelamedu, Chinniapalayam, 
Chennai (Airports Authority of 
India; Airport expansion)
2010 Contested 2012 Successful Higher amount of compensation paid
http://coimbatore.nic.in/transport.html 
and 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coimbatore_International_Airport
Uttar Pradesh
Unnao (UP State Industrial 
Development Corporation; three 
SEZs)
2007 Contested 2015 Successful Peaceful negotiation and higher amount of compensation http://swarajyamag.com/politics/land-acquisitionlearn-from-the-states
Yamuna expressway (State 
Government; Highway) 2010 Contested 2012 Successful
Peaceful negotiation and higher amount 
of compensation
http://swarajyamag.com/politics/land-acquisitionlearn-from-the-states 
and 
http://www.hindustantimes.com/noida/yamunaexpressway-authority-to-
give-possession-of-1-000-plots-in-2009-scheme/
story-6BMj3i5sa6jZr13I5NlySJ.html
West Bengal Salboni (Sajjan Jindal Group; Steel plant) 2008 Successful 2008 Successful
Andal, Burdwan (State 
Government; Airport expansion 
and industrial hub)
2010 Contested 2013 Successful Better compensation offered http://www.telegraphindia.com/1110511/jsp/business/story_13967277.jsp
Burdwan district, Burnpur-
Purushottampur (IISCO; Steel 
plant expansion)
2008 Contested 2015 Successful Better compensation offered
http://www.thestatesman.com/news/bengal/indias-largest-blast-furnace-
plant-opens/62522.html and 
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tpnational/tp-otherstates/pm-to-
open-18000cr-steelplant-today/article7189151.ece
 5
Burdwan district, Panagarh (State 
Government., Matrix Fertilizers 
and Chemicals; Petrochemicals 
plant)
2011 Contested 2012 Successful Higher compensation provided http://duncansfertiliser.blogspot.in/2011/08/matrix-fertilisers-to-commission-its.html
Kolkata, Rajarhat (Infosys 
Technologies Ltd, IT complex) 2010 Contested 2015 Contested
Land acquired but the status of SEZ is 
in limbo.
http://www.dnaindia.com/money/report-infosysexpresses-concern-over-
wb-government-sinaction-over-proposed-centre-2050024 
and 
http://profit.ndtv.com/news/corporates/articleinfosys-wants-bengal-to-give-
sez-status-torajarhat-centre-760659
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